

UNMANAGEABLE OPERA?

**The artistic-economic dichotomy
and its manifestations in
the organisational structures
of five opera organisations**

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

UNMANAGEABLE OPERA?

The artistic-economic dichotomy and its manifestations in the organisational structures of five opera organisations.

The starting point for this research project is the high incidence in recent years of problems in the management of opera houses in Europe, especially those of an economic and managerial nature. This thesis concentrates on analysing these issues and suggests that there are inherent tensions in running an opera organisation which cause these difficulties.

A key concept in the analyses presented in this thesis is the *artistic-economic dichotomy*, which describes the dual aim of arts organisations: artistic aims and economic-organisational aims. In creating an analytical framework for this concept, theories by Jürgen Habermas, Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, and Henrik Kaare Nielsen are applied. The theoretical concepts employed include *civil society*, *state* and *market* as defined by Habermas and *quality as contextual entity* as defined by Nielsen. With the help of these concepts an analytical model is created for analysing the framework in which opera organisations operate.

In the course of the thesis five case-study organisations are analysed with the analytical apparatus created. The organisations analysed are: *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, English National Opera, Finnish National Opera, Glyndebourne Festival Opera and *Opéra national de Paris*. The information presented about the case-study organisations includes a brief organisational history, income and expenditure information, personnel structure and organisational structure. Additionally, programming, pricing and audience information is presented with basic details of the opera houses in which the organisations operate.

The key finding of the research process is that a dual organisational structure often exists in opera organisations: the official organisational structure and an unofficial artistic structure. This dual structure, it is argued in this thesis, is the reason for difficulties in managing an opera organisation.

Based on this finding, a model describing the artistic-economic framework in which opera organisations need to operate is created at the end of the thesis. This model – incorporating the different value assumptions and quality contexts existing in the framework of opera organisations – is the main result of the research process. It can be applied in the analysis of opera organisations and can, it is argued, assist in academic as well as practical discussion about how opera houses could be better managed in the future.

Keywords: Opera, organisational structure, art, economy, quality.

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

The starting point of this research project is the frequency of the problems that have occurred recently in the management of opera organisations around Europe. The best known examples are undoubtedly the *Paris Opéra's* experience with Daniel Barenboim in the late 1980s and Covent Garden's problems in the last few years. The Finnish National Opera witnessed a similar turbulent period in the early 1990s when first the Administrative Director resigned after a series of problems with the General Manager - who subsequently resigned himself due to lack of confidence towards his work.

These difficulties – which appear rather frequently and seem to follow a pattern - could naturally result from the incompetence of opera house managers. However, one cannot help wondering why the greatest opera houses in the world would repeatedly be trusted to incapable leaders. Thus it is argued in this thesis that there are inherent tensions in running an opera organisation, which cause the difficulties in its management structures and finances - the two most frequent and often coinciding problems.

The managerial and financial problems of opera organisations have been extensively discussed in several reports and consultancy papers from the internal organisational point of view over the last few decades. The main UK opera houses, for example, have been analysed at length by outside consultants and government bodies a number of times in the last forty years. These analyses have been carried out with respect to their expenditure, planning and budgeting processes, working practices, possible additional income etc. The last of these reports, the Eyre Review, was published in 1998. In addition to the UK there have recently been similar processes, for example, in Italy (*Behind the Scenes: White Paper on the management of Italy's Opera Houses*) and France (*The Hugues Gall Reports 1993 & 1997*). These reports, however helpful they might have been at their time to the current management of the houses, have not been aimed at creating any general understanding of the inherent managerial and economic difficulties of opera organisations. This is often admitted in the

conclusions of the reports and is also well demonstrated by the recurring need to return to the issues. (See e.g. Auvinen 1996.)

In the light of the above, the aim of the research project described in this thesis has been to take another view of the functioning and structures of opera organisations. Instead of analysing the organisational structures of a single opera organisation 'from the inside' - this has been done frequently enough without any long-standing success - the research aims to explore and map out some of the external forces influencing these structures and to find possible correlations between these forces, the organisational structures and the difficulties mentioned above. This is done from a more abstract theoretical perspective and by analysing five case-study organisations in order to perceive possible patterns and similarities.

2. Preliminary assumptions of the research project

The criteria on which the success of all arts organisations is judged are twofold: artistic criteria and the economic-organisational criteria. Where business organisations, by definition, aim only to increase the wealth of the owners, the often not-for-profit arts organisations need to be successful in fulfilling the artistic aspirations of the organisation whilst also maintaining the economic viability of the institution. This balancing act has often caused problems in opera organisations, both internally and externally. This phenomenon is called the artistic-economic¹ dichotomy in the course of this research project. It is a key concept employed in the course of this thesis.

¹ The complete term could be the artistic - socio-economic-organisational dichotomy. However, for the sake of practicality the term economic will be used in this context, especially when the economic issues often seem to dominate the sociological and organisational issues in the discussion about opera organisations. Further, the source of economic power is used as the basis of the analysis of the influence society has on the case-study organisations. However, in the analytical model the social value systems will be included in the analysis of the economic resources used by them.

Opera is an international art form. This is especially the case today when all the major houses present relatively similar programmes, produced and performed by a core group of international conductors, directors, designers and singers etc. This has inevitably led to a great similarity in the core product and standards of the opera houses. Therefore, the art-form itself dictates to a great extent the resources and the organisational structures needed to produce opera. For example, Verdi's *Aida* requires a fairly specific number of skilled performers, a certain type of performance space, a certain type of sets etc. wherever it is performed in order to comply with the conventions of the art form and international standards. Moreover, the importance of the performers is naturally indisputable for an opera house - the artists being the core group in putting out the organisation's 'product'. Therefore, it is assumed that the artistic process which leads to the 'product' and its influence on the functioning of an opera organisation needs to be investigated in order to create a picture of the forces influencing the organisational structures of opera companies.

Putting on opera in its current form is a costly business. This seems to be a generally accepted fact. However, there are different solutions for acquiring the necessary resources in different socio-economic surroundings. The solutions range from almost complete funding by state and municipal authorities, e.g. the 'German' model, to almost total reliance on private funding, e.g. the 'American' model. There have, however, been financial and managerial problems both in the heavily subsidised organisations as well as in the less subsidised ones. It is assumed in this research project that in order to understand the difficulties and tensions in managing an opera organisation the influence of the socio-economic context in which it exists needs to be included in the analysis.

These basic assumptions lead us to the dual analytical approach to understanding the functioning of opera organisations that is employed in this research project. The analytical apparatus presented in this thesis is aimed at assisting in the analysis of the artistic-economic framework in which opera organisations operate. It is subsequently used in the case-study analyses of five opera organisations and their organisational structures. Based on the combination of the theoretical considerations and the case-studies, a theoretical model mapping the forces included in the artistic-economic dichotomy is presented as one of the main conclusions of the thesis.

3. The thesis argued for and other findings of the research project

On the basis of the findings of the research project, it is argued in this thesis that the official opera organisational structures are incapable of dealing with the artistic processes included in opera production. Thus, a dual organisational structure exists in the organisations studied: the official organisational structure dealing with the socio-economic issues surrounding the opera organisation, and the unofficial artistic structure dealing with the artistic realm with which the organisation needs to operate. This dual structure is the main reason for the managerial difficulties involved in running an opera house.

It is further argued, that this dual structure can be explained by considering opera – and its artistic processes – as a civil society / lifeworld¹ phenomenon. Based on this, it is further claimed that the official organisational structures of the opera organisations analysed operate on the system's level. This interpretation – included in the model mapping the forces that influence the organisational structures of opera organisations – in effect defines the artistic-economic dichotomy and its manifestations in the organisational structures of opera companies.

In addition to this theoretical approach, the research project has provided a set of data about organisational structures and administration of five opera organisations. Such data is currently not readily available for study purposes. Thus, the data presented here provides a useful starting point in collecting this information and making it available in a wider context. Additionally, there are some new research questions that manifest themselves in the data collected. These will be commented on in the conclusion after the data itself has been presented.

4. The structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into three parts: theoretical considerations, the case-study descriptions and the discussion. Additionally, there is an introduction presenting

¹ These terms – based on Jürgen Habermas – are defined and presented in the theoretical section.

the research project and a conclusion recapitulating the main conclusions of the research project as a whole.

The theoretical considerations are divided into two chapters. Chapter 2 proposes the theoretical framework and analyses the development of the socio-economic background against which opera organisations have historically operated. Chapter 3 discusses the external forces influencing the organisational structures of opera companies and proposes an analytical model for analysing opera organisations and their structures. In the original research proposal, it was also planned to include an analysis of the historical development of the artistic side of opera production in the theoretical section. As it has become evident in the course of the research that these forces in the organisational realm could not be mapped with the approach selected, this analysis will not be included. This issue will be commented on further in the conclusion.

The case-study part of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 4 is an introduction into the case studies and discusses the selection of the case-study organisations, the methodology and the process of data collection. Chapters 5 to 9 present the case-study organisations and the data collected. The organisations and the respective chapters are: the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* – chapter 5, the English National Opera – chapter 6, the Finnish National Opera – chapter 7, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera – chapter 8, and the *Opéra national de Paris* – chapter 9.

The discussion about the case studies takes place in chapter 10. This chapter examines and draws together the issues included in the case-study analyses. The main conclusions of the research project are presented in chapter 11. In this chapter the model bringing together the analytical framework and the case-study findings is presented and some practical implications of the findings are also considered. Additionally, some research questions arising from the research project conducted are presented in chapter 11.

PART I – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SIDE OF PRODUCING OPERA

1. Introduction

The aim of this research project is to consider the manifestations of the artistic-economic dichotomy in opera organisations. In order to achieve this aim, the socio-economic framework in which opera organisations exist and have existed historically needs to be analysed and linked to a wider theoretical context. That is the aim of this chapter. First, a set of theories and theoretical frameworks are presented which when combined, it is argued, shed light on the socio-economic support opera has received throughout its history - and is still receiving. Structurally this chapter first presents different theories as separate entities. These, however, come together in the discussion of the historical development of support for opera and opera organisations in Italy, France and Germany-Austria. It is deemed imperative that the case-study analyses are linked - even on a limited scale - to a wider background in order to gain more insight into the results.

2. Opera in a wider context

The obvious question arising from the aim to describe the reasons and forms of support opera has received is: what is meant by opera and why has it continuously been supported by different societies? John D. Drummond's analysis of opera in a wider perspective can provide useful tools and definitions for answering these questions, especially when combined with other theories presented later on. Drummond argues in *Opera in Perspective* that music-drama in some form has been known to man as long as civilisation has existed. "There is more to music-drama than merely opera in the opera-house. It is a tree whose roots lie deep in human history, perhaps deep in the human psyche, and the branch which we call 'opera' in the 'opera-house' can only be fully understood if we learn about the nature of the tree itself. Because Western European culture has flourishing and separate musical and dramatic arts, we tend to think of 'opera'

as being drama plus music, a combination of two distinct art-forms. From a historical point of view, however, it is a misleading way of looking at music-drama: the evidence shows that music-drama as a single entity¹ has always been part of the life of man, from his earliest beginnings.” (Drummond 1980, 14.)

Drummond further argues that the basic elements of music-drama - in the sense used above - are religion, play and art. “The various forms of man’s music-drama have some basic features in common, and others which reflect the cultures of which they are part. Music-drama has always been associated with religious belief and religious ritual, because music, dance, spectacle and narrative are ingredients of worship. Music-drama, too, has always provided an opportunity for man to delight in being playful, and catered for his love of pretending. In combining worship and make-believe music-drama has developed, in every culture, into an art-form; that is, it has become a structurally self-contained form of communication, expressing and stimulating experiences symbolic of some aspect of what it is to be a human being.” In the opera house, music drama manifests itself mainly in the form of art including, however, some elements of the other categories, too. (Drummond 1980, 13.)

Further, Drummond contemplates the meaning and contents of music-drama and argues that the dual imagery of music and words and the blend of implicit and explicit create its power. “The blend of implicit and explicit in music-drama is not confined to the relationship between words and music: it is fundamental to the art form. The interaction between apprehensible and comprehensible elements permeates its whole being. Viewed overall, a music-drama communicates indefinable experiences to us in definable ways; viewed at a much lower level, every musical sound, every word, every physical gesture has both a concrete comprehensibility and a hidden implied meaning which we cannot easily explain. [--] It is a gigantic image operating visually and aurally, in time and in space, composed of a legion of constituent images, each of which contains the double-helix of implicit and explicit meaning.” (Drummond 1980, 28.) Drummond further links this double existence in music-drama to the division of Apollonian and Dionysian as first introduced to the discussion about opera by Friedrich Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1871). Nietzsche uses the Ancient Greek gods Apollo and Dionysos as labels for the two opposite forces in music. Apollo represents the forces in man considered rational, conscious and

¹ There is a similar argument made in Kerman: *Opera as Drama*. However, in this context Drummond provides the more applicable framework for analysis.

explicit, when Dionysos represents the irrational, subconscious and implicit. Drummond summarises: “Although Nietzsche was the first to explain the forces that combine to make music-drama (at least in such clear-cut terms), it was primitive man who first instinctively created that balance. We can see why music-drama has always been important to man. Together, Apollo and Dionysos provide a way to link the explicit (that which we know by direct experience) and the implicit (that which we come to sense, indirectly), the concrete (that which we can define and explain) and the discrete (that which we cannot define or explain). To ‘primitive’ man, music drama offers a way of bringing together the worlds of reality and magic. It offers the same to ‘civilized’ man.” (Drummond 1980, 31.)

Thus, ‘opera’ according to Drummond is a specific Western European branch in the historic continuum of music-drama, born at the end of the sixteenth century. It is usually performed in an opera house and is dominated by the artistic aspects of music drama (as opposed to religious or playful aspects). It deals with the mythical dimensions of life by combining the Apollonian and Dionysian elements, thus providing man with a connection between himself, the things he knows and the things he can imagine. Therefore, opera as an art form, and the support it receives from society should be considered in this wider framework. Drummond analyses the development of opera as an art form in relation to these principles in *Opera in Perspective*, however, these principles - especially when combined with theories by Habermas, Cohen and Arato, and Nielsen - will also assist in understanding the socio-economic framework in which opera organisations have existed and still exist.

3. The concepts of ‘public sphere’ and ‘civil society’

Drummond argues that opera is a specific answer by Western European society to man’s eternal need for music drama. The historic development of this (section of) society, it is argued, bears close links to the development of the socio-economic support for opera. In order to discuss these links later on, the concepts of public sphere (especially the bourgeois public sphere) and civil society, along with their development, need to be explored. This will be done on the basis of Jürgen Habermas’ *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*¹ (1962) and *Theorie des*

¹ In this study the English translation *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, translated by Thomas Burger (1989), is used.

*kommunikativen Handelns*¹ (1981), and Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato's *Civil Society and Political Theory* (1992). These theories provide, it is argued, a useful framework for the analyses of the relationship between opera and the surrounding society.

According to Habermas the concepts of 'public' (as in public sphere) and 'private' are of Greek origin, having survived in Roman Law through the Middle Ages in Europe, but having no standard usage during that period. In the feudal society of the High Middle Ages the term 'public' was used as a status attribute. "This *publicness (or publicity) of representation* was not constituted as a social realm, that is, as a public sphere; rather, it was something like a status attribute, if this term may be permitted. In itself the status of manorial lord, on whatever level, was neutral in relation to the criteria of 'public' and 'private'; but its incumbent represented himself as an embodiment of some sort of 'higher' power." (Habermas 1989, 7.) The ultimate form of this representative publicness was attained in the French Court. "In the etiquette of Louis XIV concentration of the publicity of representation at the court attained the high point of refinement." (Habermas 1989, 10.) However, the development of Renaissance society towards humanism had emerged first in Florence among the nobility of early capitalist northern Italy, then in Paris and London, leading towards separation of the Court / State from civil society. "The aristocratic 'society' that emerged from that Renaissance society no longer had to represent its own lordliness (i.e. its manorial authority), or at least no longer primarily; it served as a vehicle for the representation of the monarch. Only after national and territorial power states had arisen on the basis of the early capitalist commercial economy and shattered the feudal foundations of power could this nobility develop the framework of sociability - highly individuated, in spite of its comprehensive etiquette - into that peculiarly free-floating but clearly demarcated sphere of 'good society' in the eighteenth century. The final form of the representative publicness, reduced to the monarch's court and at the same time receiving greater emphasis, was already an enclave within a society separating itself from the state. Now for the first time private and public spheres became separate in a specifically modern sense." The term 'private' "designated the exclusion from the state apparatus" and 'public' "referred to the state that [--] had developed, under absolutism, into an entity having an objective existence over against the person of the ruler". As at the end of the eighteenth century the feudal powers, the Church, the prince,

¹ In this study the English translation *The Theory of Communicative Action*, translated by Thomas McCarthy (1987), is used.

and the nobility “who were carriers of the representative publicness, disintegrated in a process of polarization”, and “split into private elements on the one hand, and public ones, on the other”. “The first visible mark of the [-] polarization of princely authority was the separation of the public budget from the territorial ruler’s private holdings.” (Habermas 1989, 11.)

A parallel phenomenon, both historically and ideologically, to the peak and demise of the representative publicness was the rise of the bourgeois civil society, divided into private sphere and public sphere by Habermas in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. The emergence of early finance and trade capitalism started to create a new social order. “This commercial exchange developed according to rules which certainly were manipulated by political power; yet a far-reaching network of horizontal economic dependencies emerged that in principle could no longer be accommodated by the vertical relationships of dependence characterising the organisation of domination in an estate system based upon self-contained household economy.” (Habermas 1989, 14.) “Civil society came into existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority. Activities and dependencies hitherto relegated to the framework of the household economy emerged from this confinement into the public sphere. [-] The economic activity that had become private had to be oriented toward a commodity market that had expanded under public direction and supervision; the economic conditions under which this activity now took place lay outside the confines of the single household; for the first time they were of general interest”, i.e. of ‘public’ relevance. (Habermas 1989, 19.) Thus, “along with the apparatus of the modern state, a new stratum of ‘bourgeois’ people arose which occupied a central position within the ‘public’. [-] This stratum of bourgeois was the real carrier of the public, which from the outset was a reading public. [-] Their commanding status in the new sphere of civil society led to a tension [-] between ‘town’ and ‘court’”. (Habermas 1989, 23.) “The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public use of their reason.” (Habermas 1989, 27.)

In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* Habermas summarises the above argument in a 'blueprint' of the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century. (Habermas 1989, 30.) This is displayed below in figure 1.

Figure 1.

Private Realm	Sphere of Public Authority	
<p>Civil society (realm of commodity exchange and social labor)</p> <p>Conjugal family's internal space (bourgeois intellectuals)</p>	<p>Public sphere in the political realm</p> <p>Public sphere in the world of letters (clubs, press)</p> <p>(market of culture products) "Town"</p>	<p>State (realm of the "police")</p> <p>Court (courtly-noble society)</p>

Before progressing to current definitions of civil society and the public sphere, one aspect of the development of the bourgeois public sphere according to Habermas deserves to be presented. The graph above includes the category 'Public sphere in the world of letters', i.e. the culture debating public that emerged with the bourgeois public sphere. "The 'town' was the life center of civil society not only economically; in cultural-political contrast to the court, it designated especially an early public sphere in the world of letters whose institutions were the coffee houses, the *salons*, and the *Tischgesellschaften* (table societies)." (Habermas 1989, 30.) Later on, however, this development was to turn against itself, turning the culture-debating public into a culture-consuming public. "When the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity exchange and social labor also pervaded the sphere reserved for private people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unraveled into acts of individuated reception, however uniform in mode. [--] Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the institutions that until then had ensured the coherence of the public as a critically debating entity have been weakened." (Habermas 1989, 161-162.)

The analysis of society today with regards to the civil society is presented by Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action* and by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato in *Civil Society and Political Theory*. The concepts of division of the society into *lifeworld* and *system*, the further division of the lifeworld into public and private spheres (i.e. civil society), and the division of the systems level into economic system (market) and administrative system (state) need to be presented briefly in order to use Habermas's theories in subsequent analyses. Additionally, the tendency of the systems level to colonise the lifeworld provides a useful tool, it is argued, in analysing the support for opera organisations from the society around them, both today and historically. The concepts mentioned above are highly complex and theoretical; thus, the presentation below should be regarded as a practical simplification in order to make the theories available for the analytical purposes in case-study analyses.

Habermas argues that society is divided into two, the *lifeworld* and the *systemic* level. The lifeworld comprises of the private and public spheres of the individual and operates through communicative interaction among its members. "The institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family, relieved of productive functions and specialized in tasks of socialization; from the systemic perspective it is viewed as the environment of private households. The institutional core of the public sphere comprises communicative networks amplified by a cultural complex, a press and, later, mass media; they make it possible for a public of art enjoying private persons to participate in the reproduction of culture, and for a public of citizens of the state to participate in the social integration mediated by public opinion." (Habermas 1987, 319.) Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, however, in their *Civil Society and Political Theory* combine these two categories into one, civil society, which will be adopted for the purposes of this study. It is defined in their text as follows: "This concept would include all the institutions and associational forms that require communicative interaction for their reproduction and that rely primarily on processes of social integration for coordinating action within their boundaries." (Cohen & Arato 1992, 429.)

This lifeworld - civil society - is 'opposed' by two media-steered systems, state (steered by the medium of power) and economy (market steered by the medium of money). The function of these systems in conjunction with civil society is described by Habermas as follows: "From the standpoint of the subsystems of the economy and the state, their interactions with the respectively contiguous spheres of the lifeworld take the form of interchange relations connected in parallel. The economic system exchanges wages against labour (as input factor),

as well as goods and services (as the output of its own products) against consumer demand. The public administration exchanges organizational performances for taxes (as an input factor), as well as political decisions (as the output of its own products) for mass loyalty.” (Habermas 1987, 319.) “On this plane of analysis, the uncoupling of system and lifeworld is depicted in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first coextensive with a scarcely differentiated social system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others. In the process, system mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures through which social integration takes place. [--] modern societies attain a level of system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are connected with one another via delinguistified media of communication: these systemic mechanisms - for example, money - steer a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that [--] have become independent of their moral-political foundations.” (Habermas 1987, 154.) Habermas further describes the colonization of the lifeworld by state and economy: “The functional ties of money and power media become noticeable only to the degree that elements of a private way of life and cultural-political form of life get split off from the symbolic structures of the lifeworld through the monetary redefinition of goals, relations and services, life-spaces and life-times, and through the bureaucratization of decisions, duties and rights, responsibilities and dependencies. [--] Monetization and bureaucratization appear to overstep the boundaries of normality [colonize the lifeworld] when they instrumentalize an influx from the lifeworld that possesses its own logic.” (Habermas 1987, 322-323.)

With the assistance of these theoretical frameworks, the historical development of the support for opera and opera organisations is analysed below. Additionally, the analytical model created later on to analyse the current case-study organisations will be based on these theories and the framework they provide.

4. Socio-economic development of opera

Opera is often considered as an aristocratic and elitist art-form, having come into being in the court of Florence as a courtly entertainment and having often been closely associated with courts and states during its four centuries of existence. Then, on the other hand the concept of the bourgeoisie has been closely linked

with opera by Theodor Adorno, for instance. He writes: “There are also historical grounds for ascribing opera to the bourgeoisie rather than to feudal or courtly culture, with which it arranges the *convenu*. Sonorous fullness and choral masses alone point toward an incomparably greater circle than the aristocratic one, which laid claim to the privilege of the proscenium, but left the gallery, the actual viewing space of opera, to the bourgeoisie.” (Adorno 1955.) Linked with this aristocratic-bourgeois dichotomy are the concepts of commercial opera on one hand and opera funded by state, court, or by private patronage on the other. A unified understanding of these issues does not exist nor is there agreement on relevant terms among opera scholars. The aim of this section is to briefly consider the history of opera with the assistance of the theoretical framework presented above and, in the process, implicitly establish the way in which these issues and terms are understood in the context of this study.

4.1. From the 16th century to 1791

Italy

The Western European music-dramatic activity we know as opera was conceived and born at Florence in the end of the 16th century. The ideological background for opera was a relative secularisation of society which had become increasingly affluent through commerce. These circumstances gave rise to a new humanist outlook in which Greek thought was reborn. A strong influence towards this development within the sphere of opera was Girolamo Mei, a scholar who recovered some lost Greek manuscripts and provided new translations of others, freeing them from Christian influences. Most importantly he provided new insight (by request of the composer Vincenzo Galilei, father of Galileo) into Greek music and drama; the music-drama deemed to be at the heart of ‘recreating’ the Greek spirit. This inspired a succession of Florentine Camerati involved in the task, the third of which created the music-drama deemed to be the first Western opera, i.e. the Corsi-Peri-Caccini¹ collaboration, *Daphne*, in 1597. (Drummond 1980, 108.) This was received by contemporaries as something entirely new, as an art form truly combining music and drama in Greek style. Thus, the ideological connection

¹ Jacopo Corsi (1561-1602), an entrepreneurial nobleman and “chief patron of the arts in Florence” at the end of the 16th century. Ottavio Rinuccini (1562-1621), poet. Jacopo Peri (1561-1633), musician. (Parker ed. 1994, 8.)

of opera with the creation of the bourgeois public sphere and the civil society is evident, both being influenced by the secularisation of society, emerging commerce and the Greek idealised models; on one hand of society and on the other of music.

This new art form, free from the influences of the church, was eagerly adopted by the rulers of Florence. The wedding of Maria de Medici to Henry IV of France in 1600 called for something splendid; thus the second work in this style, Peri's *Eurydice* was performed¹. (Sadie ed. 1989, 16.) This is an early demonstration of the connection between the new art form and society's tendency toward representative publicness. This is further reinstated by the fact that the court of Mantua, rival to the Florentine court, displayed activity in the field of opera giving birth to Monteverdi's *Orfeo*, a work which some scholars regard as the first real opera. (Parker ed. 1994, 14.) The social tradition of representative publicness continued through the early decades of the new art form; the next main home for opera being the Barberini Palazzo in Rome. The election of Maffeo Barberini as Pope Urban VIII in 1623 gave rise to the commitment of the Barberini family towards opera as entertainment for political expediency². (Sadie ed. 1989, 20.) The importance of representative publicness to opera is well present in a description of early opera by Ellen Rosand: "The first operas, *Dafne*, *Euridice*, *Orfeo*, *Arianna*, like the intermedi before them, were courtly entertainments [--]. They were commissioned and created to celebrate specific political or social occasions, and were performed before an invited patrician audience. [--] Verbally and visually, iconographic conceit and allegorical allusion extolled a ruling dynasty - Medici, Gonzaga, or Barberini - besides marking the specific occasion. The splendor and lavishness of the productions reflected further glory on the ruler, brightening his image at home and abroad." (Rosand 1991, 10.)

The next important scene in the development of opera - both as an art-form and a socio-economic phenomenon - took place in Venice. "Born in Florence, and

¹ This has been partly linked to the political change in Florence in turning away from Spain towards France; the new form of court entertainment coincided with this change.

² The importance of opera as a forum for political influence is very well illustrated by two incidents in which the Barberini were involved. First, after the death of Urban VIII in 1644, the family was banished from Rome due to accusations of their extensive use of papal funds to organise these performances. Second, librettist Giulio Rospigliosi, author of several Barberini operas and the first stage-director in the history of opera, was elected as Pope Clement IX in 1667. (Parker ed. 1994, 17 - 20.)

further developed in Rome, opera essentially defined itself as a genre in Venice. [--] With the political stability of its oligarchic structure and the economic democracy that sustained it, Venice offered a unique situation for the elaboration of others' inventions. [--] What happened to opera in Venice during the seventeenth century was fundamental to the art itself: there and then, opera as we know it assumed its definitive identity - as a mixed theatrical spectacle available to a socially diversified, and paying, audience; a public art." (Rosand 1991, 1.) In Venice opera was for the first time performed for a paying public in Teatro S. Cassiano in 1637. (Sadie ed. 1989, 21.) The success of this 'commercial' (see below) opera was the final phase in establishing the young art form. Some scholars, e.g. Rosand, even claim that the history of opera as we know it begins in Venice. This notion is well in line with the argument presented here - i.e. that socio-economic development of opera is closely linked with the development of the bourgeois public sphere - as emerging commercialism and the public sphere played a crucial role in the Venetian operatic scene in the 17th century. As Ellen Rosand points out, the Venetian aristocracy built theatres in which the new art form could be presented, not only for commercial reasons (even though they received rent from the impresario running the theatre) but to compete with other Venetian families in splendour and power (i.e. to gain influence in the public sphere). "Dependable financial backing derived from the Venetian sociopolitical structure: competition among patrician families, *essentially a self-ennobled merchant class* [my italics], encouraged investment in theatres as a means of increasing wealth and status." (Rosand 1991, 1.) "And this [setting up theatres] was not simply for economic motives: subtly tangled up with that factor was the idea of theatre as a symbol of magnificence, an assertion of the family's economic and political clout within the city." (Kimbell 1991, 114.) The theatres were leased to impresari, who seem from the surface to have acted like businessmen. However, a closer scrutiny of their activities reveals that the companies often received hidden subsidies from the noblesse, for example in the form of a specific star singer provided 'with the protection of', say, a certain nobleman. Further, the rent of the boxes, set for the season before the repertory was known provided a subsidy as such, since it was not in effect connected with the efforts of the performing company. According to Rosand "a broader aristocratic base supported these theatres as annual leaseholders of boxes." (Rosand 1991, 1.) Further evidence of subsidy (possibly from the family owning the theatre) is the fact that several of the productions - the books of which have survived - in Venice during the 1640-60 made substantial losses. Still the impresari remained in business having had to receive funds from an external source - probably the noblesse - to be able to do so. (Bianconi and Walker 1984, 227 & 239.) Thus,

however much the Venetian opera was ostensibly run as a business and aimed at a paying public, the funding from the theatre owners and box owners is evident. Thus, opera in Venice had emerged from the court but had not, as often has been claimed, been left to the sole mercy of the emerging market. It had found a feasible place of existence in the public sphere - in many ways bourgeois since the Venetian aristocracy was "essentially a self-ennobled merchant class". (Rosand 1991, 1.) In this sphere, opera continued its existence and was defined as the art-form we currently know as opera. "Opera as we know it, as an art appealing to a broad audience, had its origins in this special environment." (Rosand 1991, 11.) However, elsewhere it existed in parallel with court opera, especially *opera seria*, which carried forward the tradition of representative publicness in its operatic form for a further two centuries.

According to Kimbell, opera in Italy was (after the 17th century example of Venice where the art-form had become established) to maintain a character of conviviality (i.e. its function in the bourgeois public sphere) for centuries. "It was less a feature of the operas themselves than of the atmosphere and environment in which they were performed. But since opera is supremely a social form of art, the conviviality of the setting did affect the work of art in a number of ways. [--] The box-system [--] has been the backbone of Italian theatre life for the best part of 300 years. From Venice, where it had first evolved as a form of insurance, it had spread rapidly to the other cities of Italy. Where it was not commercially necessary, as at some of the court operas, it was nevertheless retained because to have one's box at the opera was recognized as a charming social asset. [--] The box was their public salon: there they could mingle with the best society of the town." (Kimbell 1991, 11.) The court operas, even when maintaining the box-owner structure, upheld an attitude more towards representative publicness. "[U]ntill the unification of Italy several of the leading opera-houses in the peninsula, notably those of Turin and Naples, were court theatres. There etiquette was distinctly more starchy: in the presence of the court, laughter and conversation, even applause, were strictly proscribed; there could be no question of drawing the curtains of the boxes; the company sat formally dressed and brilliantly illuminated and submissively mannered for the whole evening." (Kimbell 1991, 13.) The Italian operatic scene in the 18th century, thus, was divided between box-owner funded theatres operating in the emerging bourgeois public sphere on one hand, and the court theatres upholding the manner of representative publicness on the other. As Kimbell writes: "Opera became so popular for two apparently distinct if not mutually exclusive reasons: In the first place as a public entertainment on the Venetian model; in the second, as the most spectacular of

the art-forms appropriate to the representative courtly life of a royal or ducal capital." (Kimbell 1991, 206.) This division, however, was not as strict as in France, for example. The Italian peninsula was divided into small city-states, in which the power of the monarch was considerably lesser than in the court of Louis XIV, for example. Also, even though *opera seria* and *opera buffa* were connected with court and public opera houses, respectively¹, this division was not as clear as in France.

France

In France the division between bourgeois opera and the representative court opera and their respective institutional frameworks was to be reflected in the art-form itself already in the late 17th century. "French opera has always been strongly institutionalized: thus serious, all sung opera [*tragédie lyrique*] is inseparably linked with the court and the *Opéra* or *Académie Royale de Musique*, while opera with spoken texts [*opéra comique*] is associated first with the *Théâtres de la Foire* and then with the *Opéra-Comique*; these divisions began to break down only in the late 19th century." (Sadie ed. 1989, 31.)

The earliest form of indigenous French opera was the *Pastorale d'Issy* by Pierre 'Abbé' Perrin and Robert Cambert, performed for Louis XIV in 1659. (Demuth 1963, 105.) "Louis XIV had a clear perception of the political usefulness of entertainments as a means of amusing and controlling his subjects, of impressing foreigners, of developing and demonstrating physical dexterity among his courtiers, and of displaying at every opportunity his personal emblem, the sun, as a symbol of enlightened rule." (Parker ed. 1994, 33.) This relates well to Habermas' view of the court of Louis XIV. "In the etiquette of Louis XIV concentration of the publicity of representation at the court attained the high point of refinement." (Habermas 1989, 10.) Thus, Louis XIV established the institutional framework for *tragédie lyrique* by granting Perrin a royal patent to form *Académie d'Opera* in 1669. After the failure of Perrin's *Académie*, the new French lyric art-form was firmly established by Lully in the late 17th century after he had acquired the royal patent for presenting lyric work. "Although Lully's patent allowed him to perform his operas before a paying public, they are indelibly

¹ "The distance between these genres made itself felt on nearly every front – their subject matter and literary tone, [--] their audiences and relative engagement with contemporary society, the cost and institutional structure of each [--]." (Parker ed. 1994, 84.)

stamped with courtly ethos: the focus on glorifying the Roi-soleil was inevitable." (Parker ed. 1994, 36.) The Lullyan tradition of *tragédies lyriques* was carried forward and developed subsequently by Rameau and Gluck, who operated in the institutional environment of the *Académie* until the revolution brought changes to the way in which the French operatic scene was organised. This was due especially to the *Liberté des Théâtres* act issued in 1791, which ended the monopoly of the *Académie* over 'serious' French lyric work. (Crosten 1948, 12.) Even though the *Académie* was not directly subsidised by the King, the royal patent had given it a role of royal importance before the revolution and it had retained its air of representative publicness. "Thought had been given as well to the reality that attendance at the Opéra was as much a performance as what took place on stage." (Parker ed. 1994, 63.)

The 'comic' form of French lyric activity was more related to the public opera houses providing 'popular entertainment' for the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie – the evolving bourgeois public sphere. The *opéra comique* with spoken dialogue, was performed in a group of fair theatres known collectively as *Théâtres de la Foire*. They presented spoken plays interspersed with well-known tunes (vaudevilles) and "enjoyed immense popularity, and the rival institutions under government monopoly – the *Opéra* and the *Comédie-Française* – did their utmost to hinder the fair theatres, mostly by restricting their ability to employ vocal music in their offerings." (Parker ed. 1994, 91.) This they were entitled to do with the monopoly granted in the royal patent to lyric performances. The *Théâtres de la Foire* were brought under common management in 1715 and named *Théâtre de l'Opéra-Comique*. It remained as the institutional background for French comic opera, even though after the death of Louis XIV Philippe of Orleans had established the *Comédie-Italienne* to favour Italian lyric entertainment. These two institutions were merged in 1762 and Opéra-Comique was to carry on the tradition of the *opéra-comique* till the late 19th century when the gap dividing French lyric art and its institutional forms was finally closed.

In 1752 an incident - the *Querelle des Bouffons* – took place in Paris centred around the Italian *opera buffa* and the French *tragédie lyrique*. After a performance of Pergolesi's *La serva padrona* by an itinerant Italian troupe at the Opéra a debacle about the two traditions – and especially about their respective merits – broke out. The Encyclopedists supported Italian opera against French, "but the real targets of the reformers were the hidebound material and performing practices at the Opéra, which were also a symbol of the absolute monarchy." (Sadie ed. 1989, 118.) The art form of the bourgeois public sphere was thus

employed in an attack on the representative publicness of the monarchy at the *Opéra*, which was to fall after the 1789 revolution and the 1791 act on freedom of theatres.

Germany-Austria

Early operatic activity in Germany and Austria was dominated by Italian opera, it was "Italian in its language and Italianate in its musical style. Many of the leading Italian composers of Italian opera held court appointments in Germany, [--] and the greatest Italian Librettist, Metastasio, was Viennese court poet." (Sadie ed. 1989, 27.) Also, the style of the German court opera was predominantly that of representative publicness, after the Italian court opera tradition. There were two exceptions to this general rule: the *Singspiel* tradition of German vernacular music theatre which gained ground in the latter part of the 18th century, and the *Theater am Gänsemarkt* in Hamburg which existed from 1678 till 1738.

The *Theater am Gänsemarkt* was "the first public opera house in any city outside Italy." (Buelow 1978, 26.) Venice had a great influence on the Hanseatic city-state of Hamburg, which was a great commercial centre on the Elbe river. "By 1678 Hamburg was the richest and largest city in northern Europe [--]. In one respect at least Hamburg did resemble Venice: both cities were centres of trade and commerce [--]." The Hamburg opera was founded by Gerhard Schott, a member of a well-known patrician family. He directed the opera himself (apart from two failed attempts to lease the opera house) till his death in 1702. "It seems probable that he had outside financial support, although no evidence exists to prove it." (Buelow 1978, 26.) "[T]he burghers managed to maintain predominantly German-language operatic performances, despite the opposition of some of the clergy and periodic financial crises." (Sadie ed. 1989, 27.) "While Hamburg opera cannot be called the first German national opera, simply because the concept of German nation did not exist, its theatre was the first opera house based on the German language and German popular music traditions. It was 'peoples opera', if it is remembered that the people were the wealthy merchant and aristocratic classes." (Buelow 1978, 28.) Thus, it seems clear that the *Theater am Gänsemarkt* existed in the bourgeois public sphere in circumstances similar to those in which 'commercial', non-court opera had been established in Venice.

The German *Singspiel* tradition was a phenomenon parallel to that of the *Théâtres de la Foire* in Paris. It is "an opera, usually comic, in German with spoken dialogue". The genre had its roots in the German *Hanswurst* tradition. "Once the Hamburg operatic venture had foundered in 1738, the only German-language *Singspiel* venture was the *Hanswurst* company at the *Kärntnertheater* in Vienna." (Sadie ed. 1989, 86-88.) It had been founded in about 1710, thus having a longstanding tradition by the time Joseph II founded the German *National-Singspiel* in 1778 which took over the *Kärntnertheater*. This enterprise was not, however, successful and the theatre closed its doors in 1788. Nevertheless, the *Singspiel* had become – as reinstated by the emperor - a relevant competitor to the *opera seria* at the court theatres. "At this time there was little demand for opera seria in Vienna. The emperor, who considered it both expensive and elusive, allowed it only on special occasions." (Parker ed. 1994, 109.) These two developments – the lessening popularity of the representative *opera seria* and the establishing *Singspiel* as a valid operatic tradition come together in 1791. In this year Mozart composed both *La clemenza di Tito* and *Die Zauberflöte*. The first is considered as the ultimate culmination in the tradition of *opera seria* and the latter the first *Singspiel* to achieve longstanding historical success. Naturally, the creation of *Don Giovanni*, *Le nozze di Figaro* and *Così fan tutte* must not be forgotten in this context. With these works the *opera buffa* had emerged from the bourgeois theatres to the sphere of connoisseurs at the court theatres. "Even a theme as dubious as the old Don Juan story could now appear on the emperor's most exclusive stage, for by virtue of Mozart's score it now shared in a Viennese conception of opera buffa as a fully fledged category of high art." (Parker ed. 1994, 111.) The bourgeois public sphere was thus gradually taking over – and partly had already done so – the sphere of representative publicness, in art as well as in the reality of revolutions.

4.2. 1791 – 1914

Italy

The 19th century witnessed notable changes in the operatic life of Italy and its institutional forms. After the victory of Napoleon at Marengo in 1800 many of the courts that had sustained Metastasian *opera seria* were left in disarray. "Napoleon's intervention led to the creation, temporarily again, of some improvised governments up and down Italy, creating a sort of paradigm for the improvisation and intrigues to opera buffa plots." (Parker ed. 1994, 169.) In the

latter part of the previous century *opera buffa* had gained ground as popular entertainment. This development continued in the first half of the 19th century, added with the creation of new genres – or amalgamation of old ones - as *opera semiseria*¹ etc. (Kimbell 1991, 334.) "One consequence that can be partially attributed to the changes brought about by the French-inspired switch of governments throughout the peninsula was a surprising increase in the number of theatres, many of which would perform opera during some portion of the year. [--] The increase was in part an aspect of urban growth, resulting from the movement of people from less prosperous rural surroundings to towns [--]. More theatres meant an increasing demand for material." (Parker ed. 1994, 171.) The same aspect is commented on by Kimbell: "One of the problems which the immense popularity of the new *opera buffa* brought was the need for what can only be described as mass production." (Kimbell 1991, 334.) As a result the concept of repertory opera started to develop, coinciding with the advancement of industrial practices elsewhere. At the start of the 19th century an Italian opera house had presented two new operas each season. As the production conventions grew more elaborate this was becoming more and more unmanageable in the first decades of the century creating a need to repeat productions. "The notion of repertory opera, with singers coming along to appear at the drop of a hat in a work everyone more or less knew, was not to develop fully until the 1840s." (Rosselli 1984, 8.) "By the mid-1850s, when the industry had fully recovered from the upheaval of 1848-9, repertory opera was becoming established. By the 1870s it was the norm." (Rosselli 1984, 170.) This development went hand in hand with the development of the market for singers. "After the 1848 revolutions, governments and law courts were increasingly reluctant to interfere with freedom of contract among those engaged in market dealings, a reluctance confirmed in Italy from 1860. Opera singers [--] were thus already creatures of the market, and the new state of things was confirmed as the nineteenth century wore on." (Rosselli 1992, 79.) The rise of the market was also reflected in the way the theatres were run – the developing opera industry called for a professional *impresario*. "In the middle decades of the eighteenth century, sometimes until its close, it had been normal practice in some leading theatres – those of Turin, Milan, and Bologna in particular – for an association of nobles to act as impresari and elect a directorate to run the opera season. [--] By the 1820s the association of noble impresari was generally recognised as extravagant and expensive [--].

¹ "[A] genre well adapted to the vogue for melodramatic plots with happy endings, works similar to the 'rescue' plots popular in Paris and elsewhere in the wake of the French revolution." (Parker ed. 1994, 171.)

On the same grounds, associations of boxholder-proprietors like those of La Fenice, Venice, did their best to attract professional *impresari*. [--] *Impresari* were not necessarily dependent on any individual member of the nobility, and the very touch of roguery that marked some of them conferred a kind of freedom. Yet they were deeply dependent on the upper classes as a whole, first for their concessions and then – crucially – for the means of making up an almost certain loss." (Rosselli 1984, 20 & 39.)

The popularity of opera-going – resulting in the need for mass production of an industrial character - was inevitably linked to the role that Romanticism had in the social and political life in Italy during the 19th century. "The peculiar significance of Romantic movement in Italy was a consequence of the fact that, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, art had become politicized, or, to use more Mazzinian phrase, 'socialized'. [--] The primary motive of Italian Romantic art was a desire to express and form the new society that was emerging in the post-Napoleonic age. [--] The theatre became the focal symbolic building at the heart of all Italian cities. And the impact it achieved might entitle us to regard it as a kind of spiritual Trojan Horse. [--] Increasingly during the 1840s theatres were chosen as the scene for political demonstrations [--]." (Kimbell 1991, 391 - 394.) The rulers realised the need to control and colonise this increasingly bourgeois public sphere phenomenon, as can be seen from a memorandum¹ to the Pope from Monsignor Luigi Ciacchi in 1837. "The theatre, considered in the abstract, is and can only be an object of indifference to the government, an object to be tolerated, an object with no immediate connection with the heavy cares of the state. But considered concretely, *in view of the links it forges in society between the people and the government* [my italics], it naturally changes its aspect, and necessarily takes its place among the beneficent concerns of the governing classes." (Kimbell 1991, 395.) This attitude was also visible in the ways in which the government and the municipalities gradually took responsibility – at least partially – to make good the losses of the opera houses. The first form of subsidy had been the gambling monopoly granted to the opera houses. When the gambling monopoly was abolished in the northern Italy in 1814, the La Scala official committee, for example, ended up offering an official subsidy in cash to attract an *impresario* to manage the theatre. (Rosselli 1984, 71.) After the unification of Italy the subsidies from central government were abolished and the municipalities took over. However, the amounts declined rapidly due to social pressure, e.g. from the new socialists, and forced several leading opera houses

¹ As translated by David Kimbell in Kimbell 1991.

to close down for several years in 1870s. "Verdi's answer was to call for renewed government subsidy – something that would come about only in the twentieth century when control of opera houses had passed to public bodies. [--] The coming of a centralised state with liberal representative institutions and a growing middle class" brought an end to this era in the history of Italian opera houses. (Rosselli 1984, 79.) The framework for opera in Italy had thus seen the decline of the representative publicness, the rise in the importance of the bourgeois public sphere, market and mass production. The first marks of the increasing colonisation of the lifeworld by the state were also witnessed during the 19th century.

France

The revolution period in France starting from 1791 - when the Constituent Assembly demolished the system of privileges of the *Académie royale de musique* - was to be turbulent in the socio-economic and institutional history of French operatic life. This is well reflected in the frequency in which the Paris *Opéra* (*Académie royale de musique*) changed its name between 1791 and 1871, a total of 22 times. (Bereson 1998, 89.) A thorough description of the changes in the institutional history of opera in France would thus be an impossible task within the scope of this study. Therefore, only the main trends illustrating the lines of development in the socio-economic framework for opera in France will be discussed here.

The Paris *Opéra* - the former bastion of representative publicness - underwent major changes during the decades of revolution. The case of *opéra comique* was different; "popular opera in Paris was firmly established on business principles and remained so, for all the shocking episodes that we like to associate with the word 'revolution'. In fact, the revolution opened up opera as a business proposition, creating far more opportunities than it did catastrophes." (Parker ed. 1994, 122.) There was an increased demand for *opéra comique* in Paris. This was encouraged "by the various Revolutionary governments, who saw the advantage of whipping up patriotic enthusiasm by theatrical means [--], and the existence of two flourishing *opéra comique* theatres at the same time. [--] The old Comédie-Italienne in the rue Favart, renamed Théâtre de l'Opéra-Comique National in 1793, met a formidable rival in the Théâtre Feydey, founded in 1789 as the Théâtre de Monsieur and renamed in 1791." (Sadie ed. 1989, 195.) "The rivalry between these two theatres lasted for ten years, by which time they were economically exhausted: thus they merged." (Parker ed. 1994, 127.) The

Revolutionary *opera comique*, even though losing its importance gradually in Paris after the amalgamation of the two rival theatres, was successful elsewhere in Europe, most notably Germany. "The story of French opera from 1800 to 1830 is vitally concerned with its international acceptance: in fact, its transformation into an exportable commodity." (Parker ed. 1994, 130.) Thus, the emergence of a market that coincided with the revolutions opened up new opportunities for French comic opera operating on business principles.

The *Opéra*, however, was to experience a period of extreme turmoil before the emerging bourgeoisie and the market gained ground in its function. As the freedom to establish theatres was granted in 1791, the *Opéra* was to lose. It had acquired the majority of its funds through the annual dues payable by the lesser theatres to the *Opéra*. When the dues were abolished the commercial theatres flourished. However, "the other side of the coin was that the Paris *Opéra* almost died with the king and the queen, who were executed in 1793." (Parker ed. 1994, 125.) After the rise of Napoleon the role of the *Opéra* was strengthened again. "Napoleon's motivations for support of opera were far from 'artistically' inspired. His much vaunted phrase '*Paris vaut bien un opéra*' reveals the cardinal rule operating at least since the 17th century that a capital city requires a great opera. [-] Furthermore he stated unequivocally that the opera is important and should be supported by the state because it is one of the places of contact between the head of the nation and the nation itself [--]." (Bereson 1998, 86.) The state support for the *Opéra* was thus reinstated and remained, in principle, very similar over the first three decades of the 19th century, whatever the prevailing regime.

After the 1830 'bourgeois' revolution, the administration of the *Opéra* changed considerably. "The *Opéra* now becomes a business, catering to newly ascendant bourgeois audience. Since a self-proclaimed 'bourgeois-king' had recently assumed the throne of France, cultural institutions now naturally turned to the needs of this social class. And so it was as part of his program to buttress his new base of political support that Louis-Philippe encouraged the entry of bourgeois values into the Académie Royale de Musique." (Fulcher 1987, 2.) However, the business character of the *Opéra* after 1830 was only one way of looking at it. Even though Louis Veron made a fortune for himself as the director of the *Opéra*, the enterprise still received state subsidies. These were even more relied on when the first enthusiasm of the new bourgeois public towards grand opera started to decrease in the middle of the 19th century. "[W]ith the French Revolution conceptions of power change; the locus of the power is now the 'people', and hence it resides in 'public opinion'. [--] The *Opéra* was palpably a

dangerous realm, one of contestation over the voice of the 'people', and concomitantly politicians saw it as potentially a realm of challenge to political authority. Not surprisingly they took special care to 'control' the Opéra's public as part of an increased surveillance of the theaters [--]." (Fulcher 1987, 5-7.) Thus the French State assumed the control of the Opéra in 1871, renaming it *Théâtre National d'Opera*. The inauguration of the new Palais Garnier in 1875 marked the end of the era of bourgeois grand opera, and the increase in the colonisation of this public sphere phenomenon by the newly emerged democratic state - as opposed to the previous colonisation by the emerging market during grand opera's peak period. (Gourret 1977, 86.) The end of the century also witnessed the beginnings of the breakdown in the established artistic and institutional division between all sung opera at the *Opéra* and the comic repertory at the *Opéra Comique*. This is evident, for example, in the way Gounod's *Faust* developed. "*Faust*, which was commonly regarded as typical 'grand opera', in fact started life at the Théâtre Lyrique as an *opéra comique* with spoken dialogues. Gounod added the recitatives and the big ballet for the Opéra in 1875." (Sadie ed. 1989, 210.) This development towards the breakdown in the historic division - all sung opera at the *Opéra* and *opéra comique* at the *Opéra Comique* - in the status of the Paris opera houses was to be concluded in 1939, when the two main houses were merged under state control. (Gourret 1977, 94.)

Germany and Austria

The beginning of the 19th century in Germany was characterised by the lingering death of the ideals and structures of the previous century, coinciding with the birth of new ideals that (when carried out by Richard Wagner in the latter part of the century) were to influence the operatic world considerably. The slowness in the demise of the 18th century ideals and practices was partly due to practical reasons. "The decentralisation of German life meant lack of organization: the theatre in Germany was long dependent on a structure consisting broadly of Hoftheater [Court theatres], in which aristocratic and normally Italian traditions predominated, Stadttheater [State theatres] or private enterprise theatre (especially in the Hanseatic cities), and small wandering troupes [--]." In the latter three "mixed repertoires prevailed, with the leading operatic roles often taken by actors willing to sing rather than trained singers, supplemented by a slender chorus probably drawn from a neighbouring church. Upon these shaky

foundations several composers set about building a more individual and dramatic art." (Sadie ed. 1989, 185.) Thus, the institutional structure of the previous century, and the lack of organisation long hindered the development of the German *Singspiel* – which had reached its peak with Mozart - into fully-fledged German romantic opera. In the early decades of the century, models were sought outside Germany. "The French Revolution profoundly impressed the artists of the politically stagnant groups of states that then formed Germany, and in their search for national unity and for a sense of growth and direction it was to France that they turned for the inspiration of a dynamic alternative society. [--] There was [--] a strong wish to develop a more popular, realistic form of opera in reaction to the Italian tradition of *opera seria* which had long been identified with the courts and the *ancien régime*." (Sadie ed. 1989, 181.) However, despite the first 'real' romantic German operas in the early part of the century by Weber, Spohr and Marschner, the changes in the art form and the institutional conventions surrounding it were to come after the 1848 revolution and the rise of Wagner.

"[B]y the end of the 1840s Wagner was formulating [--] radical solutions to what he, and others, regarded as the crisis of opera. Nor is it coincidence that this reappraisal was taking place at precisely the time that social revolution was breaking out all over Europe. For Wagner, the issues of art and society were inextricably intertwined: true art could flourish only in a society free from oppression and exploitation." (Parker ed. 1994, 223-224.) Thus, when the 1848 revolutionary movement reached Dresden, Wagner joined in – not as an artist but as a citizen. He was forced to flee to Zurich where he wrote several essays on art and its function in society, criticising equally the bourgeois opera for being an industry, and the representative opera as entertainment for those who are bored. "What Wagner held up by contrast was the Greece of Aeschylus where the whole community, not just the social élite, attended artistic festivals and where the honour of participation, not money, was the reward." (Spotts 1994, 31.) Thus, there is an obvious parallel between the ideals of Wagner and the ideas of Habermas, who defines the colonisation of the lifeworld (Wagner's 'whole community') by the systemic levels of market, (Wagner's 'money') and the state (Wagner's 'social élite'). The ideals of Wagner are thus already directed beyond the bourgeois public sphere opera towards democratisation of the institution of opera. However, this was not to take place during Wagner's lifetime despite his attempts to hinder the consequences of the market and state involvement, by placing the shrine of his art – Bayreuth – outside the metropolises (to avoid displays of power by the élite) and by dimming the lights in the auditorium (to prevent all bourgeois public sphere interaction or gestures of representative

publicness by the aristocracy). However, even in the case of financing Bayreuth, he needed to rely on these two sources; Ludwig II of Bavaria in the form of royal patronage, and the bourgeoisie in the form of the box office takings after the attempt to fund the enterprise through a patron's association had failed. (Spotts 1994, 45 & 80.) Artistically, however, if not organisationally Wagner proved successful in appealing to the broader German audience. "In the wake of unification in 1871, Germany was awash with musings about national greatness, the 'German soul', the 'German spirit', 'national redemption', 'national salvation'. Wagner's dramas and prose writings had something to offer on all these topics. It was also perfectly natural to compare his struggles in launching the Festival [i.e. Bayreuth] with Bismarck's efforts in founding the Reich and to regard the success of 1876 [the first Bayreuth season] as the cultural counterpart of the military and political triumph of 1871." (Spotts 1994, 77.) The seeds of the nationalistic development of the 20th century were thus already apparent in the case of Bayreuth. In many ways, however, the organisational framework of opera remained static elsewhere in Germany and Austria. For example, it took the 1918 November Revolution to finally end the exclusivity of the Berlin Hofoper – one of the remaining bastions of representative publicness in Germany. (Cowden ed. 1992, 86.) As a comparison, only in 1907 a bourgeois opera house – *Deutsches Opernhaus* - was established in Berlin. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 14.)

4.3. 1914-

The 20th century development in the socio-economic framework for opera in all three countries considered here has been relatively unified. The same trends of development have been fairly uniform around Europe, many even globally. These tendencies are diminishing renewal of the core operatic repertory and increased state funding and control.

The 20th century witnessed a decline in creative operatic activity throughout Europe. The number of 20th century operas that have gained a lasting position in the core repertory of opera houses is very limited when compared with 19th century operas. Often it seems that even 18th century repertory can compete in frequency of appearance with 20th century creations. This development is inevitably linked to 20th century development in music, e.g. the increasing complexity of harmony. "Harmony provides narrative with an engine; harmony

provides harmony with an explanation. But the increasing complexity of harmony in the early twentieth-century was beginning to rob it of its onward urge, and hence to deprive opera of its motive power." (Parker ed. 1994, 280.) Artistic reasons aside, however, there are also socio-economic explanations to the fact that the repertory of opera houses concentrated around the 19th century operas. "Cities were now much larger, the professional and business classes much more numerous and more varied. [--] [O]nly in small town could a narrow élite [--] go on dominating the opera house. [--] Rising incomes and the spread of modern comforts led more and more theatres by the 1880s to take benches out of stalls, fill them with chairs with arm rests, and cut standing room down to almost nothing; promenading was out. [--] Fewer and fewer new operas were being created; opera goers were now content to hear the same dozen or two works again and again [--]. But they did not, as before, hear an opera twenty times in a season; instead they might hear it ten times in forty years [--]." (Parker ed. 1994, 479-481.) Thus, as the wealth of society was increasing and widening the opera audience, the liberal bourgeois public sphere function of the opera house was diminished. The public was now larger but visited the opera house less frequently. This made it possible for the opera houses to present same repertory year after year. This change in the audience, often dated around the First World War, coincides surprisingly with the date of composing of the last operas that have gained a place in the core operatic repertory. "As in so many other areas of artistic, scientific, technical, and philosophical endeavour, the period up to the end of the First World War was one of crucial and rapid change in opera. Within a decade of Verdi's death (in 1901) Strauss's *Elektra* and Schoenberg's *Erwartung* had been written, and by 1917 Berg was at work on *Wozzek* and Stravinsky on *Histoire du soldat*. (Parker ed. 1994, 280.) This further validates the interpretation that the development of the operatic repertory, and thus the socio-economic operating principles of the opera houses, is intertwined with the development towards democratisation of the opera audience.

The second main socio-economic development that can be linked to the broadening and democratisation of the opera audience is the increasing state involvement - in funds and control - in the running of the main opera houses in Italy, France and Germany. This development, as pointed out earlier, has been a pan-European trend, especially since the Second World War. The case of Italy serves well as an example. "The reorganisation of opera with state subsidy and a form of state control was not unique to Italy; it has happened all over Europe, essentially because in advanced economies the costs of opera rise faster than either the possible takings or the general price index. In Italy it was hastened by

discontent at boxholders who blocked financial reform, and by tensions of the First World War [--]. La Scala became a public institution (*ente autonomo*) in 1920; so between 1926 and 1936, did the main – soon to be the only – opera houses in ten other cities; from the latter year, municipalities in smaller towns with opera seasons of more than a month also had to set up a public body to run them." (Rosselli 1992, 210.) With the emergence of public funding the control also crept in. "[B]y the 1930s the essentials were in place – not only subsidy but, in each of the main opera houses, and administration responsible to a ministry in Rome and headed by a superintendent who was a government appointee." (Rosselli 1992, 211.) Similarly, in Germany the Ministry of Culture assumed responsibility over the main opera houses after the 1918 November Revolution. (Cowden ed. 1992, 86.) In France the democratic state had already assumed control and provided funds for the *Opéra* from 1871 onwards. State control of the Paris opera houses was further tightened in 1939 when the *Opéra* and *Opéra-Comique* were brought together under state control by *Réunion des Théâtres Lyriques Nationaux*. "Government bureaucracy with all its regulations now intruded directly into the artistic process." (Cowden ed. 1992, 68.) The state funding, control and the democratisation of opera houses seems during the last few years to have lost its impetus. Several governments have imposed limits on the growth in the amounts of funding and the Italian *enti autonomi* were to be 'privatised', i.e. changed from public bodies into 'independent' foundations by 30 June 1999 to enable the involvement of private capital and commercial ventures. (Sicca 1997, 217.) Thus, the 20th century has witnessed a decline in the role of opera as a bourgeois public sphere phenomenon and the increasing colonisation of the opera organisations by the states. However, the willingness of the states to bear the financial consequences of this colonisation seems to be decreasing. Thus, at the close of the 20th century, the socio-economic organisation of the opera houses appears to be in turmoil again. This further reinforces the need to examine the situation from an analytic point of view.

5. Conclusion

In this section the development of opera, and the socio-economic framework in which it has developed organisationally and institutionally has been briefly presented and analysed. The issues, however, need to be linked together more concisely, as is done below.

Ruth Bereson has recently argued (Bereson 1998) that the continuous support for opera from different states and regimes, whether monarchies or democracies, is due to the fact that opera is above all a state ceremony. To support her argument she analyses the organisational development of opera in France and England in a similar way to this chapter. This, it is argued here, is an unnecessarily state-biased way of looking at the historic development of the socio-economic framework of opera. Based on the theories and examples in this chapter there is a different argument is made here, based on somewhat similar evidence.

It is argued, that opera as an art form is an answer to man's eternal need (Drummond 1980.) for music drama during a certain historic period of Western European society's development – especially in the bourgeois public sphere. (Habermas 1987 & 1989.) Further, it is closely linked to that section of society and its development. As has been demonstrated above, the early development of opera coincides with the changes in society from the feudal system towards the emergence of the state as a separate entity from the ruler, and the rise of the market. Opera as a lifeworld (as opposed to the emerging systems of state and market) phenomenon existed in both these realms, on one hand as a medium for representative publicness (e.g. court operas) and on the other hand as an emerging bourgeois public sphere phenomenon (e.g. the public opera houses in Venice). With the growing importance of the market, opera - as an important aspect of the social life of the emerging bourgeoisie - was increasingly colonised by it. This is evident, for example, in the Italian *impressario* system and the emergence of repertory opera. (Rosselli 1984.) The peak period of opera, especially Italian opera, coincides with this development. The chain of revolutions between 1789 (France) and 1918 (Germany) gradually brought an end to the role of opera as representative publicness and increased the dominating role of the bourgeoisie. This development of increasing democratisation – as it further progressed beyond the bourgeoisie – brought to the fore the colonisation of opera by the state in the 20th century, during which most of the leading opera houses in Europe became state funded and administered. However, it is argued that opera still is – as it always has been – a lifeworld phenomenon existing in the public sphere. It has, during its 400-year existence been a vehicle for representative publicness, and been colonised by the emerging market and subsequently by the emerging welfare-states. As the end of the 20th century is witnessing a shift from state dominance in opera organisations towards the market again, the importance of the civil society – its bourgeois sector or some other – to opera must be born in mind. After all opera is – it is argued – a lifeworld phenomenon, not a systemic one. Thus, only at the

lifeworld level does it attain its importance. This has been recognised – as is evident from the colonisation of the phenomenon – both by the states and the market during the history of opera. At the lifeworld level, therefore, socio-economic support of opera organisations needs to be discussed now as well as in the future.

3. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to define the parameters and variables that influence the organisational structures of opera organisations. This is done in three sections; first the artistic production process and the socio-economic support for opera production are considered individually. At the end of the chapter the discussion is brought together and an analytical model is created for examining the forces that influence the structures of opera organisations.

2. The artistic processes

The aim of this section is to define the artistic variables that need to be investigated if we try to understand the way opera organisations function. The approach used here is 'product led', i.e. the inevitable elements needed in a specific production will be derived from the events that take place on the stage. This is based on the assumption that opera as an art form inevitably imposes its own structures on the organisations engaged in its production. As this historical abstracting process is based on the tacit assumptions of the author, it is naturally only one of the possible interpretations of the facts¹. However, in the course of this study the model arrived at will be tested to justify the assumptions.

2.1. On the physical constraints

In order to define the physical limits of the activity we have defined as opera we need to discuss how far these limits can be extended before we depart from the art form. The limits of any art form are always inevitably in dispute - by the artists

¹ However, Walther Volbach and Quaintance Eaton arrive at similar categorisations in their writings about opera production. The existence of similar classifications and categorisations increases the justification of this attempt as well.

themselves as well as by the analysts and the aestheticians. This aesthetic discussion is outside the limits of this study and will therefore be left to people more qualified to attempt it. However, a working knowledge of the limits of the 'product', opera, needs to be achieved in order to proceed in the analysis of the organisation producing – and thus being influenced by – this 'product'.

We can fairly safely say that opera is an art form appealing to two senses: vision and hearing. More seldom an opera performance engages our senses of taste, feeling or smell. It might be argued that all these senses contribute to the holistic experience of a night at the opera, but as far as the conditions are suitable for human existence (e.g. temperature is within the comfort range) these senses are fairly seldom engaged in the experience of opera as an art form. Naturally, the need to keep the performing environment suitable for the presence of audience and performers has implications for the 'husbandry' of any opera organisation. These practical issues belong to the area of more general venue management and therefore their influence will be included in this study only where they have implications on the artistic-economic dichotomy in opera investigated here. For the above mentioned reasons, we can safely consider opera as an art form of two senses for the purposes of this study, i.e. vision and hearing. Traditionally opera as an art form would be divided into three interdependent aspects, i.e. musical, dramatic and visual elements. This approach will be used later in this discussion. However, at this point it seems fruitful to analyse physical realities of opera divided according to the actual sense with which they are perceived.

Let us first consider the aspect of hearing. In the previous chapter opera was described as a Western European child of the family of music-drama. This indicates that our hearing is engaged in the process of receiving the music associated with the drama in question. Also, as far as the opera contains language-based drama, as is often the case, our hearing is also responsible for receiving that information, be it sung or spoken dialogue. In most opera the music and other heard aspects of drama are produced by acoustic instruments and unaided human voices. (In some contemporary opera this generalisation does not hold. However, here we are bordering the area of shift from traditional opera towards some other form of music-drama.) This acoustic production of the sound elements of opera creates certain demands on the physical realities in which opera is performed. The surroundings need to be limited in size and acoustically favourable to enable the human voice, however well trained, to reach the listeners. The place of performance also needs to be quiet enough to enable this process of communication. These physical demands have led opera as an art

form to contribute towards the development of a purpose built venue, an opera house, in which it is mainly performed. The size and layout of this specific form of building thus reflects aspects of the art form for which it was designed and the size of the audience for which it was intended. The physical reality of the performing venue is thus an aspect that has to be investigated in order to create an understanding of the influence of the art form on the organisation of opera production since the venue and its physical characteristics inevitably define some of its functions.

A similar line of argument is also valid for the visual aspects (here meaning the aspects perceived by the sense of vision) of music drama. Our vision provides us with the information on the rest of the dramatic aspects of opera, i.e. expressions and movements of the singer-actors. It also receives information about the illusory reality in which the music-drama concerned is placed in the form of sets and props. In order for all this to be perceived, we again face the limitations of the human capability of observation. The activities need to be observed from such close range and direction that they can be properly seen. This leads to limitations on size of the venue and also to demands on light and position of the performance in the venue so that it can be seen. The traditional solution to this has been to concentrate all activities on one specific area, the stage. This has obviously been an effective solution to the problems of both seeing and hearing.

The solution to the physical limitations of opera as an art form described above has been the opera house and its stage, which has provided the means to produce opera in a way that it can be seen and heard. Inevitably, whilst the art form has evolved and developed over the centuries, the physical realities (e.g. sizes of venues, lighting techniques etc.) in which it has been performed have also changed.

2.2. Music-dramatic constraints

Alongside this division of opera – based on the physical constraints – into two parts, the more traditional way of describing opera as a threefold activity of music, drama and visual aspects is useful to us. This division reflects the more inherent aspects of the art form. The variables it urges us to investigate will be discussed below one aspect at the time.

Music

We have defined opera in the context of this study to mean a certain Western-European form of music-drama. Therefore, it is not necessary to define all aspects of the music involved in this activity from the very beginning; some aspects will be taken as 'given' in Western-European classical music, leaving the definitions and limits of these issues to be discussed and investigated by musicologists.

In the realm of opera, the music performed on the stage and the music accompanying the stage events needs to be created and performed. In opera these roles are usually separated, i.e. music is composed first and then performed on stage rather than improvised¹. For this production of music we therefore need composer(s) and performers. The role and the definition of the composer is fairly straightforward; the composer is the person responsible for the creation of the music performed. In opera this is usually one person. However, in the early days of opera the music was often compiled from different sources (and also from different composers – the whole remaining, however, stylistically relatively consistent due to usage of contemporary sources) and further adapted by the 'composer' – often the house music director – responsible for the specific performance. This process naturally blurs the identity and role of the composer. However, the music performed at any given time has always been composed by someone and possibly further arranged by another. Therefore, in the creative process of composing opera we find two roles; that of a composer and that of an arranger.

The performing side of music in opera can be roughly divided into two categories; the performers on-stage and the performers off-stage. Normally this division is based on the distinction of participation in the dramatic activities, i.e. the performers on-stage participate in the drama-side of opera whereas the off-stage performers participate only in the musical performance. However, there are instances – depending especially on production – where the off-stage performers also have a dramatic role. The performers on-stage are usually

¹ The amount of freedom of the performers has changed during the history of opera. At some periods improvised embellishments of composed arias have been an integral part of the performer's interpretation. The freedom has not, however, been so great that it could be labelled as improvisation of all the music.

singers, i.e. soloists playing persons of the drama and the chorus acting as non-specified persons taking part in the dramatic events. The musical on-stage performers sometimes also include instrumentalists in a form of a stage ensemble of instruments characterising an ensemble in the drama. The musical performers off-stage usually consist of an orchestra or an ensemble. The size of this group can vary greatly whilst the role it performs remains similar. The leader of this orchestra or ensemble has throughout the history of opera had a distinctive role in acting as an overall coordinator of the musical side of opera production, i.e. conductor – the tradition of the 'artistic conductor' starting from Jean-Baptiste Lully in 1680s.

For the practical side of producing the musical side of opera in physical reality we need (apart from the composer, possible arranger, soloists, chorus, conductor and orchestra) some additional objects (and thus persons to produce these objects). The music has to be made available to the musicians in a printed or written form as a score and the parts; the musicians need training and instruments to be able to perform the music needed etc. The extent to which these practical issues have been included in the role of an opera organisation has changed during the history of the art form; they being most often outside the organisational domain. Therefore, it is important to realise their existence but the relevance they have to this study is fairly limited.

Drama

The dramatic side of opera can be divided into two, the same way as the musical, i.e. to creative and performing sides. The drama has to be created, normally in written form as libretto, for the opera to be composed. It then needs to be performed on stage by performers. In the early days of opera this division into two used to be fairly clear. However, the situation was further complicated later by a person interpreting the dramatic contents of the musical-dramatic activity and instructing the performers in expressing this interpretation. Here we are talking about a stage director - who acts in a similar way to the musical arranger on the musical side - creating an interpretation of a work of art for others to perform. Therefore, in the dramatic side of opera we find two 'creative' roles: that of the author of the libretto (often using a myth or a work of another author as the starting

point) and that of a stage director¹. The stage director, however creative he or she may be, belongs to the performing side of the production team. This view is based on the fact that the creative interpretation of a stage director is associated with a specific performance, not with all the performances of the opera concerned. The on-stage performing side of the dramatic activity is fairly straightforward consisting of the persons participating in the drama. There is a division within this group of people which is based on the importance of the stage role of an individual, i.e. the theatrical division to 'roles' and 'extras'².

Visual aspects of opera

The artistically visual aspects – as opposed to the physical limits of the visual aspects – of opera greatly intertwine with the dramatic aspects. However, in the context of artistically visual (i.e. concerned with different forms of the visual arts) aspects of opera we aim to limit the discussion only to the issues outside the musical or dramatic activities³. The description of visual aspects of opera is easiest to start from the physical objects incorporated in this domain; the roles of the persons needed to produce or design these objects can then be derived from this description. It seems inevitable that all aspects that can be seen on the stage should be included in this category. This goes as far as the looks of the singer-actors who are chosen (apart from the dominant issues of singing and acting skills) on the basis of their appearance and then made further suitable for the role by means of wigs, make-up and costumes. The more obvious issues to

¹ The role of a stage director as an artistic creator is fairly new in the history of opera. Before his arrival the original librettist (or his adapting in-house counterpart) was often the person responsible for the stage action. During different periods of opera history this role has been assumed by composers or occasionally ballet masters. Before the current tradition of stage-directors, the singer-actors played an important role in this creation of the dramatic activity on stage; it being sometimes left completely to them.

² This category would include dancers in operas where ballet is incorporated, supposing that the dancers do not have specific roles in the dramatic activity.

³ The division is often difficult. For example one could ask: Is a knife on stage used for a murder a dramatic or visual aspect? In this we could differentiate between two functions of the knife: it being a knife and serving the drama as a knife and it being a knife with certain visual characteristics outside it being recognisable as a knife. The former would define the dramatic role and the latter the visual role of the knife in the performance concerned.

be incorporated are the objects on the stage, the physical surroundings of the performance (i.e. sets) and the lighting of the stage.

The rationale of incorporating everything that can be seen on stage in the visual objects stems from the fact that so far we have just described activities and persons taking part in the performance. Therefore, without any visual planning we would in effect have naked or arbitrarily dressed performers in an arbitrary place performing the music-drama. Whereas this might be the case in some contemporary performance exploring the limits of the art form, the more usual case would be different. Normally all the aspects needed on stage: costumes, wigs, make-up, props, sets (i.e. surroundings) and lighting would have received some thought even if the outcome of this process were to leave them without any special attention. Therefore, inevitably, persons are needed to make the decisions about the visual aspects of the production. This can be the responsibility of a single person, i.e. visual designer, or all these aspects can be decided by different people resulting in a group of people consisting of set designer, costume designer, make-up artist and lighting designer. This is currently often the case, especially in larger productions.

Apart from the person or group making the decisions, the visual aspects need people to realise these designs, i.e. set builders and painters, props makers, dress makers, make-up personnel, lighting technicians etc. These issues are to some extent outside (i.e. interpreted as belonging to a non-artistic¹ world of management) the domain of this study. However, this group of people is often of considerable size, hence causing significant expenses to the organisation. This inevitably has an impact on the artistic-economic dichotomy investigated here by limiting the freedom of the visual designer(s) through a limited amount of resources. The organisation of these (from the artistic point of view) auxiliary personnel will therefore be left mostly outside this study.

2.3. Conclusion

¹ The skills of set painters etc. are interpreted as belonging more to the category of craftsmanship than art. However, this interpretation might change if the situation were to be looked at from another point in history.

Above we have discussed the variables influencing the functioning of the opera organisation, that can be derived from activities on stage. The discussion has listed several factors and parameters that need to be taken into account. These lists and issues will be further categorised and a model of their relations created later in the course of this chapter. First, however, we need to explore the other side of the organisational reality in producing opera, i.e. the acquiring of the resources needed so that the production process can take place.

3. Economic constraints

In describing the artistic processes needed to produce opera we have, in effect, described the 'spending' side, since all these activities need human and material resources to be realised. In a world of limited resources all these either have to be received as gifts or acquired by exchanging them for money or services etc. Naturally the source of these funds and the limiting aspect of their scarceness form the economic, i.e. 'income' side of the artistic-economic dichotomy explored in this study. Different sources of this 'income' will now be examined and the effect they have on the organisational structures of opera companies will be analysed. This discussion is based on the logical division of this income into four different categories. Additionally, a tripartite division of values attached to this income based on the division of society into three different spheres, i.e. civil society, economy and state, modelled on Habermas, Cohen & Arato, and Nielsen will be used¹. With the help of this tripartite value model, the logical division of four different income sources will then be examined and discussed. Additionally, the question of quality as contextual entity, as proposed by Nielsen (1999) will be incorporated in the discussion. The argument is at this point deliberately theoretical; the modelling exercise requires us to create the categories presented here. In the actual reality of producing opera, and thus in the later analyses, these categories often interact and overlap. However, defining the 'pure' categories here will help us later on in describing the more blurred reality.

3.1. Different sources of income

¹ This model will be presented here for clarity's sake despite the fact that it includes some material that has been briefly presented in the previous chapter.

The most straightforward source of the resources needed for the production process of opera would naturally be the audience that enjoys the 'product', i.e. performance of the opera. In this case the resources needed for the production would be provided by the audience in the form of box office income or some other form of contribution directly linked to the opportunity to enjoy the performance. However, this approach to income by opera organisations has not always been the case. The organisations have often needed additional resources to cover this 'market failure' in gaining their support directly from the audience. The different sources of income can be divided into two categories describing the dichotomies to be found in the contributing bodies. These dichotomies are firstly the division between one source and multiple sources of income and secondly the division between private¹ and institutional² sources. The need to combine these two dichotomies results in four different possible categories of income sources: single private source, multiple private sources, single institutional source and multiple institutional sources. As was mentioned above in the actual reality of producing opera any of these categories seldom appear alone or in a pure form. However, in the course of the later analyses these categories will help us in labelling and understanding the different sources of income in question and their influence on the organisations concerned. The categories mentioned here label only the source of the income without tackling the issue of the reason for the support and the values 'attached' to it. In this the division into civil society, economy and state will be helpful.

3.2. Civil society-economy-state model

The tripartite model of civil society, economy and state is based on the division of society into categories of lifeworld and system explored by Jürgen Habermas in *The Theory of Communicative Action*. In his theory the lifeworld of the individual is further divided into two, i.e. private sphere and public sphere. Cohen & Arato, however, in their *Civil Society and Political Theory* combine these two categories into one, civil society, which will be adopted for the purposes of this study. This lifeworld - civil society - is 'opposed' by two media steered systems, state

¹ The term 'private' here refers to private individuals as opposed to institutions. The distinction between this usage of the term and the way 'private' is used in the theory of Habermas below should be born in mind.

² Institutional here means all bodies that are not private individuals (i.e. belonging to the lifeworld), be they commercial enterprises, states etc.

(steered by the media of power) and economy (market steered by media of money). The theoretical argument has been summarised on pages 12-16 and will not, therefore, be repeated here.

This tripartite division has been introduced into the context of arts funding by Henrik Kaare Nielsen (Nielsen 1996 & 1999.) The application of this theory to arts support is based on the assumption that the community/audience/public finds value in the art-form in question in the lifeworld context. Subsequently these three sources, i.e. state, civil society and economy, provide support for the art-form found valuable by the surrounding society. Each of them has different aims and reasons for this support based on their own values and assumptions. The author's interpretation and understanding of these three value systems will be briefly presented below one category at a time.

Civil society

The underlying value system in the support for arts from civil society is the notion of the members of society accepting common individual responsibility for the things commonly found valuable. That is to say that whoever has the means of providing something found communally valuable is expected to provide it. However, the judgement for the relative value of things and the amount of support they need, is left to the discretion of the individual. In this he/she is sensitive to the communal values and to the ethos of shared responsibility for the 'common good' in his lifeworld.

State

The value system behind support from the state is the bureaucratized form of accepting common responsibility for the common good on the systems level. In this form the individuals contribute to the state according to their means (normally in the form of taxes) and the state then distributes the funds to provide services according to the priorities decided by the rulers, in democratic societies through a democratic process. In the case of democracies the values of competing needs in the society and their relative priority becomes a more problematic issue (than e.g. in the case of civil society) since they need to be made more explicit for them to be commonly discussed and decided by public opinion.

Economy

The value system behind the third source of support, the economy (market place, market force), is more straightforward. The support is channelled to things found valuable for the individual or organisation concerned. The value can be direct, as in the case of a paying audience, or indirect, as in the case of a sponsoring commercial enterprise. The task of prioritising and valuing the things competing for a contribution is, in the case of the market, a more straightforward process, since it involves only one individual or organisation which makes the decision on the basis of the greatest good gained for it/him/herself in relation to the expenditure.

Closely associated with these categories is the notion of quality - used commonly as a measure of success of an arts organisation - as a contextual entity as proposed by Nielsen. (Nielsen 1999.) He finds three different contexts for discussion of quality; the art institution as context, the political and economic context and the lifeworld as context. The quality in the context of an arts institution is “determined by a common reference to the ‘institution of art’, conceived as an esoteric field of praxis with its own criteria for validity based on discourses stemming from expert culture”. (Nielsen 1999, 191.) In the political and economic context of quality “the quality of aesthetic artefacts is directly proportional to their ability to attract broad and positive public attention.” (Nielsen 1999, 192.) The lifeworld as context discusses quality “in connection with, for instance the concept of *aesthetic experience* and hence as the question of the qualitative features of the dialogic exchange between a certain artefact and the potentials of a certain user shaped by the lifeworld and the life experience of the user.” (Nielsen 1999, 192.) Naturally, the discussion of quality is very complex and philosophically less clear-cut than described here. However, these categories seem useful for analysing the organisational reality in which opera organisations exist, even though they could be further debated aesthetic-philosophical terms.

With the help of these three categories we can analyse the underlying value systems of different sources of income for opera organisations. The different contextual concepts of quality have not been included directly in the model presented below. However, they will be used in the subsequent analyses. It cannot be emphasised too much that these are only analytical categories and seldom exist in pure forms in reality. However, it is argued here that they clarify the discussion and analyses of opera organisational structures.

3.3. Conclusion

We have discussed different ways of analysing and categorising the income, i.e. economic, side of opera organisations. The different ways of obtaining resources, including the income derived directly from the audience at the box-office, bear different sets of values. These inevitably have an impact on the organisation that needs to fulfil the value expectations that come with the support it receives. These will not be discussed here; this issue is one to which we hope to gain some insight in the course of the analyses. Hopefully, some correlation between different organisational structures and income sources will be detected and thus some insight into this interaction gained in the course of this study. Before tackling with the actual analyses, the taxonomies and models based on the discussion above will need to be explicitly presented. This will be done below.

4. The model of variables and parameters

We have listed issues and topics to be considered in the analyses of opera organisations. Also, some analytical categories have been discussed in order for them to be engaged in this process. To present these more explicitly and to observe their relations with each other we need to examine these in the forms of taxonomies and models that will then be used as tools in the analyses to come. This will be done in the same order as in the discussion to enable comparisons with the text.

4.1. Venue

In conjunction with the discussion of the physical limits of opera above, the issue of the venue was brought up. This was done on the assumption that the art form has influenced the development of the venue in which it has been performed and this has subsequently had effects on the production of opera and the management of opera organisations. Therefore, by observing some aspects of

this venue and its development we can find links with the changes within the organisation of the production.

The variables that came up in the discussion are:


- Type of venue
- Size of venue
- Acoustics of the venue
- Layout of the venue
- Lighting
- Stage

All these variables define the type of performance venue we now know as 'opera house'. They also define the physical realities that need to be considered when performing opera. The importance of these issues to the discussion and understanding of opera, and thus opera organisations, comes clear for example from Wagner's minute attention to the planning of his Bayreuth theatre. With the help of the variables listed above we can set the scene for the analyses of the artistic processes, and subsequently of the organisations, functioning in these specific physical limits. These issues will be incorporated in the model below as a background in which the model of the artistic production process exists.

4.2. Music-dramatic constraints

In the discussion above we adopted the traditional division of opera into tripartite activity of music, drama and visual aspects as a useful concept for the purposes of this study. As this division forms the basis for the process of building a model below, it is presented here in the form of a figure, however simple this may seem. Below we will contemplate the individual 'corners' of this figure, i.e. music, drama and visual aspects, one at the time.


Figure 2.



Music

In the discussion above about the music-dramatic constraints we found two distinctive roles in the production of music for opera, i.e. creative and performing. The creative role is limited to composer and in some cases arranger (whose secondary role is implicated by a dashed line in the model). The performing side is further divided into two different groups, i.e. performers on stage and off stage. The former consists of soloists, chorus and in some cases an ensemble. The latter consists of an orchestra or ensemble and its leader or conductor. In this process of bringing music about in an opera production we also defined some extra-musical issues needed, such as printed music, instruments etc. These, however, were considered to be mainly outside the scope of this study. The division of music according to this categorisation is presented in figure 3.


Figure 3.



Drama

The dramatic side of opera in the discussion above was divided into two, i.e. the creative and performing sides. The creative side consists of a librettist alone¹, often influenced, however, by a myth or an original author. The librettist creates the drama to be performed. The performing side consists of a creative stage director² (in recent times) and the roles, performed by singer-actors, and extras, consisting of members of chorus, dancers etc. This division is presented in the figure 4 below.

Figure 4.



Visual aspects


The visual aspects of opera production were divided into several different areas, i.e. costumes, wigs, make-up, props, sets and lighting. These issues need to be planned and decided by a single person, or each by a different individual. On the creative side of visual aspects of opera we can therefore have a different number of people. In the realisation of these designs certain craftsmen and assistants are needed. In the discussion above, however, we categorised these people as non-artistic staff, mainly on the basis of current consensus. Their numbers,

¹ Sometimes this role is divided between two people, the original librettist and the in-house adapting librettist acting in a way similar to that of the arranger on the musical side.

² The stage director does not appear on the stage him/herself. However, as was described above, his role is more associated with a specific performance than with more overall creative responsibilities. Thus, he/she is categorised on the performing side.

however, influence the artistic freedom of the designers and also the economic implications of their designs. Therefore, they need to be included in the model. The model is presented in figure 5.

Figure 5.




4.3. Holistic model of the artistic process

To successfully contemplate the artistic side of opera production we need to incorporate all the above models into one. This model is presented below in figure 6. It aims to describe the variables of artistic opera production and their relationship to each other and to the surrounding physical realities. In the model, the core artistic roles are highlighted with bold text. There are several ways in which these key artists interrelate with each other in the artistic production process. However, these cannot be mapped here as they change in each individual production team.

Figure 6.


Artistic process in its physical constraints



4.4. Sources of income and their values

In the discussion above we arrived at a logical division of four different sources of resources for opera organisations, i.e. 1) single private source, 2) single institutional source, 3) multiple private sources and 4) multiple institutional sources. In addition to this we defined three different value systems attached to this income, i.e. civil society, economy and state. It seems unnecessary to list all twelve combinations of these categories; in the analyses the first will act as the basis for classifying the income source and the latter will be used in defining the value system that it represents. Naturally, these will seldom be clear cut. However, the combinations and conflicts that may be observed will be illuminating for the analyses. Also, the concept of quality as contextual entity will be incorporated in the analyses even though it is not explicitly present in the model. The model for analysing the income sources is presented below in figure 7.


Figure 7.



4.5. The model for analysing the organisational environment of opera organisations

Above we have presented two different sides affecting the functioning of opera organisations in model form. These models represent the forces at the respective ends of the artistic-economic continuum. They are incorporated in a single model below in figure 8. The point of intersection in this model represents the organisation and its decision-making and organisational structures. The aim of the research project is to analyse five opera organisations and explore how the forces mapped in this analytical model influence their organisational structures.

Figure 8.



5. Conclusion

In this chapter the analytical parameters and model for analysing the environment influencing organisational structures of opera companies have been presented. In the next part of the thesis five case-study organisations are presented and the aspects explored in the analytical model described – as far as the information has been available – in the context of individual opera companies. This will enable further analyses and discussion about the forces and variables listed here in the discussion and conclusion of the thesis.

PART II – CASE STUDIES

4. INTRODUCTION

1. Preface

In this section of the thesis five case-studies on organisational structures of opera companies are presented. The aim of the case-studies is to examine the way in which the variables and structures listed in the analytical model presented in the first part of the thesis manifest themselves in the selected opera organisations. Furthermore, the aim is to find patterns and similarities in their structures that arise from the influences caused by the artistic and the socio-economic sides of producing opera. The case-study organisations described are the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, the English National Opera, the Finnish National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the *Opéra national de Paris*. The *Teatro alla Scala*, Milan and the Metropolitan Opera Association were also involved in the initial stages of the case-study material collection, but unfortunately withdrew in the course of the process.

2. Selection of the case-study organisations

The selection of the case-study organisations was based initially on three criteria: geographical spread in the historical core area of opera activity (i.e. Europe and North America), the spread in the income structure of the houses, and the size and status of the organisation. These criteria will be discussed below one at the time. The aim was to get as wide a differentiation in the two first criteria and as uniform a corpus as possible in the third criterion. The corpus of the organisations analysed in this research was, however, also influenced by several practical limitations. These will also be discussed below in conjunction with the description of the process of data collection.

The first criterion in the case-study selection was the geographical spread of organisations. The aim was to select a set of organisations that would represent the main areas of operatic activity. In this selection the importance of the area in

the historical continuum of opera was also considered. These core areas were deemed¹ to be the Italian peninsula (today's Italy), France, and the German-speaking area of Europe (today's Austria and Germany). The organisations included represent these areas, with the exception of Italy due to the withdrawal of the *Teatro alla Scala*. North America was to be included in the research partly for the geographical spread, but mainly due to the differing income structure of most North-American opera organisations. Unfortunately, the Metropolitan Opera Association withdrew from the research project and it could not be replaced due to the time-limitations of the project. Thus, there is no representative of North America among the case-study organisations. England was also included in the study, increasing the geographical spread. However, the reasons for including the English case-studies were more to do with the income structures of the selected English opera organisations and practical reasons than geographical considerations. Unfortunately, Eastern Europe, as influential as it has often been in the history of opera especially in the 19th century, had to be excluded. This was due mainly to the practical reasons of language, as the researcher did not have command of any of the eastern languages. (The inclusion of, say, the Marinsky Theatre, would have certainly provided very interesting information.) However, due to the background of the author, Finland was included to increase the geographical spread of the case-study organisations.

The second criterion in the selection of the case-study organisations was the income structure of the organisations. The aim was to get a variation between a high level of state funding on one hand and high level of reliance on self-generated income and private patronage on the other. The organisations included in the research representing the extremes of this dichotomy are the Deutsche Oper Berlin and the Glyndebourne Festival Opera. There is a greater number of organisations relying on high levels of state funding in the case-study organisations than organisations relying on self-generated income and private patronage. If the Metropolitan Opera Association could have been included in the research a better balance would have been achieved. Unfortunately the withdrawal of the MET left the majority of the organisations as being fairly heavily subsidised, as is the case in most European countries. Thus, the geographical spread of the organisations influenced the variation in the income structures. This,

¹ The selection of the geographical areas is reinforced by most opera histories; the geographical structure in the presentation of opera history is often based on the same area definitions as adopted here.

however, can be seen as an interesting finding of the research as the continental European opera houses seem to represent a fairly uniform income structure.

The third criterion in the selection of the case-study organisations was the size and status of the organisation. The aim was to find organisations that have a high artistic status either nationally or internationally. Thus, the artistic quality of the case-study organisations' output could in this way be assumed to be fairly uniform – it being either nationally or internationally recognised. Also, the organisations (with the exception of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera¹) are opera houses presenting opera on a continuous basis. This approach was chosen for several reasons. First, the case-study organisations chosen this way are at least rudimentarily comparable. The study does not aim to be comparative research in the strict sense, but aims to perceive patterns and analyse the structures of the case-study organisations. Thus, the similarity in status and size helps in this process. Also, as the organisations operate in a similar realm artistically and have similarities in size and status, some comparative data can be based on this selection.² Second, there is more material available about the nationally and internationally important opera organisations, than about smaller and less significant organisations. This was deemed important for the practical reasons of data collection. There is literature available about all the organisations selected as case-studies which proved to be invaluable in the course of conducting the research process.

3. The method of data collection

The data presented below in the case-study descriptions has been collected in three different ways: from existing literature, by correspondence with the organisations involved resulting in sets of primary and secondary data, and by conducting semi-structured interviews. These will be presented and explained below. The actual process of data-collection will also be described.

¹ However, as General Director Nicholas Snowman points out, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera with 75 performances at Glyndebourne and 45 on tour annually is more active than La Scala. (Clark 1999, 10.)

² The inclusion of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is slightly problematic in this sense. However, the income-structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera provides interesting information that outweigh the problems in comparability.

The first method of data-collection from literature is self-evident. However, it is important to note, that the information available about the historical development of the organisations in question was deemed imperative to be included in the case-study descriptions. This information, however, was not readily available from the organisations themselves; they seem to have their hands too full in dealing with the present to trouble themselves with the historical facts. Thus, the literature and studies of the histories of the organisations have provided the main sources of information about the organisational history (i.e. development of legal status etc.) of the case-study organisations.

The written information acquired from the organisations through correspondence constitutes primary and secondary data. The selected organisations were initially contacted by letter asking their willingness to participate in the research. After the initial reaction had proved positive in all seven cases (i.e. the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, the English National Opera, the Finnish National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the Metropolitan Opera Association, the *Opéra national de Paris* and the *Teatro alla Scala*, Milan) the detailed description of the information requested was sent to the organisations. The main categories of information requested were: legal status, composition of the board of directors, organisational structure/chart, income and expenditure information, information about the employee structure of the organisation, information about the venue used by the organisation, and programming and pricing information. The complete set of information requested is included in Appendix 1. The information gathered – as far as possible – concerned the calendar year 1998¹ as the financial information about the organisations was most often based on the calendar year. This approach was chosen to maintain some degree of comparability between the organisations. Thus, all other information – e.g. about programmes etc. is presented for the same period of time (often the calendar year) wherever possible, even though the actual seasons differ from this definition in all cases. The material gathered from the organisations containing the requested information, includes unpublished internal documents, internal working-papers, publicity materials, annual reports etc. As the referencing of some of the primary and

¹ There are exceptions to this rule due to different time-frame of operations of the organisations. For example, the data about the Finnish National Opera is about year 1997, due to the early response of the organisation to the researcher's requests. Further, the data about the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is compiled from different sources, the years varying between 1995 and 1998.

secondary material would have proven to be very complex, a simple method of referencing has been adopted in these cases. The case-study material of each of the organisations (apart from published literature) is referred to as one entity, the list of all the material given separately in the bibliography section. For example, in the case of the English National Opera the whole case-study information collected in the course of the research, but not having a clear separate reference, is referred to as ENO 1998. The definitions of the sources, both primary and secondary, can then be found in the bibliography.

In the course of the correspondence process the Metropolitan Opera Association and the *Teatro alla Scala* withdrew from the project. The reason for the MET so doing was obviously the extensive set of information requested. The management of the organisation considered some of the information highly confidential due to the private nature (legally the MET is a private association) of the organisation. This was the case especially about all financial information over and above the information included in the Annual Report of the organisation. Similar problems were involved in the process of data-collection on the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the other privately-funded organisation included. However, as the requested information was discussed, a compromise was achieved that enabled Glyndebourne to participate in the research without disclosing any confidential information. Thus, some information available about other case-study organisations is not available about the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, or is only present in a more general form. The *Teatro alla Scala* was undergoing a change in its legal status from an *ente autonomo* (a public autonomous body) into a foundation under the private law operating (at least in principle) more independently of the government. Thus, during the process of data collection this change seemed to influence the whole organisation, resulting in reluctance to provide the information required. Also, there was an Italian research project underway into the change of status of the organisation, which contributed to the reluctance to provide the information once again, to a foreign researcher. Therefore, it was decided not to include the *Teatro alla Scala* in the study, since the required set of information could not be completed.

After the completion of the written data collection and initial analysis of the information gathered, the key figures in the case-study organisations were interviewed. The aim was to interview the directors dealing with the artistic-economic dichotomy. Interviews were requested with the General Director (in most cases the artistic director) and the Administrative Director of each of the organisations. Additionally, interviews were requested with the Chair of the Board

of Directors or representative of the funding body, whichever was applicable. Unfortunately, not all the interviews could be granted, due to the tight schedules of the directors involved. However, a sufficient number of interviews were conducted to explore the artistic-economic decision-making structures of the case-study organisations. The interviews conducted were semi-structured concentrating on five major topics: the relationship between the organisation and the funding body, the division of responsibilities between the directors (general director, administrative director and music director or whichever set was applicable), the relationship between artistic planning and budgeting processes, the economic-organisational control of the artistic production process, and the predicted future trends in the artistic-economic relationship (e.g. diminishing funding and its implications on policies etc.). As the issues discussed were of a relatively delicate nature, the interviews were not recorded. This was deemed important for keeping the interviews 'confidential' in nature. The main points covered in the interviews were recorded in the interviewer's notes. This semi-structured and 'confidential' way of conducting the interviews did not produce a defined set of recorded answers to a defined set of questions. However, as the interviews mainly supported and confirmed the findings of the analysis of the written case-study material, the method was deemed most appropriate. Had the interviews been recorded word for word, the directors would hardly have commented on e.g. the artistic-economic planning process as freely as they in fact did.

4. Presentation of the case studies

The case-studies will be presented one at the time. Each of the case-study presentations is divided into nine different topics, that are presented individually below. There are some minor variations in the presentation of the material based on the differing structures of the organisations. Even though every possible effort has been made to present the material in a uniform manner, the organisations and the information available about them have inevitably influenced the nature of the descriptions. There is, for example, quite comprehensive data available about the income and expenditure structure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*. Thus, the financial data is presented in a more detailed manner than in other case-studies. However, it has been deemed useful to provide such a detailed account about the expenditure structure of one of the opera organisation since this information is often not available. The small variations in the structures of the case-study descriptions are due to factors similar to this. The main areas covered in the case-

study descriptions are: the legal status of the organisation and its historical development; the income and expenditure structure; the board of directors (or equivalent) governing structure; the personnel structure; the basic details about the venue used; the programming, pricing and audience figures (where available); the organisational structure; and the artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure. At the end of each of the case-study descriptions, the data is summarised in table form. The case studies will be compared and discussed and the emerging conclusions will be examined in the discussion and conclusions part of the thesis following the case-study descriptions.

5. THE *DEUTSCHE OPER BERLIN*

1. *Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation*

In 1907, representatives of the Berlin bourgeoisie - e.g. prominent artists, public figures and journalists - organised themselves into an association '*Grosse Berliner Operverein e.V.*' to create a 'Richard Wagner' opera theatre in Charlottenburg, Berlin. The aim was to erect a bourgeois opera theatre with democratic seating - all seats facing the stage, no boxes - to compete with the *Königlichen Hofoper Unter den Linden* (Royal Opera 'Unter den Linden'), which at that time still did not allow entry to the bourgeois public¹. (*Berlin Senatsverwaltung* 1983, 4.). The aim was to gain cultural equality with the aristocracy for the bourgeoisie who had become financially emancipated during the 19th century. The chair of the association was composer Engelbert Humperdinck, who had been an assistant to Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 12.)

The two other opera houses in Berlin - the *Hofoper* and the *Komische Oper* - were financially dependent on subsidies from the Prussian Monarch and a businessman, J. Epstein, respectively. The '*Grosse Berliner Operverein e.V.*' aimed at creating a financially independent opera organisation and trying to run it under the commerce laws in the form of a private company (*Aktiengesellschaft*, i.e. PLC). (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 13.) In order to publicise the project and to raise funds, the association created a publicity campaign at the end of 1910. It was given an enthusiastic reception by the opera-loving bourgeoisie, e.g. businessmen, civil servants, doctors, engineers etc., resulting in a total of 8 350 subscriptions. This raised DM 600 000² of the DM 1 000 000 share capital, the rest being donated by the founders of the association. Thus, the '*Deutsche Opernhaus Betriebs-Aktiengesellschaft*' was founded in January 1911. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 14.)

Even though the bourgeois association had sought independence from all authorities, financial or other, it did not quite escape the control of the officialdom.

¹ This was changed only few years later when as a result of the November Revolution of 1918, the *Hofoper* changed into the more democratic *Staatsoper*. The new Ministry of Culture assumed the responsibility of the *Staatsoper* in 1919. (Cowden, ed.1992, 86.)

² In 1911 figures.

The lease agreement between the *Stadt Charlottenburg* (City of Charlottenburg in the western region of Greater Berlin, now an integral part of Berlin) and the '*Deutsche Opernhaus Betriebs-Aktiengesellschaft*' created the instrument for control. The City of Charlottenburg agreed to erect an opera house, the cost of which would amount to DM 3 000 000, and lease it to the company for 30 years for an annual rent of DM 250 000. However, the City retained the rights to decide the ticket prices, to oversee the maintaining of high artistic quality and to monitor the contracts of the company. In addition to this, the City had a general right to control the functioning of the company. If these clauses were not honoured the lease agreement would be terminated. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 16.)

The new opera house was opened in November 1912 under the name of '*Deutsches Opernhaus*'. To begin with it operated as a private company but faced its first financial difficulties already in 1913, despite the fact that the performances were sold out every evening. The company asked the City to raise the ticket prices, which was agreed upon but resulted in tightening control by the City authorities. The company kept operating with financial difficulties during its early years of existence - partly due to the First World War and the high inflation in Germany after the war - and gradually became more dependent on the City, which granted it partial exemption from rental payments from 1914 onwards and finally a direct subsidy in 1920. After a series of speculative attempts by businessmen to take over the company, it was finally declared bankrupt in December 1924. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 19-34.)

In 1925, the *Stadt Berlin* (City of Berlin, under which all the Cities - including Charlottenburg - in the Greater Berlin area had been united in 1920) took responsibility for the organisation, taking over the limited shares on favourable terms and renamed it *Städtische Oper* (City Opera). It came under the authority of the Prussian Cultural Bureau, remaining however for the time being as '*Aktiengesellschaft*', and has since then been controlled and funded by the cultural authorities of Berlin. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 76-78.) Between 1933-44 the Propaganda Ministry of the German Reich was responsible for running the company, again named *Deutsches Opernhaus* for political purposes. (*Berlin Senatsverwaltung* 1983, 4.) During this 'take-over' the legal status of the organisation was changed and it became a public institution operating under the direct authority of the cultural administration - a model which has continued until today.

In 1943, the Charlottenburg Opera House was badly damaged in air raids and the company performed in *Admiralspalast am Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse* till the closure of all theatres in Berlin in autumn 1944. After the Second World War the company performed in the relatively undamaged *Theater des Westens* as the *Städtisches Oper Berlin* (Berlin City Opera), operating under the authority of the western allied forces until the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* was formed. In 1961 the company moved to a new theatre built by the Berlin Senate on the Charlottenburg site. It changed its name to *Deutsche Oper Berlin* which linked the organisation and the New Opera House to the original Charlottenburg opera house and company. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 79-80.) The unification of Germany did not have any direct effects on the functioning, legal or financial, of the company, but it did, however, open it to competition from the other two Berlin opera houses that had existed in East Berlin.

Currently the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* operates under the control of *Berlin Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur* (Senate Administration of Science, Research and Culture). It is a legally non-independent public organisation and its relationship with the *Berlin Senatsverwaltung* is defined in *Haushaltsstrukturgesetz* of 1996. The financial relationship between the Deutsche Oper and the *Senatsverwaltung* is defined in the Statute '*Allgemeine Anweisung über die Finanzierung von Theatern und Orchestern in Berlin*' (General Instructions on the Financing of Theatres and Orchestras in Berlin) of 25th October 1994. The introduction to the instructions for the '*Staatliche Einrichtungen*' (Public Institutions) states that the "first task of theatres and orchestras is to fulfil the organisation's cultural aims. However, they must in this framework ensure that as high proportion of the expenditure as possible is covered by their own income." The more specific ways in which these statutes dictate the financial control and management of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* will be commented on in the section addressing the decision-making structures of the organisation.

2. Income structure of the DOB

This section is based on several sources of information, all from different years (1995-1998). However, it is deemed useful to consider all these sources as they reveal different aspects about the organisation. The total income of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* in the 1996 financial year - the most recent figures available from the *Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur* - amounted (in full

thousands) to DM 102 100 000¹. It is divided into two categories: subsidies DM 88 137 000 (86,3%) and self-generated income, DM 13 963 000 (13.7%) The only source of subsidies is the Berlin Land² (State of Berlin), *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* under which the Deutsche Oper exists organisationally as was explained above. The category of self-generated income is in the 1996 figures by the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* divided into three subcategories: Ticket yield DM 9 207 600, sundry income DM 2 167 000 and sundry operational income DM 2 588 000. (*Berlin Senatsverwaltung* 1997, 1102.)

The 1998 budget of *Deutsche Oper Berlin* sheds more light into the division of the income structure. The anticipated total income for 1998³ amounts to DM 100 025 000, consisting of DM 80 231 000 (80%) subsidy from the Land⁴ and self-generated income of DM 19 794 000 (20%), divided into DM 9 550 000 box office yield, DM 7 409 000 sundry income and DM 2 835 000 sundry operational income. The latter two are further broken down in the budget as follows: (*Berlin Senatsverwaltung* 1997, 1103-1105.)

Sundry income 1998:

Touring	6 208 000 ⁵
Rental income	610 000
Programme sales	350 000
Advertising income	120 000
Lease income	61 000
Broadcasting income	50 000
Sundry	10 000
Total Sundry income DM	7 409 000

¹ The result for the financial year 1996 was DM 2 492 000 in deficit, i.e. the total expenditure figure was DM 104 592 000.

² According to the German system of arts subsidies, the *Länder* (the States) subsidise the arts organisations functioning in their area. The *Bund* (Federation) subsidises very few organisations directly and even then the amount of subsidy is relatively small.

³ The DOB made a surplus for 1998 totalling DM 350 000. However, as the accounts are not made publicly available the, Budget needs to be the basis for the presentation. This is deemed sufficiently accurate as the surplus is relatively small in comparison with the whole budget.

⁴ The Land is the only source of direct subsidies. However, the Federal Government has granted the Berlin Senate an 'earmarked' sum of DM 17 000 000 for subsidies to the nationally important Berlin opera houses. This figure is anticipated to rise in the future.

⁵ The category of sundry income is exceptionally large in 1998 due to the high touring income, DM 6 208 000. The comparable 1997 figure was only DM 200 000.

<i>Sundry operational income 1998:</i>	
Donations and sponsorship income	2 000 000
Reimbursements by third parties	350 000
Income from investments	20 000
Sales	5 000
Sundry	460 000
Total Sundry operational income DM	2 835 000

There is more detailed information about box-office income and some other items in the *Deutscher Bühnenverein Theaterstatistik* 1995/96. The category of self-generated income for the financial year 1995 - the most recent figures available - totalling DM 12 916 000, is broken down accordingly below. The *Deutscher Bühnenverein* figures also give a separate category of sponsorship income amounting to DM 908 000 (0.8% of total income) in 1995. The amount of sponsorship income has since risen dramatically to DM 2 000 000 in 1998 (2% of total income), more than doubling the 1995 figures in four years. (*Deutscher Bühnenverein* 1996, 96-97.)

<i>Self-generated income 1995:</i>	
Box office income	9 926 000
<i>Individual tickets</i>	<i>7 294 000</i>
<i>Subscriptions</i>	<i>1 343 000</i>
<i>Sales through 'friends' organisations¹</i>	<i>1 289 000</i>
Sales of programmes	381 000
Costume rentals	375 000
Broadcasting fees	350 000
Touring	112 000
Advertisements income	110 000
Sundry income ²	1 662 000
Total self-generated income 1995 DM	12 916 000

3. The expenditure structure of the DOB

The 1996 total expenditure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* amounted to DM 104 592 000 according to the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*. This is divided into four categories: personnel expenses DM 90 811 000 (87% of total expenditure),

¹ *Besucherorganisationen.*

² Includes box-office income from certain concession tickets.

sundry operational expenses DM 9 414 000 (9% of total expenditure), material expenses DM 3 931 000 (3,6% of total expenditure), and write-offs DM 436 000 (0,4% of total expenditure).

These categories are broken down more specifically - making the information more useful - in the 1998 budget of the organisation. The total anticipated expenditure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is DM 102 590 000. It breaks down into subcategories as follows: personnel expenses DM 86 640 000 (84.5% of total expenditure), sundry operational expenses DM 12 631 000 (12.4% of total expenditure), material expenses DM 3 136 000 (3% of total expenditure), and taxes DM 183 000 (0.1% of total expenditure). These categories are further broken down in considerable detail below: (*Berlin Senatsverwaltung* 1997, 1104-1105.)

Personnel expenses 1998:

Salaries of civil servants ¹	208 000
Remuneration for permanent employees	7 688 000
Remuneration for temporary employees	99 000
Wages for permanent workers	17 882 000
Wages for temporary workers	1 180 000
Expenditure for permanent artistic and artistic-technical personnel	48 471 000
Expenditure for temporary artistic and artistic-technical personnel	12 502 000
Expenditure for free-lance staff	96 000
- structural savings in personnel expenses	- 1 486 000
Total personnel expenses DM	86 640 000

¹ For further definitions of the different employee categories, see the section on personnel structure below. The categories are presented here in the same 'hierarchical order' as in the budget.

<i>Sundry operational expenses 1998:</i>	<i>Subdivided</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Artistic expenses¹</i>		<i>5 957 000</i>
Touring	4 510 000	
Copyright fees and commissions	807 000	
Travel expenses (artistic activities)	640 000	
<i>Building related costs</i>		<i>2 249 000</i>
Heating	860 000	
Electricity	713 000	
Cleaning	381 000	
Water and sewage	180 000	
Refuse collection	115 000	
<i>Rents and maintenance</i>		<i>1 725 000</i>
Rents for vehicles	540 000	
Rents for buildings	520 000	
Maintenance of machinery	287 000	
Computers and their maintenance	154 000	
Maintenance of vehicles	22 000	
Maintenance of buildings	112 000	
Rents for equipment	75 000	
Maintenance of office equipment	15 000	
<i>Administration</i>		<i>1 407 000</i>
Marketing and public relations	681 000	
Consultation	208 000	
Auditing	160 000	
Telephone	130 000	
Postage	135 000	
Travel expenses (administration)	42 000	
Office stationary	35 000	
Publications	11 000	
Hospitality	5 000	
<i>Sundry</i>		<i>1 293 000</i>
Sundry personnel expenses	223 000	
Insurance	205 000	
Sundry expenses	865 000	
Total sundry operational expenses DM		12 631 000

¹ For the sake of clarity this category has been grouped into subcategories. This is, however, not a feature of the original budget of *Deutsche Oper Berlin* but has been done here for the purpose of increased readability and informativity .

<i>Material expenses 1998:</i>		
Material for new productions		1 163 000
Material for revivals		680 000
Sundry contracted material preparation		597 000
Printed materials		385 000
Raw materials for workshops and technical departments		135 000
Contracted material preparation for productions		120 000
Props		50 000
Sundry material expenses		6 000
Total material expenses DM		3 136 000

A different way of breaking down the costs can be found in the *Deutscher Bühnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96*. It gives details for the financial year 1995, during which the total expenditure of *Deutsche Oper Berlin* amounted to DM 105 247 000. This is broken down into three categories, personnel expenses DM 93 751 000 (89.1% of total expenditure), material expenses DM 11 260 000 (10.7% of total expenditure), and finance related expenses DM 236 000 (0.2% of total expenditure). The first two figures are further broken down below. (*Deutscher Bühnenverein 1996*, 114-115.)

<i>Personnel expenditure 1995:</i>		
Artistic personnel		62 005 000
<i>Directors etc.</i>	5 917 000	(9.5%)
<i>Soloists</i>	20 736 000	(33.4%)
<i>Ballet ensemble</i>	5 136 000	(8.3%)
<i>Chorus</i>	10 336 000	(16.7%)
<i>Orchestra</i>	19 880 000	(32.1%)
Technical and stage personnel		25 863 000
Administration and front-of-house staff		5 054 000
Sundry personnel expenditure		829 000
Total personnel expenditure DM		93 751 000

<i>Material expenses 1995:</i>		
Administration expenses		507 000
Rents and leases		584 000
Publicity materials, publications		1 182 000
Sets and costumes		2 615 000
Copyright and related material costs		910 000
Touring		95 000
Expenses from visiting companies		331 000
Sundry expenses		5 038 000
Total material expenses		11 260 000

4. The personnel structure

In the Appendix¹ to the 1998 Budget of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* the personnel is divided into four different main categories: civil servants, employees, workers and artistic-technical personnel. The last three of these are further divided into two categories based on the nature of employment, i.e. permanent or temporary. As the organisation is a non-independent public institution its employment structure and categories are based on the German public service structures thus giving very good security to the employees. The category of civil servants² (*Beamte*, 3.5 positions) is a relic of the past, when most of the employees were granted civil servant status. More recently, this very restrictive personnel policy has been changed towards more flexible contracts. The three latter categories can roughly be described according to the function of the posts and their relative importance in the organisation. The employees (*Angestellte*, 110 permanent and 1 temporary positions) are the administrative personnel and the heads of workshops etc. The workers (*Arbeiter*, 259.5 permanent and 37 temporary positions) are the labourers of the organisation consisting of stage hands, lighting technicians, cleaners etc. The artistic and artistic-technical personnel (*Künstlerisches und künstlerisch-technisches Personal*, 407 permanent and 30 temporary positions) consist of the creative artistic personnel (directors, conductors, designers) and their assistants, soloists, chorus and orchestra etc. The total number of employees budgeted for the year 1998 is thus 847. The artistic and artistic-technical personnel has been broken down in the budget in an informative manner and will be presented below. The other categories consist mainly of separate professional titles under which a few people are employed, making the breakdown unnecessarily detailed. (*Senatsverwaltung* 1997, 1108.) A more useful breakdown of the overall personnel structure can be found in the *Deutscher Bühnenverein Theaterstatistik* 1995/96. It can be used as an alternative source of information comparable to the 1998 figure (847 employees) since the 1995 figure is very similar (867 employees). (*Deutscher Bühnenverein* 1996, 86.)

¹ As the personnel expenses of the organisation are responsible for 84.5% of the total expenditure, the Employment Plan (*Stellen- und Beschäftigungsplan*) is an important part of the organisation's budget and it is thus attached to the actual budget accepted by the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*.

² The categories used are difficult to translate as they also define the contractual relationship between the employee and the employer. Thus, the original German terms will be included in parentheses for the sake of clarity.

Breakdown of the artistic and artistic-technical personnel (temporary personnel and trainees included) according to the 1998 Budget of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*:

Artistic and artistic-technical personnel in 1998:

General Director	1
Music Director	1
Artistic personnel (directors, conductors, set designers)	55
Soloists, opera	45
Soloists, ballet	18
Chorus members	100
Ballet chorus members	35
Orchestra leaders	3
Orchestra co-leaders	2
Solo violinists	2
Solo cellists	2
Orchestra members	132
Technical director	1
Assistant to the Technical director	1
Technical manager	1
Heads of make-up artists	4
Make-up artists	14
Head of Costumes department	1
Planning assistant to the Costumes department	1
Production assistant to the Costumes department	1
Head of Set workshop	1
Head of Design department	1
Head of Electricity, Light and Audio department	1
Total of artistic and artistic-technical personnel	437

In the budget under the heading of temporary artistic and artistic-technical personnel (consisting of 30 posts), the visiting artists for ballet, the directors, conductors, set designers etc., and the visiting opera soloists are also included, without not mentioning the numbers of employees concerned. Based on the 1998-99 season (1998 annual figures are not available nor extractable) the estimated number of singers is 153, of which the permanent ensemble consists of 45 singers, leaving 108 visiting soloists. Their fees are included in this expense category. Additionally the fees for groups such as boys' choir, additional chorus and extras are included in this category. The total anticipated expenditure of this category (containing 30 actual posts in addition to the visitors) in 1998 is DM 12 502 000, 12% of the total expenditure of the organisation. It is a significant amount also compared with the expenditure for the category of permanent artistic and artistic-technical personnel, DM 48 731 000. Therefore, it obviously contains the 'star' visitors' fees but does not give information on the

actual numbers (estimated above from other sources of information) of the visiting artists or the expenditure connected with them¹.

The breakdown of the personnel structure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* in 1995 according to the *Deutscher Bühnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96*:

<i>Personnel structure in 1995:</i>		
Artistic personnel		417
<i>Opera soloists</i>	49	
<i>Ballet members</i>	62	
<i>Chorus members</i>	109	
<i>Orchestra members</i>	139	
<i>Sundry artistic personnel</i>	58	
Technical personnel		332 ²
Administration		52
Maintenance and front-of-house personnel		66 ³
<i>Total of personnel employed</i>		867

¹ This practice is a fairly clever way of 'disguising' the star fees, a jealously protected secret. Most opera organisations simply refuse to give out even this detailed information about their accounts in order to prevent any calculations in this direction.

² Costume production partly contracted out of the organisation.

³ Cleaning partly contracted out of the organisation.

5. The Opera House

The original Charlottenburg Opera House, built by the City of Charlottenburg and subsequently leased to the '*Deutsches Opernhaus Betriebs-Aktiengesellschaft*', was reduced to rubble in 1943. Only the foundations and some of the service areas (some workshops and administration) of the theatre survived. After the division of Berlin into four sectors following the Second World War, the company performed in the *Theater des Westens* in the British sector. The rebuilding of the '*Lindenoper*' (home of the *Staatsoper 'Unter den Linden*'), which had also been destroyed in the bombing of Berlin, was begun soon after the war and completed in 1955. Meanwhile, however, Berlin had been divided into eastern and western parts, and the rebuilding of the Charlottenburg Opera House had gained momentum as a project of national importance in the competition between the east and the west. Thus, the original concept of Charlottenburg Opera competing with the *Oper Unter den Linden* was repeated, however, in a different form. (Roesler 1997, 1.)

In 1953 an architectural competition for rebuilding the Charlottenburg Opera House was announced. It was won in 1955 by Fritz Bornemann who integrated the old foundations and the service buildings into his new design of the auditorium and the foyer. The design remained faithful to the original ideals of the Charlottenburg bourgeois opera house, the seating being 'democratic' - even the boxes and their seats face the stage - and the auditorium being modelled in many ways after the design of Bayreuth, thus serving the original aim of creating a Wagner opera house. (Roesler 1997, 2.) However, the appearance of the rebuilt parts of the house is strikingly modern, the design thus having successfully created a modern opera house which respects its past. The building work on the site started in spring 1956. The topping-out ceremony was held at the end of 1959 and the inauguration of the New Opera House took place in September 1961. (Heidelmeyer 1998, 24.) The total cost of the rebuilding project was DM 27 440 000¹, financed by the Federal Government within the framework of long-term fund-aid for the rebuilding of the capital, Berlin². (DOB 1992, 18.)

The new Charlottenburg opera house, called the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* after the company, has one auditorium, with 1900 seats which are all directed towards the

¹ In 1961 figures.

² *Bundeshilfe in Rahmen des langfristigen Aufbauplanes für die Hauptstadt Berlin.*

centre of the stage. There are 1200 seats in the stalls, 365 in the dress circle and 335 in the upper circle. The house does not have a studio theatre, but the main foyer can be used for small-scale performances. The stage is cruciform consisting of an 18 X 18 metre main stage (divided into six individual risers, +- 3 m), a revolving rear stage of the same size that can be wheeled onto the main stage, and wing stages sized 17 x 19 m (left) and 12 x 25 m (right). The stage trucks of the wing stages can be wheeled onto the stage, thus making the set changes quick and effective. The fly-tower height is 27 metres. The proscenium arch is adjustable, its width varying from 11 to 14.7 metres and its height up to a maximum of 8 metres. (DOB 1992, 20.) The orchestra pit size is 142 square metres. The lighting and sound technology is state of the art, due to an extensive refit in 1989. The main technical problem of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is the lack of space to store sets (see below for the number of different performances during a season), resulting in the need to store sets outside the house. The technical staff dismantle the sets etc. after a show and they are transported and stored by a contractors.

6. Programming, pricing and audience figures

In 1998¹ the repertory of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* consisted of six premieres in the main auditorium, four operas and two ballets. The opera premieres were Wagner: *Parsifal*, Massenet: *Manon*, Massenet: *Werther* (Concert version), Ponchielli: *La Gioconda* and Strauss: *Die Frau ohne Schatten*. The ballet premieres were Zanella: *...schatten von sensucht...*, *Last Blues*, and de Oliveira: *Cinderella*.

The opera repertory of *Deutsche Oper Berlin* consisted of 30 other operas in 1998 (some performed on tour) listed below: *Hänsel und Gretel*, *Carmen*, *Boris Godunov*, *Die Zauberflöte*, *Der fliegende Holländer* (Tokyo), *Tannhäuser* (Tokyo and Stockholm), *Der Rosenkavalier* (Yokohama), *Il Trovatore*, *Aida*, *Das Rheingold*, *Die Walküre*, *Siegfried*, *Götterdämmerung*, *Susannah*, *Elektra*, *Don Giovanni*, *Lucia di Lammermoor*, *Tosca*, *Der Prinz von Homburg*, *Rigoletto*, *Lohengrin*, *Káta Kabanová*, *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, *Eugene Onegin*,

¹ For the sake of consistency (all the financial data is based on the calendar year 1998) the repertory is presented by calendar year. The actual 1998/99 season ran from 23rd August 1998 to 11th July 1999.

Madame Butterfly, Carmina Burana, Die Entführung aus dem Serail, La Forza del destino, Faust, Die Hugenotten, Salome.

The repertory of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* ballet consisted of eight ballets (including three triple bills) listed below: Barra: *Die Schneekönigin*, Bigonzetti / Kylián / Forsythe: *Stamping Ground etc.*, Hynd: *Rosalinde*, de Oliveiras / Gomes / Pederneiras: *Credo*, Cranko: *Onegin*, Schaufuss / Bournonville: *La Sylphide*, Béjart: *Ring um den "Ring"*, MacMillan: *Concerto* / Bigonzetti: *Turnpike* / Petipa: *Raymonda*.

In 1998 the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* gave a total of 195 opera and ballet performances in its main auditorium, 145 operas and 50 ballets. In addition to this the company performed 10 operas on tour in Japan and Sweden. Additionally there were 49 performances in the foyer consisting of ballet matinees, children's programmes, outreach work etc. The number of different programmes in the foyer was 24. There were a total of 26 concerts (4 of them on tour) organised by the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, ranging from recitals and chamber music to symphony concerts. There were several venues used for the concerts: the main auditorium, the foyer, the *Konzerthaus Berlin*, the *Kloster Chorin* and the *Philharmonie*. In 1998 several visiting companies also performed at the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, mainly during the periods when the company was touring. These included the Swedish Royal Opera, the Netherlands Dance Theatre etc., the total number of guest performances reaching 24. In addition to this there was a charitable AIDS Opera Gala organised in the main auditorium. (DOB *Die Spielzeit* 97/98 & 98/99.)

There are six performance categories in the ticket prices for the main auditorium of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, each divided into six different categories based on the location of the seat. The performance categories A, B and C refer to different types of opera performances; price category A is used mostly for matinees, B is the 'normal' opera performance and category C is used for premieres, Wagner's operas etc. There are two price categories for the ballet performances, Ballet I used for performances with music from tape and Ballet II used for performances with live music. Additionally there is a category S, special prices, which is applied to concerts, foyer performances, etc. that need to be individually priced. The range of prices (in autumn 1998) for the three opera price categories were: A DM 92-17, B DM 112-22 and C DM 142-32. The ballet price categories were: Ballet I DM 57-17 and Ballet II DM 70-22.

The auditorium is divided into six price categories within each performance price category. For example the most common price category B is divided as follows. The stalls are divided into four price areas, (from the front) DM 87, 72, 62, 42 (this category including the back of the stalls boxes). The dress circle is divided into three price areas (from the front), DM 112, 87, 72. The upper circle is divided similarly into three price areas, DM 62, 42, 22. Additionally there are eight boxes in the dress circle, places in the first row costing DM 112 and the remainder DM 87, and eight boxes in the upper circle, the seats costing DM 72 or DM 42 depending on the location of the box. Furthermore, there is a different pricing system used for the concerts given in the *Konzerthaus Berlin*, prices ranging from DM 50 to DM 20.

There are different subscription schemes in operation at the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, the main form of subscription being a series of eight performances annually, either specified performances or a free selection of works (more expensive). There are two sets of concessions groups that can acquire tickets a week before the performance at either 25% (pensioners, students and unemployed) or 50% (school children, persons doing military or community service, and the unemployed) discount. All tickets are sold at a reduction of 25 on the day of the performance, except price group C performances.

There is no conclusive information available about the audience structure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*. This is a problem, according to the *Senatsverwaltung* representatives, especially since the sold capacities are relatively low¹. The latest available information on audiences, based on the capacities and ticket types sold, is from the 1995/96 season. According to *Theaterstatistik* 1995/96, the total number of tickets sold was 265 946, of which tickets sold for opera performances amounted to 202 259, ballet performances 49 347, concerts 4 263 and other performances (foyer etc.) 10 077. Additionally 6 740 tickets were sold for performances on tour. (*Deutscher Bühnenverein* 1996, 48-49.)

The breakdown of audience by the method ticket sales in the 1995/96 season was as follows: individually bought full-price tickets 86 149, subscriptions 29 993, tickets through friends' organisations² 44 961, children's, student's etc. tickets 44 164, discounted tickets for personnel, trade unions, disabled etc. 41 668 and

¹ This issue will be further examined in the section discussing the relationship between the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Senatsverwaltung*.

² *Besucherorganisation*.


complimentary tickets 19 013. (*Deutscher Bühnenverein* 1996, 48-49.) The average capacity sold in the 1995/96 season in the main auditorium was 70.2% for operas, 41.4% for ballets and 76.1% for concerts. (*Deutscher Bühnenverein* 1996, 139.)

7. The organisational structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin

The organisational structure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is described in figure 9 below. It is given in the form in which the organisation itself defines it.

Figure 9.

Organisational Structure,
Deutsche Oper Berlin



The *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is directed by General Director 'Generalintendant' Prof. Götz Friedrich, a prominent stage director, who has sole authority and responsibility over the organisation. The second layer of directors consist of four positions: the Music Director (*Generalmusikdirektor* Christian Thielemann, conductor), the Opera Director (*Operndirektor* Dr. Alan von Rohr), Principal Stage Director (*Chefregisseur* Prof. Friedrich), and Administrative Director (*Geschäftsführender Direktor* André Schmitz, lawyer). The director of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* ballet (Ballet Director Richard Cragun, dancer) is shown in the chart as being subordinate to the Opera Director. However, in a letter dated 18.5.1998 the Administrative Director, André Schmitz,¹ defines the organisation as being led by the General Director, the Administrative Director, the Music Director and the Ballet Director. This seems plausible and practical, despite the fact that it contradicts the actual organisational chart. It would, however, well reflect the strong artistic position of General Director Friedrich in the organisation, who has additionally taken on the responsibilities of Principal Stage Director. It seems evident that he has a strong influence on all matters relating to the responsibilities of the Opera Director, thus in effect making the post of the Opera Director weaker than those of the Music Director, the Ballet Director and the Administrative Director. The artistic matters in the organisation, excluding the orchestra which is under the responsibility of the Music Director, are 'horizontally' connected (broken line in the chart) to enable communication and authority without having to refer to the General Director. However, this is not the case with the technical department, costumes department and administration. These are all direct subordinates of the General Director in the chart. Naturally there are informal links of authority and information between the artistic and administrative departments, for example, to enable the organisation to function in practice. These are not, however, defined in the organisational chart.

8. The relationship between the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur*

The relationship between the *Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur* and the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is defined in three Statutes: '*Haushaltsstrukturgesetz 1996*' (15th April, 1996), '*Landeshaushaltsordnung §26*'

¹ During 1998 there have been changes in the relationship of the General Director and the Administrative Director giving more responsibility to the latter. This may partly explain the differing ways of defining the top level of the organisation. This change is further commented on below.

(Landeshauptkasse 1992) and '*Allgemeine Anweisung über die Finanzierung von Theatern und Orchestern in Berlin*' (25th October 1994). As the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is a non-independent part of the 'Land' Berlin's administration, the statutes contain a great many general bureaucratic and budgetary regulations for the whole of the Senate administration, thus not very relevant for detailed exploration in this study. This is the case especially with the first two statutes. The statute '*Allgemeine anweisung...*' is specifically directed towards the management of arts organisations, thus containing more practically relevant regulations on the financial relationship between the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*. It thus merits a brief description here. The first sentence of the Statute concerning the '*Staatliche Einrichtungen*' - i.e. legally non-independent public organisations such as *Deutsche Oper Berlin* - defines the first task of the organisations as the fulfilment of their artistic aims. This is, however, to be achieved with as high proportion of their own income as possible. The rest of the statute concentrates on the compulsory methods of financial control and on advice and constraints on the budgeting process. The aim of this statute in 1994 was to increase financial accountability and at the same time the financial independence of the theatres and orchestras. It has to be born in mind that until the creation of this statute in 1994, the box-office income of the organisations had gone directly to the *Senatsverwaltung*, thus giving no financial incentive to the organisations to increase the sold capacities. In several ways the arts organisations concerned have previously been more directly part of the *Senatsverwaltung* than after this statute came into effect.

The statute compels the organisations to create a comparable (i.e. common to all organisations in question) cost structure which takes into account all cost centres and enables the calculation of returns for each cost class. This general cost framework (*Gemeinschaftskontenrahmen*) will be agreed between the management of the organisation in question, the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* and the Treasury of Berlin (*Rechnunghof von Berlin*), and is thereafter binding. After the cost framework and the budget have been fixed, the organisations are free to decide their ticket prices, but maintaining accessibility for the socially deprived and for students. The statute spells out the way in which the general cost framework should be arrived at (it being implemented for the first time) and how it should operate. The most interesting clauses concern possible exceeding of estimated income, which - as distinct from before the 1994 statute - can be rolled over to the next financial year. This is also the case with possible savings. Should the estimated income not be achieved, the relevant sum will be reduced accordingly - based on the actual yield - in the next budget, in order to create realistic

budgets in the long run . However, as the organisations are part of the *Senatsverwaltung*, there is no chance of accumulating deficit to be rolled over to the following financial year. Thus, in the case of a deficit, negotiations for extra subsidies from the Senate are needed.

The budgets of the theatres and orchestras, as is the case with the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, are defined in great detail in the budget of the 'Land' Berlin, under the heading '*Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur - bereich Kultur*'. The budget of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* has been extensively presented above - this gives a feeling of the precision in which the 'Land' budget defines the expenditure and income of the organisation, including the personnel structure. Apart from the financial planning and control by the *Senatsverwaltung*, the statutes do not define the relationship - artistically or otherwise - between the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* and the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*.

According to Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann from the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*, the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* enjoys artistic autonomy within its financial framework. The only aspects of the artistic plan the *Senatsverwaltung* and the Directors of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* agree upon beforehand are the numbers of premieres, and the proportions of opera and ballet performances in the programme. However, the artistic contents of those premieres, performances etc. are at the discretion of the General Director, Götz Friedrich. However, the *Senatsverwaltung* monitors the development of the organisation on the basis of these plans, i.e. how well they have been fulfilled. This monitoring follows the artistic season of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, instead of being based on the calendar year as in the financial control. The top management of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* present a report on the previous season to the *Senatsverwaltung*, on 30th June each year. In this report they comment on three aspects of the organisation: artistic achievements, organisational development and the financial situation. In addition to this main report there are similar quarterly reports following developments in these areas during the season. Guido Herrmann sees these reports and the discussions involved in this process the most important tool in monitoring the organisation. According to him the *Senatsverwaltung* aims to create a 'contract' with the General Director and the Administrative Director about these issues, defining the direction that development of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* should take. In this he sees the person of the General Director as especially important; in the long run the only direct way for the *Senatsverwaltung* to influence the artistic direction of the organisation is in the selection of the General Director.

The relationship between the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Senatsverwaltung* has recently been affected by the financial difficulties of the organisation. The anticipated accumulated deficit¹ of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* for the period of 1995-1998 was up to DM 20 000 000. There are two main reasons for this. The first is the change in the funding framework within the last three years due to the need of the Berlin Senate to cut its expenditure. Earlier, the funding framework for the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* (as for all the Berlin Opera Houses) was agreed three years in advance. However, the anticipated subsidy of DM 90 000 000 has been reduced to DM 80 000 000 for 1998. Due to its current failure the three-year framework system has been abandoned and the DM 80 000 000 figure has been announced as the 'fixed' level of subsidy for the organisation in the future. The second main reason for the organisation's deficit is the box office income which has fallen behind the anticipated figure. According to the Financial Director, Heinz-Dieter Sense, this is due to the General Director's emphasis on the artistic profile of the organisation rather than the financial situation. In order to prevent the deficit for 1998, the *Senatsverwaltung* strengthened the position of the Administrative Director, thus limiting the artistic freedom of the General Director. Savings were achieved, for instance, by paying special attention to production costs etc.

The *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is not the only opera house in Berlin going through a financially difficult period; the *Komische Oper* was taken under tight financial control by the *Senatsverwaltung* in October 1998. All the financial decisions of the organisation for future commitments are to be accepted by the *Senatsverwaltung* for the time being. Due to these common problems in the Berlin Opera Houses the *Senatsverwaltung* has devised a plan to stabilise the situation in order to avoid closing down one of the houses to make savings. This plan involves 'privatising' the opera organisations and introducing a two-manager structure to replace the powerful artistic General Director. The management structure of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* will be under scrutiny when Götz Friedrich steps down from his position in 2001. The Administrative Director is also leaving the organisation thus giving the *Senatsverwaltung* a good opportunity to reorganise the relationship between the two top directorial roles. The 'privatisation' - i.e. changing the legal status of the organisations into public limited company (GmbH) form - would bring two main advantages compared with the current situation: the employment structure of the organisations would not be a rigid

¹ The term is slightly misleading as the organisation cannot accumulate deficit due to its non-independent public status.

public service structure, and the Plc. form would enable the organisations to accumulate deficit, thus making the management responsible for the possible losses in the long run. The two-manager structure - i.e. equally powerful artistic and administrative directors - aims to further enhance this financial accountability.

In addition to these two main reforms there are several somewhat less radical proposed changes that are spelled out in a discussion paper on cultural administration in Berlin by the *Senatsverwaltung*; '*Materialien zum öffentlich geförderten Kulturangebot in Berlin*' from 1996. This paper, while assuring the artistic autonomy of different opera organisations, proposes the following changes: creating the cost framework defined in the 1994 Statute, sharpening and differentiating the artistic profiles of the different opera organisations, optimising production resources between the opera organisations (possibility of centralised workshops), increasing marketing efforts and sharing these between the opera organisations, optimising the relationship between yield and expenditure in production and programming, reducing the administrative functions in opera organisations (possibility of centralised administration), and creating a special admissions tariff for the inhabitants of Berlin (i.e. the taxpayers subsidising the organisations). (*Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* 1996, 16.) The majority of these propositions are currently under discussion, not however, being implemented in reality and thus not affecting the relationship between the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* and the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* other than on the discussion level.

9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure

The organisational structure and the socio-economic environment of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* have been presented above. The aim of this section is to discuss the artistic and financial decision-making and planning structures of the organisation. This section is mainly based on three interviews with members of the organisation and the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*. Financial Manager (Betriebs-Manager) Heinz-Dieter Sense, Chief Dramaturg Curt A. Roesler, and Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann.

The starting point for the artistic and financial planning of the organisation consists of the artistic considerations. This is in accordance with the Statute of 25th October 1994 which, as stated earlier, places the cultural aims of the organisation as the top priority, financial considerations being secondary. According to the Financial

Manager, Heinz-Dieter Sense, the programming and casting plans of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, made roughly three years in advance, are first made by the General Director, Götz Friedrich, and the cost of the plan is then calculated. Normally, the plan exceeds the estimated budget and thus needs to be adjusted until the plan meets the budget. This process, with all necessary negotiations and calculations normally takes about six months. When the artistic plan has been made to comply with the anticipated financial situation of the organisation, the contracts with the artists can be negotiated and finalised. According to the Financial Manager, the contracts refer fairly specifically to the financial constraints, i.e. budgets, numbers of rehearsals etc., of the project, leading to fairly good enforceability of the economic framework. Control of this is achieved through constant monitoring of the costs per production by the accounts department. However, the cost of new productions annually amount to approximately 3%¹ of the budget thus, according to Sense, making this control relatively unimportant in the framework of the organisation's overall budget.

The financially more important factor in the artistic planning process is the programming and the style of productions, the factors that create the artistic profile of the organisation and appeal to the audience, thus influencing the box-office takings. According to Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann the failure of the box office is one of the main reasons for the financial problems of the organisation in 1995-1998. This was also admitted by the Financial Manager. The policy of the General Director is to produce operas that are relevant today and also to emphasise contemporary music theatre in the production of the classics. This approach has had its effects on the sold capacities of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* - a fact that is recognised and has so far been accepted by the *Senatsverwaltung*, particularly in view of the fact that the Charlottenburg Opera House is deemed 'oversized' for contemporary music theatre. (*Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* 1996, 19.) However, from the 1980/81 season when the average capacity of the house was 85% (Priestley 1983, 258.) the audience figures have fallen considerably, the figure for opera having been 70.2% in the 1995/96 season. (Deutscher Bühnenverein 1996, 139.) This trend with the tightening financial

¹ This figure is based on the estimate of the Financial Manager. The numerical basis on which this has been calculated is, therefore, not known. However, the budget of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* supports the range of the figure since the annual material cost for new productions is DM 1 163 000, i.e. 1.1% of the total budget. The rest of the increased personnel costs etc. for new productions compared with revivals seem likely to amount to something within the range of the 'other' 2%.

situation of the Berlin opera houses - partly due to the new competition for funds and audiences between the former East-Berlin and West-Berlin companies - has led the *Senatsverwaltung* to question the audience figures. However, the artistic weight of Prof. Friedrich and the artistic success of his organisation have been able to counter-balance the financial difficulties and the deficits of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* up to 1998. However, the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* has become more aware of the need to increase financial accountability of the organisation in the future especially in the relationship between artistic planning and box-office takings. This has led to action – i.e. new emphasis on the role of the Administrative Director – during 1998 and is obviously the ultimate reason why the General Director is leaving the organisation. The artistic-financial dichotomy thus exists in the relationship between the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur*. The discussions about ‘privatising’ the organisation and changing its management structure by bringing the Administrative Director onto the same level as the artistic head (currently the General Director) of the organisation are attempts to break the artistic-financial tension between the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* and the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and bring it into the organisation itself. This, according to Guido Herrmann would give the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* more freedom for its policy-making role and move the financial responsibility more onto the organisation. In reality this would mean that the organisation would receive a fixed amount of funding annually and would have to manage with that, instead of the Generalintendant constantly arm-wrestling with the *Senatsverwaltung für Kultur* for more funds using his artistic weight and the artistic success of his organisation as an instrument for making the *Land* accept deficits at the end of the year.

10. Summary

In this section, the main points of the information presented above are collected in table form. The information is based – where applicable – on annual figures, the sources of which have been defined in the above text. The information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the next part of the thesis.

Organisational history and legal status	Established as a bourgeois opera theatre in 1911 by civil-society initiative. The City of Berlin assumed responsibility for the organisation in 1925 changing it into a public institution under the authority of the cultural administration. The authority over the organisation has changed several times from the City of Berlin to the German Reich to the Allied Forces. Currently the organisation operates under the authority of the <i>Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur</i> as a non-independent public organisation.
Governing bodies	No board of directors structure. Organisation governed through the Berlin Senate Administration.
Management structure	The organisation is directed by the General Director. The management team also includes the Administrative Director, the Music Director and the ballet Director. (Schmitz 1998.)

Organisational structure	The organisational structure is relatively flat and the role of the General Director is strong. The second managerial layer of the organisation consists of the Music Director, the Opera Director, the Principal Stage Director and the Managing Director. Additionally there are seven other Directors under the General Director on a level below the second managerial level.
Income structure	Total income in 1998 budget DM 100 025 000. <i>Land</i> subsidy 80%, Box Office 9.5%, Other self-generated income (mainly touring) 10.5%.
Expenditure structure	Personnel 84.5%, Operational 12.5%, Materials 3%.
Number of employees	867 employees + 108 visiting artists
Personnel structure	Artistic personnel 417 (ensemble 45, ballet 53, chorus 100, orchestra 141, other artistic personnel 55), technical staff 332, administration 52, maintenance 66.
Opera House	The New Charlottenburg Opera House was inaugurated in 1961. Capacity of 1900 seats, all facing the stage (i.e. democratic layout). The cruciform main stage is 18 x 18 m, with similar size wing (right wing stage slightly narrower) and rear stages. The lighting and sound technology have been refitted in 1989, being thus state-of-the-art.
Programming and number of performances in the main auditorium	Total number of performances 195, 145 opera performances and 50 ballet performances. Additionally 10 opera performances on tour. Number of different productions 36, out of which six new (four operas, two ballets). Programming principle – semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory fairly traditional, Wagner emphasised.
Ticket prices and sold capacities	Ticket prices DM 17 - 142. Sold capacities 70% for opera, 41% for ballet.

6. THE ENGLISH NATIONAL OPERA

1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation

The English National Opera as an organisation was created - under the name of Sadler's Wells Opera - as the result of the expansion of Lillian Baylis's theatrical activities in London. She was running the Old Vic Theatre on the south side of the Thames "to further the cause of drama and opera at popular prices". (Arundell 1978, 185.) In the 1920s she started to consider expanding operations to North London and persuaded the Duke of Devonshire to launch an appeal in March 1925 to purchase the freehold of the historic Sadler's Wells Theatre (at that point of time in poor structural condition) and establish it as a non-profit-making Foundation to provide a base for the North London operations of the Old Vic. The appeal proved successful enough to allow the Foundation to be formed, with several eminent public figures as Commissioners, and to take an option on the property. The fund, not yet big enough to purchase the property, was enlarged during the summer of 1925 by benefit concerts, fetes and performances. Support for the scheme was widespread and subscribers included, for example, the Finsbury Borough Council, the Islington Gazette and the Carnegie Trust. Some of the leading performers of the time, such as Dame Nellie Melba, also took part in the fund-raising campaign. By December the Theatre had been purchased, but the appeal for funds for repairing and equipping it still continued. (Arundell 1978, 185-187.) In late 1928 the rebuilding of Sadler's Wells Theatre began. It was not, however, finished until the end of 1930 after several fresh appeals for funds.

The Theatre opened in January 1931 and operated on the principle of a fortnight of plays followed by a fortnight of opera. The repertory alternated with the Old Vic Theatre. This made it possible for Lillian Baylis to establish a permanent opera company, the idea being to engage English singers and perform all the operas in English. Also, Ninette de Valois was engaged to establish a ballet company to collaborate with the Vic-Wells¹ theatre companies. The first spring season resulted in a loss of £3 229, added to the debts after the refurbishment of

¹ The company operating in the Old Vic Theatre and the Sadler's Wells Theatre soon began to be called Vic-Wells company for practical reasons even though the organisations were legally separate entities.

£21 000. As the cheaper seats in the spring season had sold best the decision was made to reduce the prices to make more through the Box Office, rather than raise them. This policy of 'affordable prices' has subsequently been a trademark of the company, and the practice is still carried on today by the English National Opera. (Arundell 1978, 188-192 & ENO 1998.)

In May 1932, the Sadler's Wells Foundation published its Declaration of Trust. The aim of the organisation was to put on drama and opera in a way that was affordable and beneficial to the less well-off classes. Some performances of high-class opera or high-class drama could also be allowed in the Theatre when it would financially benefit the Foundation in achieving its principal objectives. (Arundell 1978, 195.) During the same year the Sadler's Wells Society was founded by Lord and Lady Hamilton to support the work of the company. Gradually over the years, opera proved to be more successful at Sadler's Wells than drama, and thus the proportion of opera was gradually increased and ballet also gained ground at the expense of plays. As a result, in 1936 the Charity Commissioners cancelled the Trust's interchange with the Old Vic, and Sadler's Wells operated from the 1936-37 season onwards as a separate opera and ballet company. (Arundell 1978, 209.)

Financially Sadler's Wells had difficulties in breaking even despite the rising artistic standards throughout the 1930s. The refurbishing and equipping process of the Theatre had left a considerable debt to be carried forward and the first three seasons increased that deficit. The first season to show a profit was the 1933-34 season (£5 11s. 1d.). Showing a profit was not to become the rule, but rather an exception that was repeated a few times during the late 1930s. The company was kept afloat by donations and grants. In 1931 the Government had channelled funds to encourage opera through the BBC and Sadler's Wells was engaged to broadcast. In 1934 the company was granted exemption from Entertainment Tax. Also in 1934 a new appeal was launched to free the Vic-Wells companies from debt and in 1936 a five-year project to raise funds for the Vic-Wells ballet was launched. This scheme provided funds for the organisation till CEMA (during the Second World) and subsequently the Arts Council (after the war) started funding the company; the scheme started in 1936 turning into the Sadler's Wells Benevolent Fund. (Arundell 1978, 188-219.) Lillian Baylis, the founder of the company, had died in 1937. With the assistance of a Memorial appeal to modernise the Sadler's Wells Theatre, the company - still £18 000 in debt - managed to conduct a refurbishment process on the theatre in 1938. The

organisation had one successful season in the renovated theatre before the war forced it to close down its operations in London.

After the war the pattern in the operations that still form the framework in which the English National Opera operates started to emerge. The company was benefiting from the refurbished theatre, which had not been used much before the war. Also, the resident ensemble and the orchestra were more numerous than before. The Arts Council began to subsidise the company, starting with £10 000 for the 1945-46 season, the amount of funding rising rapidly, being £40 000 for the 1948-49 season. (Arundell 1978, 219 & 224.) However, there were negative aspects in the development of the company as well. When Covent Garden was established after the war Sadler's Wells Ballet moved there in 1946 to form the resident ballet company. Thus Sadler's Wells Opera lost a considerable source of income, the reserves of the company subsequently falling from a figure of £75 000 in 1946 to a point where the theatre was threatened with closure in the 1950-51 season due to economic hardship. (Arundell 1978, 220 & 229.) Sadler's Wells created a new ballet company, the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet, which soon replaced the previous ballet company. However, this consumed its resources with the maintenance of the ballet school. The new ballet company was lost in 1956, when the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet and the Sadler's Wells School of Ballet were amalgamated with the Sadler's Wells Ballet (the original Sadler's Wells ballet company) resident at the Covent Garden, to form the Royal Ballet. (Arundell 1978, 239 & ACGB 1966, 11.) Since then the Sadler's Wells Opera (subsequently the English National Opera) has operated with just a resident opera-ballet if even that.

The legal organisational framework in which the English National Opera operates was created after the war. In 1946, Sadler's Wells Trust Limited was incorporated as the legal organisational structure of the Sadler's Wells operations. The Sadler's Wells Theatre was owned by the Sadler's Wells Foundation (with a board of governors often referred to as the Wells Governors), but from 1946 onwards the operations were run by the new Trust. (Arundell 1978, 245.) The Trust operated as a charitable company limited by guarantee and with no share capital. Its name was subsequently changed through different forms to the English National Opera (in 1975). (ENO 1998.)

In 1957 the Arts Council realised that the resources it had for funding opera were not sufficient when divided among all the companies it was supporting. Thus an amalgamation of some of the companies was proposed as a solution. The initial

scheme suggested by the Sadler's Wells Trust was to merge the company with the Carl Rosa Opera Company (a formerly successful touring company in financial difficulties) and put on eighteen weeks of opera at the Wells and thirty weeks of opera on tour. However, the whole top management of Sadler's Wells Opera resigned over problems in agreeing the practicalities of the merger. Therefore, the Sadler's Wells Trust and the Wells Governors abandoned the idea of amalgamation and launched an appeal for funds to maintain the independent status of the Sadler's Wells Opera. The appeal proved successful; an anonymous donor gave £15 000, the London County Council granted £25 000 and ABC Television gave £3 000 annually for seven years. Thus, Sadler's Wells was able to maintain its independence. The Carl Rosa Opera Company was not as successful. In the confusion that followed the abandoned amalgamation, the Carl Rosa Opera Company lost all its support from the Arts Council and was subsequently forced to close down. The members of the company joined the revitalised Sadler's Wells Opera which added touring to its operations, now having two interchangeable companies and orchestras etc. (Arundell 1978, 244-248.)

The next process that led to an organisational change affecting the English National Opera began in 1961. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd, announced on the 12th July that a project to build a National Theatre on the South Bank was to commence. The companies to be housed in the new building were to be the Old Vic Company, the Stratford-upon-Avon Shakespeare Company (now known as the Royal Shakespeare Company) and Sadler's Wells Opera. The Governors of the Sadler's Wells Foundation and the Trustees of the Sadler's Wells Trust were enthusiastic about the proposal and the Governors were willing to sell the Sadler's Wells Theatre to provide funds for the new National Theatre building. The Theatre was put on sale in 1962, but attracted only a 3 000 name petition opposed to the sale and fierce criticism of the proposal to sell and severe doubts about whether the Governors had the legal right to sell the property. (Arundell 1978, 255-264.) Although the National Theatre was eventually built, the scheme to house Sadler's Wells Opera on the South Bank did not materialise, so the company started to look elsewhere for a new home. Sadler's Wells Theatre with its poor acoustics was felt to be too small and outdated for the company's operations. Thus, in 1968, Sadler's Wells Opera moved "with the approval of the Arts Council and the Greater London Council" to the Coliseum in central London, on which the company had acquired a ten-year lease. (ACGB 1969, 11.) The increased seating capacity and a £75 000 (10%) increase in the Arts Council grant made the move possible financially. Funds to

cover the cost of essential refurbishing and alterations had already been acquired through donations. (Arundell 1978, 277 & ENO 1988.) After the move to the Coliseum, the operations of Sadler's Wells Opera were separated from the Sadler's Wells Theatre (run and owned by the Governors of the Sadler's Wells Foundation). This, however, was not an easy process, since the ownership of the Theatre remained in the hands of the Governors - a fact not well liked by the Trust. However, in 1992 after twenty-five years as a lessee at the Coliseum, the English National Opera (the former Sadler's Wells Trust Limited) purchased the freehold of the theatre with the assistance of the Arts Council and the Foundation for Sport and the Arts. It still operates at the Coliseum even though the theatre is in urgent need of redevelopment and the English National Opera had plans to move to a new purpose-built theatre. These, however, have been shelved at least until 2001 when the original agreement for the purchase of the freehold of the theatre ends. The Arts Council, the Foundation for Sports and the Arts and the ENO will then be free from previous commitments to contemplate their options. (Eyre 1998, 33-34 & 77.)

The present legal status of the organisation is a charitable company limited by guarantee and with no share capital. The legal organisation is the same one that was established in 1946 under the name Sadler's Wells Trust Limited, subsequently changing its name through various forms to English National Opera. It operates in the London Coliseum and pursues a policy of performing opera in English sung mostly by English performers, who form a resident ensemble. Its objective is still to maintain Lillian Baylis's original aim of opera at prices affordable by the 'man in the street'. (ENO 1998.)

2. Income structure of the ENO

The total income of the English National Opera amounted to £26 680 000 during the financial year 1997-98. The breakdown based on the statement of financial activities of the company is following:

Grants	£12 187 000	46%
Box Office	£7 047 000	26%
Rental income	£1 010 000	4%
Sponsorship and donations	£1 547 000	5%
Catering and sales	£795 000	3%
Other income	£466 000	2%
Lottery funding ¹	£3 628 000	14%
Total income		£26 680 000

Some of the income categories are divided in more detail in the statement of financial activities of the company. The categories of Grants and Sponsorship and donations are presented below, as they are deemed to shed more light on the description of income sources of the English National Opera given above.

Grant income:

Arts Council of England, Core grant	£11 955 000	98.1%
Westminster City Council, Core Grant	£160 000	1.3%
Arts Council of England, Commissioning grant	£22 000	0.2%
Dance Umbrella, Co-presentation grant ²	£50 000	0.4%
Total of Grants		£12 187 000

Sponsorship and donations:

Corporate membership and premium seat schemes	£454 000	29.4%
Donations, legacies and major gifts	£383 000	24.7%
Individual membership and subscription schemes	£324 000	20.9%
Production and performance sponsorship and support	£138 000	8.9%
Project sponsorship and support	£71 000	4.6%
Special appeals	£135 000	8.8%
Fund-raising events	£42 000	2.7%
Total of Sponsorship and donations		£1 547 000

Unfortunately, the statement of financial activities of the English National Opera does not reveal in any more detail the division of its Box Office income.

¹ The Lottery Funding is given to the company in conjunction with the Arts Council Stabilisation pilot project. This project aims to ensure the company's efficiency in the future by enabling it analyse and develop its working practices etc.. This funding is not considered to form a part of the company's revenue funding from the Arts Council.

² This co-presentation grant related to the Händel's L'Allegro oratorio performed with the Dance Umbrella, who provided the stage choreography.

3. The expenditure structure

The total expenditure of the English National Opera in the financial year 1997-98 was £23 723 000. This total expenditure is divided into two in the statement of financial activities of the company, i.e. Direct charitable expenditure £21 330 000 and Other expenditure £2 393 000. The surplus for the financial year was £2 957 000 as the total income amounted to £26 680 000. However, if Lottery funding and the costs related to the Lottery project (the Arts Council Stabilisation programme) are excluded, the deficit of the company amounted to £65 000. Below, the total expenditure is broken down as in the statement of financial activities of the company.

<i>Direct charitable expenditure:</i>		
Production and performance	£12 935 000	54.5%
Technical and transport	£4 284 000	18.0%
Education, outreach and information	£579 000	2.4%
Cost of catering and sales	£467 000	2.0%
Donations payable	£40 000	0.2%
Support costs	£3 019 000	12.8%
<i>Other expenditure:</i>		
Fund-raising and marketing	£1 924 000	8.1%
Management and administration	£385 000	1.7%
Interest payable	£84 000	0.3%
Total expenditure	£23 723 000	

In the statement of financial activities of the company the above expenditure structure is further divided item by item into staff costs, other direct costs and depreciation. This division is presented below.

	Staff costs £1000s	Other direct costs £1000s	Depr. £1000s	<i>Total</i>
Production and performance	8 466	4 433	42	<i>£12 935 000</i>
Technical and transport	3 366	822	96	<i>£4 284 000</i>
Education, outreach and information	249	313	17	<i>£579 000</i>
Cost of catering and sales	2	459	6	<i>£467 000</i>
Donations payable	-	40	-	<i>£40 000</i>
Support costs	1 187	1 466	366	<i>£3 019 000</i>
Fund-raising and marketing	439	1 422	63	<i>£1 924 000</i>
Management and administration	287	53	45	<i>£385 000</i>
Interest payable		84		<i>£84 000</i>
Total	13 996	9 092	635	<i>£23 723 000</i>

Thus, apart from dividing the expenditure categories into the subtotals of staff costs, other direct costs and depreciation, the above division also provides the information about the total expenditure divided into these subcategories. The amounts are: Staff costs £13 996 000 (59% of total expenditure), Other direct costs (i.e. materials etc.) £9 092 000 (38% of total expenditure) and depreciation (of equipment, sets etc.) £635 000 (3% of total expenditure).

4. The Board of Directors of the English National Opera

According to the Articles of Association of the English National Opera the business of the company is managed by the Board of Directors. The Directors are to be members of the company and their number varies between six and twenty. According to the English practice the members of the company consist of the members of the board, there not being a group of members of the Association from among whom the Board members could be elected. Thus, in practice, the Board is a self-appointing body. The Directors retire from office in rotation, a quarter of them each year and are eligible for re-election. In case a re-election is not made the Board Nominations Committee recommends a new Board member for election. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is to be approved (unofficially) by the Arts Council. The Eyre Review recommends this practice for the appointment of the members as well. According to Chairman John Baker, the current custom is to appoint the Board members for a term of three years, the appointment being renewable once. (Baker 1998.) This is to ensure the appropriate renewal of the Board membership base.

The responsibilities of the Board (partly as the sole members of the company) are to manage the business of the company, keep accounts of the company and make them available to the General Meeting of the company, and appoint the executives of the company. The General Manager and the Finance Director of the company then become members of the Board ex-officio. The members of the Board (as only members of the company) are liable to contribute to the assets of the company if it is wound up. This liability, however, is limited to £10 per member.

During the 1997-98 financial year of the company the Board of Directors consisted of 16 members, headed by Chairman John Baker. The Board convened quarterly and the relationship between the Board and the executives of the company was not ideal due to the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between them. Also, Board membership was often considered as an honorary position, leading to weak Boards. To rectify this and to anticipate the criticism towards the Board structures of the opera houses by the Eyre Review (The future of the Lyric Theatre in London), the Chairman has subsequently modified the Board working practices. Currently, there are twelve members of the Board who are (and will be even more so in the future) appointed more in a functional role, having expertise in a field relevant to the functioning of the company. The Board meets once a month, to ensure a close relationship with and control of the organisation. The function of the Board is much like that in a commercial organisation, i.e. to ensure that the operations of the company are in line with its objectives and that its financial performance is satisfactory. (Eyre 1998, 96 & Baker 1998.)

5. The personnel structure

The English National Opera is legally a private charitable company and all its employees have normal English employee status. This is relatively weak compared with, e.g. German employee status due to the rather unrestricted English 'hire and fire' policy. There are no legally different categories of employees within the permanent employees of the ENO. According to the statement of financial activities the average weekly number of employees of the English National Opera during the 1997-98 financial year was 570. This is divided into subcategories below, according the statement of financial activities. These figures include 23 opera company staff and 69 technical staff who were not

permanent members (i.e. employees) of the company. Further, the number of visiting artists, totalling approximately 100¹, have not been included in these numbers.

Opera company	151
Orchestra and music staff	87
Technical staff	191
Front of house and premises	84
Finance, administration and marketing	57
Total number of employees	570

The English National Opera publish a list of the company members annually in the programme books. Based on the 1997-98 list the company structure was as presented below. This division is deemed to shed more light to some of the categories above.

¹ The names of the visiting singers and conductors are listed in the programme book, the total number being 90. However, the directors and designers are not included in this number, raising the grand total to approximately 100.

Music director	1	
Company principals (ensemble)	20	
Orchestra	79	
Chorus	68	
Artistic administration	24	
Opera Studio	2	
Music staff	22	
Baylis Programme	7	
<i>Total of artistic staff</i>		223
Technical direction and production planning	17	
Stage management	9	
Production wardrobe	18	
Theatre wardrobe	18	
Wig and make-up department	10	
Props workshop	6	
Transport	4	
Lilian Baylis House	2	
Stage department	31	
Electrics department	17	
Sound department	4	
Theatre management and front-of-house staff	18	
Maintenance	32	
<i>Total of technical staff</i>		156
Executive Director	1	
Finance and administration department	19	
Human resources department	6	
Development and sponsorship department	15	
Public relations (press and marketing) department	11	
Box Office staff	24	
Company doctor	1	
<i>Total of administrative staff</i>		77
Total of company members		456

As can be seen the total number of employees based on the list of company members in the 1997-98 programme books differs somewhat from the 570 figure given in the statement of financial activities. When the 23 non-permanent opera company members and the 69 non-permanent technical staff members are added to this figure the total rises to 548, the difference arising evidently from different categorisation. However, the figures of 548 and 570 are close enough to the above list to be a useful clarification of the division of different staff groups presented in the statement of financial activities of the English National Opera.

6. The Opera House

The English National Opera has throughout its history been accommodated in theatres not originally built or designed for the company. The first Opera House in which it operated was the historic Sadler's Wells theatre, which -even though refurbished through the appeals of Lilian Baylis - soon proved to be inadequate

for the company. The acoustics and the technical facilities especially were problematic. The company thus relocated to the London Coliseum, when it had become evident that the intended National Theatre scheme was not to host the ENO (then Sadler's Wells Opera). The Coliseum had originally been built as a variety hall on a grand scale by the entrepreneur Oswald Stoll in 1904 and was used for Cinerama performances in the 1960s. Since these were not successful, the owner, Prince Littler, agreed to lease the theatre to the Sadler's Wells Opera. The theatre is situated in a central position near Charing Cross Station and its location, added to its size and splendour seemed to provide a good solution to the Sadler's Wells Opera's venue problems in 1968. In 1992 the English National Opera purchased the freehold of the Coliseum with the assistance of the Arts Council and the Foundation for Sport and the Arts on condition that they redevelop and refurbish the theatre, which was at that point recognised as being in a very dilapidated state. (ENO 1998 & Jarman 1982.) The relocation of the company to the Coliseum is, however, currently causing a series of problems. The physical state of the theatre is felt to be much worse and the company's need for space more pressing than was anticipated in the early 1990s and thus an attempt to build a new theatre was launched in the early 1990s. This scheme, which was counting on new National Lottery Capital Project Funding, proved to be a failure leading to the departure of the General Director, Dennis Marks, in 1997. Additionally, the company is facing a series of practical problems in its everyday operations due to the technical and space limitations of the Coliseum. It is widely recognised that to keep the theatre even up to the standard required by the Health and Safety Laws it urgently needs redeveloping. This, however, will not solve the space problems experienced by the company. However, the company has agreed to stay at the Coliseum at least till 2001 and the discussion about relocation versus redevelopment is currently being conducted outside the public domain.

The auditorium of the Coliseum has a seating capacity of 2350 people providing good visibility from all seats. In addition to the stalls there are two circles and a balcony, the ceilings of the circles being very low, which in some areas creates problems with the acoustics. The Coliseum has only one stage, the size¹ of which is 16 m x 16 m with three-metre wide wings on both sides. The seven-metre deep back-stage area is used for storing scenery, there being additionally a small scenery storage area adjacent to the prompt side wing stage. The

¹ The numerical information on the Coliseum is derived from the theatre plans used by the company for lighting and design purposes.

proscenium opening is 15 m wide and 9 m high, the opening being variable (width from 12 m to 14 m and height from 7 to 9 m) by a false proscenium. The orchestra pit size is 6 m x 18 m and the pit depth is 2.5 m. The fly-tower height is 21 m from stage surface to the grid. (ENO 1998.) The technical equipment is antiquated and cannot easily be made up-to-date due to the limited scale of modifications possible at the Coliseum. The theatre does not offer additional rehearsal rooms or workshop facilities leading the company to be located in five different sites. Additionally, there are no scenery storing facilities apart from the stage area leading to a need to transport scenes to storage facilities outside the theatre. This, in turn is made difficult by the residential nature of Bedfordbury Street onto which the loading dock opens. (ENO 1998.)

7. Programming, pricing and audience figures

In the financial year 1997-98¹, from the beginning of April 1997 to end of March 1998, the English National Opera had seven opera premieres in its programme at the Coliseum. The new productions were Berlioz: *The Damnation of Faust*, Händel: *L'Allegro, il Penseroso ed il Moderato* (oratorio with choreography), Wagner: *Der Fliegende Holländer*, Janáček: *From the House of the Dead*, Verdi: *Falstaff*, Donizetti: *L'Elisir d'amore* and Offenbach: *Les Contes d'Hoffmann*. Additionally the English National Opera gave the world premiere of a double bill by Mark Anthony Turnage (*Twice Through the Hart, Country of the Blind*) at the Aldeburgh Festival, bringing the total number of premieres to nine.

In addition to the premieres there were 13 other operas in the repertory at the Coliseum. These were *Madam Butterfly*, *Orpheus and Eurydice*, *Ariadne auf Naxos*, *La traviata*, *Carmen*, *Don Pasquale*, *Tosca*, *The Mikado*, *Così fan tutte*, *Die Zauberflöte*, *Eugene Onegin*, *Xerxes* and *La bohème*. The total number of opera performances by the English National Opera amounted to 193. The company does not provide ballet performances itself. Thus, the company leased its venue to two ballet companies, the Kirov Ballet and the English National Ballet, for a total of ten weeks of ballet performances during the financial year. (ENO 1998.)

The admission price structure of the English National Opera is divided by the location of the seat in the auditorium and by the day of performance, i.e. Saturday evening performances are sold at increased prices. All the productions are in general priced homogeneously. The exception in spring 1997 was Händel's *Allegro*, which was offered at reduced prices due to its exceptional nature as a staged oratorio. The prices did not remain constant during the financial year ending in March 1998, having been slightly different in the spring - summer 1997 season from the autumn - winter 1998 season. The prices went down in some categories and were increased in others, the differences being relatively small (roughly +/- 10%). Thus, the pricing structure will be presented based on the

¹ The information about the programming of the ENO is presented based on the financial year of the company, 1st April 1997 - 31st March 1998. This is done in order to keep the description consistent with the financial data included. The actual 1997-98 season lasted from 6th September 1997 to 4th July 1998.

autumn - winter 1998 prices, since the period forms the majority of the financial year in question. (ENO 1998.)

The auditorium is divided into 12 different price categories, from £52 to £5. On Saturday evenings the range is from £55 to £5. The stalls are divided into two price categories, the centre belonging to the higher category and the sides and rear of the auditorium to the lower category. The prices for the two categories are £47.50 (49.59 on Saturday evenings¹) and £37 (£42). The stalls box seat prices and the dress circle box seat prices are £52 (£55) and the stage box seat price is £25 (£32). The dress circle is divided into four price categories higher at the front and lower at the back, the range being from £47.50 (£49.50) to £22.50 (£25). The upper circle is divided similarly into four price categories, the range being from £25 (£32) to £12.50 (£17.50). The upper circle box seat price is £27.50 (£32). The balcony is divided into two price categories, higher prices at the front, cheaper in the middle due to a railing obstructing the view and higher again at the back. The prices are £10 (£12) and £5 (£8.50), respectively. There are a number of seats and areas in the auditorium, especially in the circles, in which the acoustics are especially difficult. These seats and areas have not, however, been priced differently but are, if possible, left unsold. (ENO1998.)

The English National Opera offers a range of discount and subscription schemes, belonging to three different categories, i.e. day seats, reduced prices, and flexible subscription scheme. The day seats scheme offers a limited number of seats for sale on the day of the performance for a reduced price. Additionally, tickets still available three hours before the performance are sold for reduced prices to concessions groups (i.e. students, senior citizens etc.) members, and on Saturdays also to the general public (who pay more than concessions group members). The reduced prices scheme is available to groups of over ten persons (saving 25%) and to children under 18 accompanied by an adult (one child per adult, saving 50%). The flexible subscription scheme offers a free selection of operas and dates from three performances upwards, the discount starting from 15% with three operas and reaching 30% with seven operas. The bookings for the flexible subscription scheme are processed before general booking opens, thus giving the extra benefit of good seats. (ENO 1998.)

¹ In order to avoid repetition the Saturday evening price will be provided in parenthesis after the weekday price without repeating the 'on Saturday evenings'.

The numbers of the paying audience at the English National Opera during the financial year ended 31st March 1998 totalled 342 335. This gives an average of 1774 per performance, 75% of the total capacity. (ENO 1998.) The company does not make other audience information publicly available. However, the audience survey carried out by Caroline Gardiner for the organisation in 1989 gives an indication of the composition of the audience. Due to the fact that the 1985 and 1989 audience surveys by Gardiner give fairly similar pictures of the ENO audience it seems possible to assume that the situation has not dramatically changed over the period since the 1989 survey. Thus the results can be regarded as indicative - if not conclusive - of the structure of the current audience. Based on the survey in 1989 by Gardiner the majority of the audience comes from the Greater London area and only 15% of the audience comes from further than 60 kilometres outside London. The audience is composed relatively equally of men and women, however, the 1989 survey found differences between performances. For example, some productions appealed more to women than to men. With respect to age, the general finding about opera audiences was confirmed, the average age being 45. Further, the average age of a regular ENO visitor was 48. The audience of the ENO is relatively loyal to the organisation, the average number of visits to the ENO by the audience surveyed being three (excluding the performance surveyed) within last 12 months. Further, 11% of the audience surveyed had made at least 12 visits to the ENO during the last 12 months. Thus, the survey confirms the assumption of the organisation that it has a relatively supportive and loyal audience base in the Greater London area. (Gardiner 1989, 3-8.)


8. The organisational structure of the English National Opera

The English National Opera describe their organisational structure in a very detailed manner in a hierarchical organisational chart. This chart extends to the level of each individual in the organisation describing the formal chains of command. The top levels of the organisation consist of the Chairman of the Board, the Board of Directors and the General Director assisted by the Executive Director. Under this structure there exist two entities in the chart: the Contemporary Opera Studio (as a somewhat autonomous unit) and the English National Opera structure, the top level of which consists of the ENO Directorate. This directorate is formed by the Directors of each department of the organisation, i.e. the Director of Artistic Administration and Dramaturgy, the Director of Business and

Administration, the Director of Development, the Director of Human Resources, the Music Director, the Director of Public Relations and the Technical Director. Additionally, the Head of Finance is a member of this Directorate even though organisationally placed under the authority of the Director of Business and Administration. This structure is described, including the responsibilities of each department in figure 10 describing the English National Opera's organisational structure. In the organisational chart prepared by the organisation each of the departments is described with a tree-structure. This is deemed, however, too detailed for the purposes of this study.

Figure 10.

Organisational Structure,
the English National Opera



There have been changes in the management of the English National Opera since the creation of the organisational chart (dated May 1997) by the company. General Director Dennis Marks resigned due to failures in the company's relocation plans soon after Paul Daniel took over the position of Music Director in 1997. This led to a situation where the new Music Director needed to assume responsibility over the whole organisation temporarily. Since then, the current management trio has been formed consisting of General Director Nicholas Payne (with a background in Arts Administration, especially in opera) and Executive Director Russell Willis-Taylor (with a background in management and fund-raising for the arts) in addition to Music Director Paul Daniel (conductor). This arrangement is somewhat contradictory to the organisational chart created by the company in which the Music Director is one of the departmental directors. However, in the interviews conducted at the organisation the trio was recognised as the top management of the organisation, the General Director being the *Primus inter pares* and ultimately responsible for the organisation.

9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure

This section describing the artistic and financial planning and decision making structure of the English National Opera is based mainly on three interviews, two within the organisation i.e. Chairman John Baker and General Director Nicholas Payne (both on 10th February 1999) and one at the Arts Council with the Music Director Kathryn McDowell (on 23rd February 1999).

The artistic planning process is started with a five year 'idea structure', an artistic policy for the organisation not involving a great deal of budgeting. This is compiled by the General Director in cooperation with the Music Director and subsequently discussed in principle with the Board of Directors. Through this process, the Arts Council of England - the main funding body which has a right to attend the Board meetings - is also informed about future trends in the organisation. After the initial plan has been approved (informally, however, by the Arts Council) by all parties, more detailed plans are drawn up and budgeted with the assistance of the Executive Director. The final plans need to be executable normally three years in advance, the final deadline for changes being

18 months¹ before the season in question. Thus, the planning operation is three-tiered, there being the five-year plan which deals with the future artistic policy of the organisation, the three-year plan dealing with the long-term financial and artistic planning and, finally, the eighteen month plan which does not allow much scope for changes - no matter whether due to threats or opportunities - due to high costs involved in last minute changes. The process includes all the parties concerned, the Board, the three executive Directors and the Arts Council. However, according to General Director Payne, the responsibility for the success of the plans and the budgets rests finally with him.

The financial control mechanism of the artistic production process starts from the contracts level. The budgets and timetables of the production in question are incorporated into the contracts of the directors and designers, the two groups most likely to cause extra expenses in the process. The General Director and the Executive Director of the company monitor the production timetables and costs on a continuous basis and, if there seem to be problems, will be involved in the process using a mixture of incentives and fines in order to keep the process under control. In addition, the Board of Directors receive monthly reports on the development of the Box Office and the costs of the organisation. This information, due to the right of the Arts Council to have their representative present at Board meetings, is available to the Arts Council as well. Additionally, the Board of Directors receives reports on the cost development 'per department' and can take action if there are problems regularly within a department.

The relationship between the English National Opera and the Arts Council of England concerning the artistic and financial planning and control processes is based on informal links, as has been described above. The ENO is a legally independent body and the Board of Directors is officially independent from the funding body. However, links naturally exist between the two organisations due to the fact that the Arts Council provides nearly half (60% if the Lottery Stabilisation scheme funding is included) of the income of the organisation. The Arts Council is included in the five-year policy discussion and in the general process of defining the artistic direction of the organisation. However, the role is only advisory and the only actual way of reacting to the development of the ENO is through the funding decisions and the three-year funding agreement framework

¹ According to General Director Nicholas Payne, this is the time when only emergency changes can be made due to costs included in last minute changes.

in operation. In relation to these decisions the ENO and the ACE create an annual agreement including the numbers of performances and productions, the ticket prices, the general policy of the organisation etc. The artistic development of the organisation, apart from the planning and annual agreement process, is monitored by the Arts Council through peer-group reports (the Arts Council advisory panels) on approximately ten performances per year. In general, the relationship between the English National Opera and the Arts Council of England is acknowledged by both parties to rely on mutual trust and understanding, due to the independent nature of the organisations. This trust is maintained - with greater or lesser success - through frequent contacts between the Arts Council lead assessor of the organisation (in 1998 Music Director Kathryn McDowell) and the Directors of the ENO. In exceptional cases the Chairmen of both organisations can be included in the communication and negotiation process, if necessary. The Arts Council insists that the 'arm's length' principle exists in the process, even though the influence of the funding body is used in the manner described above.

10. Summary

In this section the main points of the information presented above are collected in table form. The information is based – where applicable – on annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the next part of the thesis.

Organisational history and legal status	Founded in 1925 (opened in 1931 at the Sadler's Wells Theatre) on the initiative of Lillian Baylis to offer opera and drama at popular prices. Legal status Charitable Company limited by guarantee - Sadler's Wells Trust Limited (non-profit-making organisation) established in 1946. Company changed its name to the English National Opera in 1974 after moving to the London Coliseum.
Governing bodies	Board of Directors elected by the general meeting from the members of the Company. In practice the members of the Company and the Board of Directors are the same, making the Board a self-nominating body.
Management structure	Three top managers: General Director, Executive Director and Music Director. General Director ultimately responsible.
Organisational structure	Seven departmental directors (senior management team) under the General Director leading to a fairly flat organisational structure. Structure defined, however, hierarchically to the level of individual workers.
Income structure	Total income £26 680 000: 46% Arts Council subsidy, 26% Box Office, 14% Subsidy from National Lottery Funds, 5% Sponsorship and donations, 9% Other income (sales etc.).
Expenditure structure	59% personnel, 38% other operational costs, 3% depreciation. Divided by activity (including staff costs): 55% production and performance, 18% technical and transport, 13% support costs, 8% fund-raising and marketing, 6% other.
Number of employees	570 + 92 visiting artists
Personnel structure	Artistic personnel 238 (ensemble 20, chorus 68, orchestra 79, other artistic personnel 71), technical staff 191, administration 57, front-of-house and maintenance staff 84.
Opera House	London Coliseum, built in 1904 as a variety hall. Auditorium capacity 2350. Stage 16 x 16 m, with

very limited wing and rear-stage spaces. Technically fairly outdated, the limitations in space and stage-technology hinder effective working. Some of the workshops and majority of storage space not located in the theatre.

Programming and number of performances in the main auditorium	Total number of performances 193. 22 different productions, out of which 9 new productions. The English National Ballet visited the theatre with 78 ballet performances.
Ticket prices and sold capacities	Ticket prices £5 - £55. Sold capacities 75% (for the opera performances by the company).

7. THE FINNISH NATIONAL OPERA

1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation

The Finnish National Opera was founded in 1911 under the name *Kotimainen ooppera* (Domestic Opera), as an artists' cooperative. The initiative came from two people, internationally known soprano Aino Ackté and a wealthy businessman and artists manager Edvard Fazer (brother of the founder of the Fazer confectionery company). They invited four other prominent figures from the Finnish operatic scene to participate in the cooperative. The founders agreed to work for the company without pay and contribute towards any losses. Other soloists and the orchestra were to receive salaries. If there was a surplus, it was to be divided between the founders. (Lampila 1997, 114.)

In 1914, the artists cooperative changed its name to *Suomalainen Ooppera* (the Finnish Opera) and became a limited company, the founders remaining the only shareholders with the exception of Aino Ackté, who had left the company after a bitter disagreement with the other members two years earlier. The company was again transformed in 1917 to comply with the Company Law by a prominent lawyer, Emil Forsström, who had been invited to join the Board of Directors as an advisory member. In this transformation the shareholders (the founding members) agreed to forego most of the funds they had invested in the company over the years. Edvard Fazer especially had subsidised the work of the company from his own personal wealth and he continued to do so in this transformation by donating the entire share capital of the new company from his personal funds. At the same time the basis on which the company was governed was broadened; the Board was to consist of the Director of the company, a number of artists' representatives and other stakeholders from society at large. (Lampila 1997, 132-133.) In 1922 an addition to the company was formed when *Suomalainen baletti* (the Finnish Ballet) was founded. The Finnish National Ballet still exists within the organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera.

The next transformation in the legal status of the Finnish Opera took place in 1956 when the limited company was dismantled and *Suomen Kansallisoopperan Säätiö* (The Finnish National Opera Foundation) was founded. This took on all the responsibilities and liabilities of the Finnish Opera and thus the actual opera company continued as before. The new Foundation was formed in close

cooperation with the Ministry of Education, which appointed seven out of twelve members of the Board of Governors. (Lampila 1997, 476.) This development is closely linked to developments in the Finnish National Opera's income structure, i.e. increased State subsidy.

The present legal status of the Finnish National Opera is a Foundation; i.e. non-profit-making organisation with limited own capital (FIM 1 000 000). It is governed by a Board of Governors with 20 members representing different stakeholders and its subordinate executive committee, the Board of Directors, which has 12 members. (FNO 1992: 3-6.) The composition, duties and the criteria of appointment of the members of these Boards will be examined below when commenting on the organisational role of these bodies.

2. Income structure of the FNO

In the beginning of its existence the Finnish National Opera (then the Domestic Opera) operated as an artists' cooperative and was thus subsidised by the labour and personal wealth of the founder members. This continued to some extent in the case of Edvard Fazer, the first Director of the opera, until 1923. Only then did the Board of Directors realise that he had directed the opera without a salary for the first 12 years. (Lampila 1997, 115.) However, soon after the opera had been founded it became evident that additional funds were necessary. These were available to some extent from lotteries organised by a group of prominent society ladies, and from the City of Helsinki. The State did not find it necessary to allocate funds for the opera in the early years of its existence. (Lampila 1997, 131-133.)

The first form of subsidy from the State - which had recently become independent - to the opera was a rent-free lease for 80 years of a former Russian Military Theatre, *Aleksanterin Teatteri*. The theatre had recently been confiscated by the new State of Finland and was given to the opera in rather run-down condition. The Opera itself was to fund all necessary refurbishment work and modernisation. However, in the same year - 1918, Parliament granted a small subsidy to the Opera, amounting to FIM 25 000 - small compared with the grand total of FIM 600 000 used to renovate the theatre. (Lampila 1997, 149.) The rest of the sum was collected from individual donors, e.g. Edvard Fazer donated FIM 100 000, and by raising the 'share capital' of the company. However, the sole

benefit the shareholders enjoyed was a right to reserve seats for performances before the tickets went on sale publicly. (Lampila 1997, 153-54.)

In the early years of 1920s the need for subsidies to finance the opera became greater and greater. In 1921 the Board of Directors gave an ultimatum to Parliament; the opera would need an extra FIM 240 000 to cover its accumulated deficit or it would cease to exist. After fierce debate Parliament granted the sum of FIM 200 000. In 1923 a similar situation occurred and the Board of Directors made a proposition to Parliament for a Lottery, the surplus of which would be used to fund the opera. The proposal was not accepted. The opera kept accumulating deficit and gave Parliament several ultimatums over the following years. In spring 1925, the Board of Directors carried out their threats and closed the opera down. During autumn 1925, Parliament proposed a motion to allow a Lottery to fund useful purposes in general and the Finnish Opera in particular. This law came into effect in April 1926 and formed the basis on which the Finnish National Opera still is funded. The opera resumed its activities and the pattern of its State subsidy had been created. (Lampila 1997, 166-80.)

The total income of the Finnish National Opera in 1997 was FIM 204 324 000. The State subsidy from the surplus of *Veikkaus Oy* (the State-owned Lottery company) channelled through the Ministry of Education in the State Budget amounted to FIM 137 000 000, 67% of its total income. (FNO 1997, 46.) This subsidy is based on Statute no. 725 (24 September, 1982) which defines the way in which the Lottery surplus is to be divided. This Statute determines the Finnish National Opera's share as 8% of the surplus of *Veikkaus Oy*. In 1997 this surplus, however, amounted to FIM 1 920 000 000 (*Veikkaus Oy* 1997, 32.) of which 8% is FIM 153 600 000, FIM 16 600 000 more than was actually granted to the FNO. This discrepancy is explained by the financial difficulties the Finnish State was experiencing in 1990s; the annual budget laws accompanying the State Budget allow an exception to be made to the 8% figure fixed in Statute no. 725. There is currently a new Law under preparation which will clarify this practice in the future.

The next source of income in terms of size is self-generated income, FIM 47 000 000 in 1997, 23% of total income, out of which box office income amounts to FIM 40 850 000, 20% of the total, the rest consisting of sponsorship and trade income. (FNO 1997, 46.)

In addition to the State subsidy, the local authorities in the Greater Helsinki Area (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Kauniainen) subsidise the FNO according separate to cooperation agreements made with these authorities. The respective amounts of subsidy are: Helsinki FIM 13 260 000 (6.5% of total income), Espoo FIM 4 450 000 (2.2% of total income), Vantaa FIM 2 225 000 (1.1% of total income) and Kauniainen FIM 400 000 (0.1% of total income). (FNO 1997, 46.) In exchange for their subsidies the authorities are represented on the governing bodies of the FNO and additionally receive 'services' (touring, education projects etc.). This arrangement will be further commented on in conjunction with the governing bodies and their functioning.

3. The expenditure structure

The 1997 the total annual expenditure of the Finnish National Opera was (in full thousands) FIM 204 324 000. It is broken down into three main categories: personnel expenditure FIM 163 614 000 (80%), operating expenditure FIM 37 964 000 (18.6%) and rents and leases FIM 2 745 000 (1.4%). The first two are further broken down in the table below. (FNO 1997, 46-49.)

<i>Total expenditure in 1997:</i>	<i>Subdivided</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Personnel expenditure</i>		163 614 000
Salaries and fees	124 434 000	
Statutory pension expenditure	14 294 000	
Other statutory social security expenditure	11 544 000	
Complementary pension expenditure	11 419 000	
Sundry personnel expenditure	1 922 000	
<i>Operating expenditure</i>		37 964 000
Production expenditure	11 016 000	
Marketing expenditure	9 882 000	
Property and equipment expenditure	8 619 000	
Administration expenditure	2 928 000	
Bought in services and sundry fees	2 506 000	
Visiting artists' sundry expenditure	1 804 000	
Sundry operating expenditure	1 205 000	
<i>Rents and leases</i>		2 745 000
Total expenditure FIM		204 324 000

In these figures the high proportion of personnel expenditure (80%) seems striking, especially when compared with the production expenditure (5.4%), the biggest single item in the operating expenses. This is partly due to the employment structure of the Finnish National Opera which, especially under Juhani Raikinen's direction, emphasises the importance of a permanent ensemble. (FNO 1997, 4.) Thus, for example, most of the soloists' fees (as they

are permanent employees) are included in personnel expenses as opposed to production expenses.

4. The Board of Governors and the Board of Directors

The *Suomen Kansallisoopperan Säätiö*, the Finnish National Opera Foundation, is governed by two bodies, the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors, with the assistance of the managers of the organisation, i.e. General Director (Opera Director), Administrative Director and Ballet Director.

According to the Statutes of the Foundation the Board of Governors consists of twenty members and their personal substitutes, who serve for a fixed term of three years. Eight members are nominated by the Ministry of Education, two each by the Cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, and one by the City of Kauniainen. Three members represent the permanent employees of the opera. Additionally, the Board of Governors independently appoints two expert members and their substitutes. (FNO 1992, 4.) The members of the 1996-1998 Board consisted of politically prominent figures, e.g. the Speaker of Parliament, two MPs, high civil servants from the Ministry of Education, prominent municipal politicians (appointed by the three cities), etc. Interestingly enough, the two expert members are the General Managers of two main sponsors. (FNO 1997, 55.)

The Board of Governors meets twice a year, or when requested by five of its members or the Board of Directors. The main responsibilities of the Board of Governors are: to appoint the Board of Directors and the Auditors of the Foundation, to appoint the General Manager and the Administrative Director, to confirm the number of executives of the opera and their job descriptions, to approve the Annual Report of the Foundation, and to confirm the budget and the plan of operations for the next fiscal year. (FNO 1992, 5-6.)

The Board of Directors is the executive governing body of the Finnish National Opera. It consists of twelve members, appointed annually¹ by the Board of

¹ However, to ensure continuity in the government of the FNO the members serve terms of three years. This is a matter of practicality even though according to the Statutes of the

Governors. The members of the Board of Directors are not selected from amongst the members of the Board of Governors. Three members are nominated by the Ministry of Education, two by the City of Helsinki, one each by the Cities of Espoo and Vantaa, three by the permanent employees of the opera, and two are appointed directly by the Board of Governors. Additionally, the General Director and the Administrative Director are *ex officio* members of the Board of Directors. (FNO 1992, 6-7.) The 1996-98 members included a high civil servant from the Treasury (chair), the managing director of Veikkaus Oy (State Lottery company) (vice-chair), the mayor of Helsinki, the principal of the Sibelius Academy (University of Music) etc. (FNO 1997, 56.)

The Board of Directors meets at least four times per opera season, or whenever summoned by the chair, or - when he is unavailable - by the vice-chair or the General Director. It represents the Foundation and works as its executive body. The main responsibilities of the Board of Directors are: to execute the decisions of the Board of Governors and oversee that the financial situation of the Foundation is in accord with its budget, to decide on issues relating to loan capital, to prepare a budget for the next calendar year and a preliminary budget for the year after that for the Board of Governors, to prepare the Annual Report for the Board of Governors, to decide on appointments and resignations of permanent employees, and to decide on the programming of the opera company according to the recommendations of the relevant personnel groups. (FNO 1992, 7-8.)

The Board of Directors appoints a working committee from amongst its members. This working committee consists of the chair and the vice-chair of the Board of Directors, the General Manager and the Administrative Director of the opera and two other members, one of whom is a representative of the personnel. The working committee meets monthly during the opera season and otherwise whenever necessary. It prepares the issues on the agenda of the Board of Directors deemed to require this level of preparation by the General Manager or the Administrative Director. It also deals with the everyday business matters delegated to it by the Board of Directors and decides on matters within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors that needs immediate attention. In this case the decisions are further subjected to the approval of the Board as a whole. (FNO 1992, 8.)

Foundation the Board of Governors appoints the members of the Board of Directors annually. (FNO 1992, 6 & FNO 1997, 56.)

5. The personnel structure

The personnel of the FNO is divided into three different categories: permanent personnel, fixed-term contract personnel and visiting personnel (generally artists). The Finnish employment laws govern this structure and grant strong statutory rights to the permanent personnel; once a permanent appointment has been made it is relatively difficult to dismiss an employee without very strong reasons. The fixed term contract personnel are well protected, too; only the termination of their contract has been fixed in advance. However, the same person cannot be employed 'permanently' with a series of fixed term contracts; in this case the employee can be deemed as permanent employee by a Court of Law in a case of dispute.

The policy of the Finnish National Opera currently is to favour permanent employment. In the Annual Report for 1997, General Manager Juhani Raiskinen writes as follows: "In January 1997 the Board of Directors decided to grant permanent employment status to over 80 musicians, singers, dancers and members of technical personnel and thus expressed its support towards ensemble practise. This means that the orchestra, chorus and a majority of dancers, members of the technical staff and administrative staff currently form a whole that cannot be adjusted according to economic trends without interfering with the artistic achievements." (FNO 1997, 4.)

In 1997 the Finnish National Opera employed a total of 583 persons as permanent and fixed-term employees, out of which 355 were artistic personnel. It also employed 172 visiting artists¹, the Opera 121 and the Ballet 51. The breakdown of these figures are in the tables below. (FNO 1997, 16-19, 35 & FNO 1998.)

¹ This number includes all artists who worked for the organisation as guest artists, even if the visit was for only one performance.

Permanent and fixed-term contract personnel

	Subdivided Permanent / fixed term	Subdivided, total	Total, permanent / fixed term	Total
<i>Artistic personnel</i>			271/84	355
Soloists (singers)	25/4	29		
Orchestra	100/15	115		
Chorus	53/7	60		
Dancers	55/25	80		
Ballet school	5/13	18		
Other artistic personnel ¹	33/20	53		
<i>Technical personnel</i>			147/37	184
Stage technical personnel	82/31	113		
Workshops	49/4	53		
Maintenance ²	16/2	18		
<i>Administration</i>			33/11	44
Total permanent and fixed term personnel			451/132	583

¹ This category consists of in-house conductors, directors, set designers, singers' coaches, chorus masters, ballet coaches etc.

² The cleaning related activities are contracted to a cleaning company.

<i>Numbers of visiting artists:</i>	<i>Subdivided</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Total visiting artists, the Opera</i>		<i>121</i>
Soloists (singers)	74	
Conductors (incl. assistants)	13	
Directors (incl. assistants)	9	
Set designers (incl. Assistants)	8	
Costume designers (incl. Assistants)	8	
Choreographers	3	
Actors	3	
Dancers	2	
Translators	1	
<i>Total visiting artists, the Ballet</i>		<i>51</i>
Soloists (dancers)	11	
Conductors	7	
Choreographers	6	
Choreographers' assistants	11	
Teachers	13	
Visual designers	3	
Total visiting artists		172

6. The Opera House

In 1993 the Finnish National Opera moved from its 'temporary' home of over 70 years, the Alexander Theatre, to a new purpose-built modern opera house overlooking Töölö Bay in central Helsinki. The process leading to the realisation of this moment had been long; the first plans for an opera house had been made in Helsinki as early as 1817. After several futile attempts to implement these plans the process leading to the New Opera House was started in 1950s when two Societies for a New Opera House were founded (they later merged) to assist in raising the capital needed. These organised fund raising in several forms and lobbied for the new building. The Finnish National Opera Foundation became officially involved in the process in 1971, when the Board of Governors decided to found a New Opera House Foundation (taking over the responsibilities of the former Society) its aim being solely to coordinate and raise funds for the project. The City of Helsinki provisionally promised to donate a site for the New Opera House in central Helsinki in 1975. On the basis of this the New Opera House Foundation organised an architectural competition for the New House. In 1978 the State finally granted funds to further develop the winning proposal '*Scalapuikko*' by architects Hyvämäki, Karhunen & Parkkinen. In the 1980 State Budget some additional funds were granted for project planning and, at the same time, Parliament assumed responsibility for the project and its funding. With this decision the New Opera House Foundation was transformed into an advisory body concentrating on suggestions about the interior design and raising funds for

the works of art in the lobby areas. The National Board of Public Building took over the implementation of the actual building process. Despite this the project faced severe delays in many phases of its realisation due to economic and planning difficulties. Finally, at the end of 1987, the actual building work commenced. (Lampila 1997, 785-789 & Eskola 1995, 14-18.) In 1993, when the New Opera House was finished, the total cost of its building had exceeded FIM 750 000 000; a huge change from the original estimate of FIM 120 000 000 in 1977. (Later estimates were FIM 205 000 000 in 1980, FIM 318 000 000 in 1981, 384 000 000 in 1983 etc.) (Lampila 1997, 788.) However much the ever-rising cost of building was debated at the time, in hindsight the New Opera House is generally deemed worth the investment. It remains the property of the State but its usage has been granted to the Finnish National Opera Foundation rent-free.

The New Opera House has two auditoria. The horseshoe-shaped main auditorium with three balconies has a seating capacity of 1365 (1499 in concerts when the orchestra pit seating 110 musicians has been covered), and a multi-purpose studio theatre (the Almi Hall) which has the seating capacity varying from 200 to 500 depending on usage. The main auditorium stage is cruciform, consisting of 16 x 16 metre (four 4 x 16 metre risers) main stage with an adjustable (width 13-16 metres and height 7-10 metres) proscenium arch, and wing and rear stages of the same size. The fly-tower height is 28 metres. The revolving rear stage can be wheeled on to the main stage. Also, a whole setting can be wheeled in from the wing stages as they consist of stage trucks that can be driven onto the main stage silently. The technical solutions in lighting and sound are computerised and state-of-the-art; there are also reserve capacities in technical spaces, cable routes and equipment racks to enable future expansion and evolving functional requirements. The studio theatre, doubling as a rehearsal stage, is a flexible theatre space and its size, layout and acoustics can be widely adjusted. If necessary in the rehearsals, the layout and technical functions of the main stage can be simulated in the studio theatre. (Eskola 1995, 53, 63-65, 71, 104-107.)

7. Programming, pricing and audience figures

In 1997¹ the Finnish National Opera had four opera premieres in the main auditorium and the Finnish National Ballet (operating under the same organisational structure) had three. The opera premieres were: Musorgski: *Boris Godunov*; Beethoven: *Fidelio*; Sondheim: *Sweeney Todd*; and Wagner: *Die Valküre*. The ballet premieres were: Lacotte after Taglioni: *La sylphide*; Duato, Preljocaj, Uotinen: *Contemporary Triple Bill*; and Makarova after Petipa: *La Bayadère*. The Opera also had nine other operas in its repertory during the year 1997: *Tosca*, *La Traviata*, *Salome*, *Don Giovanni*, *L'elisir d'amore*, *Il barbiere di Siviglia*, *Le nozze di Figaro*, *Carmen* and *Hyönteiselämä* (a contemporary Finnish Opera by Kalevi Aho). The Ballet repertory consisted of *The Nutcracker*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Don Quixote* and a Triple Bill of *Le Sacre du printemps*, *Petrushka* and *the second detail* (Willems). The Ballet also had two Gala Nights - its 75th Anniversary gala and a New Year's Eve gala - and two contemporary programmes in the studio theatre. In addition there were various visits and cooperation projects by both the Opera and the Ballet, partly to satisfy the terms of the funding agreement between the company and the cities in the Greater Helsinki area. (FNO 1997, 8-35.)

The ticket prices (1997) at the Finnish National Opera vary from FIM 50 to 400. The auditorium has been divided into six different price groups A-F, of which B is highest (the dress circle). In 1997, the prices for a 'normal' (i.e. not a premiere, guest performance etc.) opera or ballet performance were A = 220, B = 300, C = 180, D = 100, E = 80 and F = 50. For certain performances (e.g. *Die Valküre*), visits etc. the prices were higher, the top reaching FIM 400. The studio theatre performance prices were from FIM 120 to 40. There were some concessions available for students, groups etc., the terms of which varied according to the performance at the discretion of the management. Since 1997, prices at the Finnish National Opera have been raised for 'normal' performances, the Autumn 1998 season range being FIM 350 to 50, i.e. the bottom end has remained fixed. (FNO: 1997.)

In 1997 the Finnish National Opera had 286 performances (including all visits, concerts etc.) and 273 899 tickets were sold, a total of 87% of the capacity. The total box office intake was FIM 40 848 000. In the main auditorium there were 125 opera performances and 74 ballet performances, they attracted capacities of

¹ For the sake of consistency (all financial figures etc. are based on a calendar year) the programming and pricing is presented as the calendar year 1997 instead of the 1997-98 season which covered August 1997 to June 1998.

91% and 86%, respectively. In addition there were 11 studio theatre performances (70% capacity), 16 concerts (64% capacity), 49 guest and visit performances¹ (32 by the Opera, 17 by the Ballet), 8 Ballet School performances and 3 pre-performance talks. (FNO 1997, 40-41.)

The audience profile of the Finnish National Opera, based on two audience surveys by Taloustutkimus Oy (*Suomi Tänään* 3/1996 and *Suur-Helsinki Tänään* 1/1998), differs somewhat from the demographic figures of the Finnish population. In 1996, 11% of the population had visited a performance in the New Opera House, 8% within the last year. 27% of the population had visited an opera or ballet performance at least once during their life-time. An additional 18% were interested in seeing one, thus giving a total of 45% of the population as potential opera audience. (Taloustutkimus Oy 1996, 3.)

Women represent 63% of the audience, leaving 37% for men, i.e. almost two-thirds of the audience were women. The age structure of the audience was in 1996 as follows: below 20 years 6%, 20-34 years 22%, 35-49 years 30% and over 50 years 42%. Almost half of the audience, 47% lived in the Greater-Helsinki area (Helsinki 27%, Espoo 11%, Vantaa 9% and Kauniainen² 1%), 14% of the audience lived in other cities having over 50 000 inhabitants. 19% of the audience lived in small cities (under 50 000 inhabitants) and another 19% of the audience lived in rural communities. Classified according to total household income, the structure of the audience was as follows: below FIM 120 000 p.a. 24%, FIM 120 001-240 000 p.a. 29%, FIM 240 001-360 000 p.a. 26% and over FIM 360 000 p.a. 13%. The educational level of the audience makes interesting reading; 33% had academic qualifications, 29% had high school education (A-level equivalent), and only 36% of the audience had lower qualifications.

The 1996 audience survey gives some interesting comparisons between the general population and the 11% of the population that had visited the New Opera House. The greatest deviations (in percentage of the group in question

¹ The capacity information is not relevant due to differing venues etc. for the rest of the performance categories.

² The percentage of visitors from Kauniainen does not seem significant. However, as 48% of the inhabitants of Kauniainen had visited the New Opera House, the density of opera audience is significantly high in Kauniainen. This is explained by the very high average social and educational status among the inhabitants.


that have visited the New Opera House) were: persons with academic qualifications 32%, inhabitants of Helsinki 34%, Espoo 32%, Vantaa 28% and Kauniainen 48%, members of over FIM 360 000 p.a. income households 35%, persons that have attended music 33% and opera 40% festivals. (Taloustutkimus Oy 1996, 5.)

8. The organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera

The organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera is described in figure 11 below in the form that the organisation it defines.

Figure 11.

Organisational Structure,
the Finnish National Opera



The top layers of the organisation, the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors have been extensively discussed above and thus will not be commented on here, the internal organisational and decision-making structures being the emphasis of this section.

The top management, General Manager Juhani Raiskinen (pianist, composer) and Administrative Director John-Eric Westö (economist) form the highest operating level of the organisation and belong to the working committee of the Board of Directors. Based on the bylaws of the organisation, approved by the Board of Governors, there is a top management group of five members that assist the two top managers in their task. In addition to the General Manager and the Administrative Director this group includes Ballet Director Jorma Uotinen (dancer, choreographer), Music Director Okko Kamu (conductor) and Production Director Keijo Kupiainen (theatre technician). In effect this group consists of the heads of all the four 'departments' of the organisation (Opera/music, Ballet, Production, Administration) that are the direct subordinates of the General Manager. The main responsibilities of this management group according to the bylaws are: to plan the opera and ballet activities and define the resources needed, to monitor the artistic and economic performance of the organisation, to ensure that all relevant safety and union regulations are followed, and to inform the personnel of any likely changes in the functioning of the organisation. (FNO 1994, 5.)

The way in which the four departments of the organisation have been subsequently divided is clearly visible in the organisational chart. In addition to this division into four departments there clearly exists a dual structure within the organisation, i.e. the artistic structure (Opera/music and Ballet) and the production-administrative structure. To bridge this gap and the gaps between different departments there are certain cooperation groups defined in the bylaws of the organisation: a production group responsible for creating the detailed rehearsal, production and performance plans based on the management group's long term planning; an operations group responsible for short-term planning and execution of the aforementioned plans; and production group(s) responsible for the planning and monitoring of individual productions. (FNO 1994, 5.) There are representatives from all relevant departments in all these groups operating at different levels of the organisation to ensure communication between departments and especially between the artistic structure and the production-administrative structures.

9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure

The organisational environment and structure of the Finnish National Opera have been presented above. In this section the artistic and financial decision-making and planning structures will be discussed and commented on. The information included in this section is based mainly on interviews with people within the Treasury and within the organisation: Chair of the Board of Directors Pekka Laajanen (high civil servant, the Treasury), General Manager Juhani Raiskinen (FNO) and Administrative Director John-Eric Westö (FNO).

As was mentioned earlier, State funding for the Finnish National Opera is based on Statute no. 725 (1982) which fixes the 8% share for the FNO from *Veikkaus Oy*'s (National Lottery) surplus which is allocated to the FNO in the State budget through the Ministry of Education. However, as the funding has not reached this figure for the last few years (i.e. the figure is not the sole basis for State funding) there is obviously another mechanism to determine the level of funding needed. This happens in the State Budget negotiations by the Cabinet and is subsequently approved by Parliament. The Ministry of Education negotiates with the Finnish National Opera to reach agreement on the level of subsidy needed; this is then incorporated in the budget under the Ministry of Education's allocations and subsequently approved (or adjusted) by the Cabinet and the Parliament. The Finnish National Opera has been negotiating for a four-year funding frame agreement, i.e. provisional figures of funding for the next four years, with the Ministry of Education and the Treasury, but however sympathetically the proposal is received, the State seems unable (partly for legal reasons) to commit itself beyond one budget year. However, all the parties seem confident enough that mutual trust exists and the 3% growth rate in the State subsidy (slightly above the inflation rate) proposed by the FNO seems to be accepted as fair and reasonable.

In order to maintain this mutual trust there is an unofficial 'results review' meeting twice a year with representatives of the Ministry of Education in addition to the more formal monthly economic report submitted to the Ministry by the Finnish National Opera. However, it must be born in mind that the Ministry appoints several members of the Board of Governors and Board of Directors thus having influence through these bodies as well. The policy of the State is, however, not to directly influence the artistic planning of the organisation but rather control the

economic side of its functions. The Chair of the Board of Directors, Pekka Laajanen, pointed out that the only direct artistic decision that the Board Of Directors make is the appointment of the General Manager and the Ballet Director on the basis of their artistic merits thus to some extent determining the artistic direction of the organisation. In a case of a possible economic deficit the Board would rather confront the management with the task of 'saving x millions' by adjusting artistic plans. According to Laajanen the decision on how this would be achieved would remain the General Manager's.

As was described earlier, according to the Statutes of the Finnish National Opera Foundation the Board of Directors, and especially its working committee (i.e. chair, vice-chair, two other members, General Manager and Administrative Director), prepare the artistic plans and budget of the organisation having consulted relevant personnel groups. These are then approved by the Board of Governors through a process deemed normally a mere formality. In practice this process is initiated by the General Manager (and in the case of the Ballet the Ballet Director) as initial artistic plans. In this planning the framework is determined by the ensemble (as the policy is to utilise permanent ensemble as far as possible), the selection of the production group, the *Zeitgeist*, the need to balance the books and thus produce 'cash cows' against experimental productions etc. According to General Manager Raiskinen this process is - and has to be - based on 'gut feeling' to a certain extent to maintain the artistic virility of the organisation. According to him there is no definite way to predict the success of a production and thus create a certain, calculated artistic plan and budget. The creation of the budget and calculations to justify this plan is then the task of the Administrative Director. In this process, according to the Administrative Director, John-Eric Westö, the key elements are trust and cooperation between the General Manager and the Administrative Director. The same point was emphasised by Raiskinen as he stated that opera house management is on a sound basis "when the Artistic Director is more concerned about the economic side of the operations and the Administrative Director about the artistic side".

After the selection of the programme, production groups and ensembles - the main tasks of the General Manager - the detailed planning and budgeting process takes place. The aim of the Finnish National Opera has, for the last few years, been to increase the accuracy of its budgeting process. This has led to more delegated approach to budgeting in which departments are more responsible for their own resources, and to creation of production based

budgeting and monitoring systems¹. Currently there are 'cost centres' responsible for their own budgeting (within given limits) and keeping to those budgets.

There are several different ways in which the artistic and economic processes are controlled. The 'control' of the artistic process takes place to a great extent in the planning process. The selection of productions, production groups and ensembles largely determine the outcome and expenditure of production processes. Naturally, there are legal measures in contracts to control the artistic personnel. However, according to Raiskinen, in reality these are relied on very seldom. In the case of a dispute, the General Manager's role is to look for solutions and facilitate cooperation in order to avoid walk-outs of soloists, directors etc. In an extreme situation, a director could forbid the production to go into performance giving him/her the upper hand in any negotiations. There is a recent example of this when Professor Götz Friedrich insisted on rebuilding a set at a late date of a rehearsal process of *Siegfried* in spring 1998. This resulted in an urgent need to exceed the budget for the production. However, this inevitably worked out cheaper than any dispute leading to a possible walk-out of the prominent director. According to Administrative Director Westö, the younger generation of artists (directors, set-designers, etc.) more readily accept budget limitations and are more willing to fulfil their artistic visions within this framework. However, the more prominent the artist, the less room there is for control or negotiations.

The economic control mechanism for a production process is twofold: there are management accounts for single productions making the top management aware of the expenditure-development, and each production process has a producer². He/she is responsible for overseeing the production process economically and timetable-wise. However, the management of the FNO emphasises that the producer does not have power over any important artistic decisions. Should a problematic situation arise - like the one with Professor Friedrich - he/she makes the General Manager aware of it so that the top management can deal with the problem, artistically and economically. Thus, in effect the producer acts as a

¹ This development is strikingly similar to the development in the UK organisations in the 1980s and early 1990s when the Arts Council started to emphasise financial accountability and reliable financial planning. See Auvinen 1996 'On the Processes of Opera Production'.

² This is the term the FNO uses. It refers to the film-industry type producer not a director in 'artistic producer' meaning.

controller of the process as long as the plans are met and budgets kept to, reporting any deviations to top management.

10. Summary

In this section the main points of the information presented above are collected in table form. The information is based – where applicable – on annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the next part of the thesis.

Organisational history and legal status	Founded in 1911 as an artists' cooperative. Formed into a foundation in 1956 in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. Current legal status: a private foundation (non-profit-making organisation) with close links to the Ministry of Education.
Governing bodies	Board of Governors (20 members, 15 nominated by the funding bodies) and Board of Directors (12 members, 7 nominated by the funding bodies).
Management structure	Two top managers: General Director and Administrative Director. Management team includes: Music Director, Ballet Director and Technical Director
Organisational structure	Flat organisational structure. Departments directly under the General Director.
Income structure	Total income FIM 204 324 000: 67% from the State subsidy (National Lottery Funds), 20% Box Office, 10% subsidies from local authorities, 3% other income.
Expenditure structure	80% personnel, 18,6% operational, 1,4% rents.
Number of employees	583 + 172 visiting artists
Personnel structure	Artistic personnel 355 (ensemble 29, ballet 80, chorus 60, orchestra 115, other artistic personnel 53, ballet school 18), technical staff 184, administration 44.

Opera House	New Opera House, inaugurated in 1993. Main auditorium capacity 1365. Stage cruciform-shaped, size 16 x 16 metres with good wing and rear stage spaces. State of the art equipment.
Programming and number of performances in the main auditorium	Total number of performances 199; 125 opera performances, 74 ballet performances. 20 different productions, out of which 7 new productions (4 operas, 3 ballets). Programming principle – semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory fairly traditional apart from new Finnish works.
Ticket prices and sold capacities	Ticket prices FIM 50 - 400. Sold capacities 91% for opera, 86% for ballet.

8. THE GLYNDEBOURNE FESTIVAL OPERA

1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation

The first season of opera at Glyndebourne was presented in 1934 in a purpose built opera house by a wealthy aristocrat, John Christie. The idea of a privately built and funded opera organisation in 20th century Europe seems surprising. However, the background of Mr. Christie provides some rationality for this development and the history of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera gives the reasons for its current legal organisation.

John Christie had been an assistant master at Eton before assuming his full-time responsibilities as owner of Glyndebourne in 1922. (Hughes 1981, 25.) The Glyndebourne Manor House included an Organ Room in which John Christie organised musical activities with those near him. These started initially as playing music for the pleasure of the participants, but gradually developed towards more performance-oriented evenings, the audience being the estate employees, tenants and house guests. The first operatic endeavour in the Organ Room was the third act of Wagner's *Die Meistersinger* performed in 1928 by six amateur singers, including John Christie. An organ and a piano substituted for the orchestra. The second operatic performance took place the following year in the form of the first act of *Die Entführung aus dem Serail*, this time with an orchestra of nineteen players. The next opera production, more of *Die Entführung* at Christmas 1929, was to be a turning point in the life of John Christie, as well as the Glyndebourne Festival Opera - the two being inseparably intertwined. For that performance the first professional soloists were engaged, including Audrey Mildmay who was to become John Christie's wife. (Hughes 1981, 28-31.)

After the marriage of John Christie and Audrey Mildmay in 1931, plans for an expansion of the Organ Room to host extended operatic endeavours emerged. First the idea was to extend the amateur performances in a newly-built auditorium of approximately 150 seats. The work had already been started, when Mrs. Christie persuaded her husband that the only way forward was to aspire to the highest possible international standards. Thus, the building work was halted and a new project for an opera house with a seating capacity of 311 started afresh. (Hughes 1981, 32-33.) The building project was completed in 1934 with varying degrees of success; the lighting and steam effects equipment was to have been

the best in Europe, but the orchestra pit size had been badly miscalculated and the scenery storage facilities were practically non-existent. (Hughes 1981, 35.)

John Christie's initial idea of had been to present mainly Wagner in his new opera house. In 1933 he announced that the plan for next summer's opening was to start with either Mozart's *Don Giovanni* or Wagner's *Die Walküre* and additionally present Wagner's *Ring* cycle and *Parsifal*. However, by the time of the actual festival in 1934 the realities had become clearer to the Christies and the first programme consisted of twelve performances of Mozart's *Le nozze di Figaro* and *Così fan tutte*. The men behind the change in the intended repertory were conductor Friz Busch and stage director Carl Ebert, two men to be of extreme importance in realising the aspirations of the Christies. Together they had explained the practicalities of producing opera to John Christie and provided him with a budget describing the resources needed. This soon convinced John Christie to start off with Mozart, though still determined to produce Wagner the following season. (Hughes 1981, 40-47.) The initial season was an artistic success, and even though the performances were not sold out the audience found its way to Glyndebourne. The deficit for the operation was £7 000, the amount John Christie had been reported to be prepared to lose. During the winter between the seasons, the pattern of enlarging and developing the opera house was assumed (see below the section on the opera house). After the first season, changes were made especially to enable the backstage operations to run more smoothly. (Hughes 1981, 49 & 74-76.) The programme for the second season in 1935 consisted of the productions from the first season plus Mozart's German operas *Die Zauberflöte* and *Die Entführung aus dem Serail*. The high artistic standards of the first season were not always achieved, especially with some of the soloists, but generally the season was an artistic success. However, the deficit for the operation rose to £10 000, but was underwritten by John Christie who was still convinced that the operation would provide a surplus in years to come. (Hughes 1981, 90-100.)

The pattern of operations in the 1930s remained fairly constant, the programme was to include the four Mozart operas in the repertory and additionally *Don Giovanni*. Ventures beyond Mozart included Verdi's *Macbeth* and Donizetti's *Don Pasquale*. The artistic standards were generally high under the guidance of Fritz Busch and Carl Ebert, but the finances left scope for improvement. The best season financially was the 1937 season, which provided a profit of £2 723, due to an enlarged auditorium and good wine sales. (Hughes 1981, 102-122.) The operations of the Festival Opera were interrupted by the Second World War

and the 1940 season never took place. The first years had, however, established Glyndebourne among the leading opera festivals, at a cost of approximately £100 000 to John Christie. (Hughes 1981, 150; Higgins 1984, 118.)

After the war, re-establishing the Glyndebourne Festival Opera seemed a huge task. In his letter to William Haley, the Director General of the BBC, John Christie wrote in 1946: "We have undertaken to restart Glyndebourne with our own resources this year and next. How much is involved financially we cannot yet tell." (Christie as cited in Higgins 1984, 118.) Obviously John Christie had come to realise the fact that an opera endeavour could not become profitable, especially during the post-war economic stringency. It took several years and cooperation with the Edinburgh Festival before the pattern of the Opera Festival finally became re-established at Glyndebourne. Permanent opera seasons in Glyndebourne were not reinstated until 1950 and only then by sharing productions with the Edinburgh Festival to begin with. Artistically, Glyndebourne soon reached its pre-war levels. However, the matter of financing the enterprise had become a pressing issue. John Christie was not willing to finance the operations year after year as the sole benefactor. So several changes in the way in which the operation was run financially were conceived.

Public funding was not available for Glyndebourne (before 1968, when the Arts Council started to finance the Glyndebourne Touring Opera), apart from a one-off Treasury guarantee against losses in 1951 for participating in the Festival of Britain. Thus the needed funds had to be found elsewhere. A combination of private support and corporate sponsorship was the answer. The first corporate benefactor of Glyndebourne was the John Lewis Partnership, which guaranteed £12 000 to underwrite two operas in 1950. The following year the Glyndebourne Festival Society was set up to attract further individual and corporate support. The Society had three-tiered membership structure, each benefactor group entitled to a defined set of benefits. The Society turned out to be a success, having 806 members by the start of the next season. One of the functions of the Society was to attract advertisers for the annual programme. In spite of the increased support, however, the 1952 season still produced a deficit of £17 790. At that time, the idea of the financial organisation of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera that is still in use today was devised. (Higgins 1984, 120-122.)

During the war, John Christie had come up with an idea of running the Opera Festival through a Trust and had set up two charitable companies in 1939,

Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. The former was to run the operations of the Glyndebourne Opera. However, only in 1952, as financial difficulties became apparent, did the scheme take practical form. The idea of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust was revived in 1952 and the Trust became fully operational in 1954¹. The theatre and gardens at Glyndebourne were leased to the Trust at a peppercorn rent. (Higgins 1984, 122; Hughes 1981, 184-185.) Today, however, Glyndebourne Productions Limited also runs the theatre and was responsible for building the new theatre in 1990. The Arts Trust administers the Glyndebourne Festival Society and other fund-raising activities. The funds are then donated towards the operations of Glyndebourne Productions Limited. Furthermore, the general supervision of Glyndebourne Productions Limited is one of the functions of the Arts Trust. The operational side of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and Glyndebourne Touring Opera is handled by Glyndebourne Productions Limited. This somewhat confusing legal concept is deemed necessary in order to separate the Christie family and the Glyndebourne Estate and the Opera House from the financial operations of the opera production company. It further enables the separation of the fund-raising activities from the day-to-day running of the opera house. An addition to this structure was created in 1975, when a finance committee - a subsidiary of the Arts Trust - was established. In the mid 1970s the inflation was burdening the organisation with costs rising faster than potential box-office receipts. Therefore, the finance committee was set up to tap into new sources of finance. Its operations were a success, enabling the box-office figure to drop from approximately 80% to 70% of total income - a ratio still valid. (Higgins 1984, 125.) This division of responsibilities still exists, the organisation being legally divided into two charities, the Glyndebourne Arts Trust and Glyndebourne Productions Limited.

2. Income structure of the GFO

The Glyndebourne Festival Opera is a privately funded organisation. There have been only two exceptions to this rule. First, in 1951 the Festival received a one-off guarantee against losses from the Treasury worth £25 000 for its participation

¹ There is contradictory evidence in Higgins and Hughes about the formal setting up of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. However, the Charity Commission register notes that both companies were incorporated on 16th December, 1939. The practical operations were, however, started later especially in the case of the Arts Trust.

in the Festival of Britain, and second, since 1968 the Arts Council has subsidised the touring activities of the Glyndebourne Touring Opera. As the organisation is of a private nature, there is no information available on the income structure apart from the statement of financial accounts.

In the financial year 1997, the total income of Glyndebourne Productions Limited - the company running the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education activities - was £12 725 914. The income of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera amounted to £10 476 646, leaving £2 249 268 (18%) of the income to have been generated by the Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education. The income structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera in 1997 based on the statement of financial accounts was following:

Trading income	£7 986 908	(76%)
Donations and grants	£1 416 668	(14%)
Investment income	£417 298	(4%)
Surplus on sale of assets	£54 312	(1%)
Transfer from the Building Fund	£ 601 460	(5%)
Total income		£10 476 646

The report of the directors gives out a different division of the income sources in percentages. They shed light on the category of trading income above and are thus worth spelling out here. The income sources, in percentages, of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera in 1997 were:

Box Office	70%
Glyndebourne Festival Society (donations)	15%
Sponsorship and donations	6%
Programmes, Catering, Merchandising etc.	9%

The total operational surplus on the ordinary activities of Glyndebourne Productions Limited was £36 606. After exceptional items and transfers from the building fund reserve the Company had a retained surplus of £1 414 071. Added to the general reserve of £4 990 647 brought forward from previous years, the general reserve to be carried forward amounted to £6 404 718. This is an exceptionally healthy situation for an opera company, when the general rule is rather a deficit of similar size to be carried forward.

In addition to the actual statement of financial activities, Glyndebourne Productions Limited has included detailed income and expenditure accounts for the three operational units, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education as appendices to the statement. As these

do not form a statutory part of the financial statements, they differ somewhat due to different accounting policies from the actual statements. The information about the income structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera does not shed any more light on the income structure of the Festival than can be obtained from the actual statements. However, it will be used in considering the expenditure structure of the Festival.

3. The expenditure structure

The expenditure structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is not separated in the statement of financial activities of Glyndebourne Productions Limited from the general activities of the company. The income of the Festival Opera as a percentage of the whole income of the Company was 82%. This figure must therefore be assumed as a rough guide to the expenditure structure as well. The expenditure structure is presented below as the expenditure of the whole Company, which should be borne in mind when contemplating the figures. The figure of 82% should thus be applied, where relevant.

The total operational expenditure in 1997 of Glyndebourne Productions Limited was £12 087 848. It is divided in the statements between direct charitable expenditure £7 147 429 (59%) and administration expenditure £4 940 419 (41%). These categories are divided in the statements as follows:

Artistic costs	£3 974 264	(of Total) (33%)
Technical and production costs	£2 749 419	(23%)
Specific touring expenses	£174 715	(1%)
Education projects	£249 031	(2%)
<i>Total direct charitable expenditure</i>		£7 147 429
Administration	£1 807 207	(15%)
Marketing and fund-raising	£296 435	(2%)
Overheads	£1 511 789	(13%)
Cost of sales and ancillary trading	£431 000	(4%)
Depreciation and amortisation	£893 988	(7%)
<i>Total administration expenditure</i>		£4 940 419
Total Operational expenditure		£12 087 848

A detailed income and expenditure account of Glyndebourne Festival Opera activities is given in the appendix to the financial statement. This is a very detailed description of the financial division of expenditure in producing opera and thus is worth repeating here.

Administration charges and salaries	£1 512 417	
Staff pension scheme premiums etc.	£102 120	
<i>Total Fixed Overhead Costs</i>		<i>£1 614 591</i>
Conductors	£191 745	
Orchestra	£1 092 349	
Principal singers	£732 537	
Chorus and understudies	£570 676	
Music staff	£107 233	
Artistic administration	£68 219	
Principal associate director's fee	£46 030	
Music library	£106 530	
<i>Total Artistic Costs</i>		<i>£2 915 319</i>
Wigs	£88 237	
Make-up	£20 779	
Wardrobe	£474 726	
Props	£71 389	
Scenery	£495 487	
Stage staff	£349 347	
Stage management	£80 567	
Production electrics	£160 492	
Production performers	£155 133	
Production team	£161 745	
Scenery storage	£18 721	
Technical and production administration	£50 165	
<i>Total Technical and Production Costs</i>		<i>£2 126 788</i>
Glyndebourne House and gardens	£194 909	
General expenses	£31 932	
Press and publicity costs	£93 421	
Archives	£26 601	
Professional fees	£149 524	
Insurance	£69 246	
Front of house	£292 469	
Building and services	£300 518	
Finance	£7 610	
Office services	£112 387	
Transport and car park	£71 620	
Box office	£145 641	
Information technology	£59 798	
Depreciation:		
Freehold property	£12 825	
Opera House	£815 241	
Motor vehicle	£26 168	
Equipment	£39 754	
<i>Total Overhead Costs</i>		<i>£2 449 664</i>
Bank overdraft interests	£151	
<i>Total Finance Expenses</i>		<i>£151</i>
Total Expenditure (Festival Opera)		£9 106 513

4. The Board of Directors and related bodies of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera

The Glyndebourne Festival Opera - as spelled out above in the section on the legal status of the organisation - is governed by two Charitable Companies, Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. The Board of Directors¹ of the former consisted in 1998 of Sir George Christie, the Chairman, and four other members, John Botts, David Davies, Sir Dennis Stevenson (who replaced Augustus Christie during the year) and the Hon. Mrs. Julian Fane, all belonging to that section of the society often described as 'the Great and Good'. The Directors are selected by the Board of Directors from among the members of the association, which according to the British custom is not a wide membership-base. Rather, the only members of the association tend to be the Directors, as the Board of Directors approve the new members of the association. In the course of the election of a new Director, the candidate will first be admitted as a member of the company and subsequently appointed as a Director. The business of the association (i.e. the company) is to be managed by the Trustees who are additionally responsible for the preparation of the accounts of the association. However, the financial responsibility of the members of the company is limited to £1 each. The powers of the Board of Directors can be delegated to the executives of the company, as is the case with Glyndebourne Productions Limited. The General Director and the Finance Director were Advisory Trustees, ex-officio members of the Board of Directors without voting rights during the year 1998.

The Board of Trustees of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust function in a manner similar to the Board of Directors of Glyndebourne Productions Limited. In 1998, it consisted of John Botts, chairman, and eleven other members, David Astor CBE, the Hon. Lady Cazalet, Lady Christie, Paul Collins, Lady Kelvedon, Sir Nicholas Monck, Brian Nicholson, Sir Michael Perry CBE, Lord Rees-Mogg, Sir David Scholey CBE and the Hon. David Sieff. As the aim of the Trust is to attract private funding to the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the Trustees are from the wealthier part of society. Also, as can be seen from the list of the Trustees, the majority are titled. Additionally, the cooperation between the two Boards of Trustees is visible from the dual membership of John Botts and from the representation of the Christie family on both Boards.

¹ The legal term used in the Articles of the Association is Trustees. However, even the Glyndebourne Festival Opera uses the term Directors, as a term more relevant to the role of the Trustees in the Company.

In addition to the legally defined Boards of Directors/Trustees of Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust there is a third organ of an informal nature, the Glyndebourne Council. It was originally a working-committee that consisted of members of both Boards and the executives of the Opera. However, currently the Council is - as defined in the 1998 Programme Book - "a body of eminent people connected with Glyndebourne, who give help and advice". The Members of the Council in 1998 were Sir Bernard Miller, the Countess of Albemarle DBE, Christopher Arnander, Lord Briggs, Moran Caplat CBE, the Rt. Hon. Lord Carr of Hadley, Brian Dickie, Tony Garret CBE, Lord Gibson, Sir Emmanuel Kaye CBE, Lord Kingsdown, the Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Sir Claus Moser, Lady Rupert Nevill, the Rt. Hon. Lord Richardson of Duntisbourne KG MBE TD, and Leopold de Rothschild CBE.

5. The personnel structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera

The Glyndebourne Festival Opera operates on a seasonal basis, the core of the operations taking place during the summer months. Therefore, the majority of the personnel employed by the Company is not on a full-time basis. The core administration, heads of workshops etc. are employed full-time. The company, however, did not wish to spell out in detail the proportions of full-time and part-time personnel. The average weekly number of employees of the Company was 230 in 1997 according to the financial statements, consisting of 69 people in administration and 161 in production. According to the 1998 programme book the total number of employees of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera during the 1998 festival was 603. The figure includes all permanent staff, seasonal staff and visiting artists. Additionally the two orchestras involved in the festival - the London Philharmonic Orchestra and the Orchestra of the Age of Enlightenment - are both included in the figure even though they operate on a contractual basis. Further, the catering, scenery construction and painting, and parts of the wardrobe production and maintenance had been contracted out, thus this work is not included in the personnel table below. The break-down of the personnel structure during the 1998 Festival was as follows:

Music Director	1
Director of Productions	1
Conductors	5
Directors	6
Designers	9
Lighting Designers	7

Choreographers	1	
Principal singers	53	
Chorus	66	
Dancers	4	
Actors (extras)	25	
Orchestras 118 + 36	154	
Music Staff & Coaches	25	
Sundry artistic personnel	12	
<i>Total artistic personnel</i>		369
General Director	1	
Artistic administration	14	
Finance and resources department	15	
House management & maintenance	35	
Building and services department	8	
Press and publications office	13	
Shop and gallery	11	
Box office	12	
<i>Total Administration</i>		118
Technical Direction	5	
Stage management	11	
Stage personnel and carpenters	22	
Night stage staff	14	
Lighting personnel	10	
Props personnel	8	
Wardrobe personnel	21	
Running wardrobe personnel	16	
Make-up and wigs	9	
<i>Total Technical and Production personnel</i>		116
Total personnel during 1998 Festival		603

6. The Opera House

The original Glyndebourne Opera House, completed in 1934, had a seating capacity of 311. It lacked many of the practicalities of an opera house of its time - e.g. it had no way of flying the scenery, no scenery dock, its orchestra pit was small etc. - while its lighting equipment and steam effects were among the best in Europe. (Hughes 1981, 32 & 44.) Further, the backstage facilities for the artists were poor, there were only two dressing rooms for the principals and two for the chorus. (Hughes 1981, 70.) After the first season in 1934, the Opera House went through the first of its many periods of alteration during the winter. A scenery dock was built adjoining the stage and another scenery store was built. Additionally, twenty-four dressing rooms were built onto the backstage area with a green room. Also, some improvements to the facilities provided for the audience were made. (Hughes 1981, 76.) Between the 1936 and 1937 seasons the auditorium underwent its first major change, increasing the capacity to 433 by widening the auditorium and by adding a balcony of 40 seats. Also, two

dining rooms were added to the structure for the convenience of the audience, since the practice of picnicking had not yet developed. (Hughes 1981, 119.)

After the Second World War, the Opera House underwent a major overhaul, the equipment having been idle for several years. However, after the Glyndebourne Opera Festival had been properly reinstated and the current legal and financial framework for the operations established, the Opera House was enlarged once more in 1953. The changes to the auditorium included a newly constructed roof with the columns moved outwards, thus enabling the stalls to accommodate 507 seats. Visibility was improved by this and by widening the proscenium arch. Additionally, the balcony was extended to provide a total of 178 seats plus three boxes with 30 seats each. Thus, the total capacity of the auditorium was increased to 718. Also, a new scenery dock was built to enable it to take backdrops. (Hughes 1981, 185.) After the 1953 changes there were minor expansions over the years in the actual Opera House raising its capacity to 800 seats. Additional buildings were developed around the Opera House in order to cope with the technical demands of the evolving traditions of opera production. Nevertheless, the Glyndebourne Touring Opera had expanded the audience outside Glyndebourne since 1968, and the Opera House had reached the limit of its capacity by 1980s so that it could no longer deal with the technical demands of the artists nor with the intensive demand for more seats from the audience. Therefore, a New Opera House project was launched in 1990. (ACE 1994, 65.)

The Glyndebourne Arts Trust proved to be very successful in its building fund appeal. The new Opera House was built in seventeen months between the 1992 and 1994 seasons, and the project was funded almost entirely by private donations. The cost of the New Opera House totalled £33 000 000. It has a capacity of 1200, 1.5 times the capacity of the old theatre. Naturally, the design was a very delicate matter in order to maintain the 'sprit of Glyndebourne' in the transition. The design of Michael Hopkins & Partners incorporates the old structure of workshops and service facilities outside the actual Opera House into the design, thus keeping the new structure relatively light. The auditorium is horseshoe shaped to provide the maximum number of seats without losing the intimate feeling of the original auditorium. The back wall of the new auditorium is actually two metres closer to the proscenium arch than in the old theatre. It has a gently raked bank of stalls and three horseshoe shaped balconies, one at the stalls level and two above that. The decoration of the auditorium is very 'anti-gilt-and-plush' consisting mainly of waxed timber and black textiles. (ACE 1994, 36-

65.) This is very much in line with, for example the Opéra Bastille and the New Helsinki Opera House.

The stage size¹ is 16 m x 16 m and it has wings of same depth and approximately half the width. The proscenium arch opening is 9 m wide, its height being variable. The backstage area is a semicircle with a radius of 19 metres. This reflects the circular shape in the overall design on the auditorium side of the building. The spacious backstage enables the scenery for a whole season to be stored in the stage area, up in the flies and in the back and two side stages. Around the stage area there are a generous loading-bay (as opposed to the original Opera House) and a rehearsal room, similar in layout to the main stage. The stage area is easily accessed from the workshops outside the main Opera House through the loading-bay. The lighting and technical systems, as in the original Opera House at the time of its inauguration, are state-of-the-art. In addition to the lighting facilities in the stage area there are lighting rails incorporated in the design of the auditorium balconies, and the main dome also contains a circular lighting rig which complements the proscenium lighting bridge. (ACE 1994, 36-65.)

7. Programming, pricing and audience figures

The 1998 festival² took place from 21st May till 28th August 1998. During the festival there were a total of 6 operas in the programme, 3 premieres and 3 revivals. The premieres were Mozart's *Così fan tutte*, Händel's *Rodelinda* and Verdi's *Simon Boccanegra*. The other operas in the programme were Janáček's *Káta Kabanová*, Strauss's *Capriccio* and Rossini's *Le Comte Ory*. There were a total of 76 performances.

¹ The numerical information about the New Opera House has been obtained from plans in a reprint of *The Architectural Review*, published by the Arts Council of England. The plans are at a very small scale of approximately 1:850 and thus there may be some errors in the dimensions. However, they provide a reliable overall view of the scale of the building.

² The financial information about the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is from the financial year 1997. The information about operations is from the following year, 1998 creating a slight discrepancy in the description. The 1998 financial records did not arrive in time for inclusion in this thesis.

The pricing structure of the new opera house is divided into six seat price categories plus standing room category. The prices vary between £118 and £10 (standing room). The stalls, foyer circle and circle belong mainly to the top price category, some rear seats to the £86 category and sides - due to the restricted view¹ - to the lower categories of £59, £37, £21 and £16. The upper circle has been divided into two price categories of £59 and £37, some space provided for standing room priced at £10. The structure is relatively simple, there being no different categories based on the programme, first-nights etc. The emphasis in the sales brochure is placed on the booking arrangements, since the tickets are in great demand. Priority is given to the members of the Festival Society, followed by those on the waiting list to become members² and those patrons on the mailing list. Booking opens first by mail (first members, then general public), then in person (queue tickets are issued 24 hours before the box office opens) and last by telephone.

As a private company the Glyndebourne Festival Opera does not make public their audience figures. However, the average was agreed by the administrative personnel to be somewhat above 90%³. Further, the composition of the audience is deemed a private matter, and thus no data is available. However, the list of the members of the Festival Society (as listed in the annual programme book) gives an idea of the composition, the higher sections of society being well represented.

8. The organisational structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera

The Glyndebourne Festival Opera do not define their organisational structure internally by a hierarchical organisation diagram. The preferred way is a list giving out the names and positions of the employees in each department. However, some observations about the chain of command and the division of


¹ According to the programme booklet "A number of seats have a restricted view owing to the horseshoe shape of the auditorium, which was adopted for acoustic reasons." In this case, the acoustic excellence has been prioritised over 'democratic' seating layout. See the section on the *Opéra Bastille*.

² There are currently approximately 7000 names on the waiting list, which costs £100 to join.

³ A fact that can be suspected also from the emphasis given to the booking arrangements (even if discounting them partly as a skilful marketing ploy).

responsibilities can be made on the basis of the list. Additionally, figure 12 shows a diagram describing the organisation hierarchically. This is based on interpretation of the list of the personnel and the departments.

Figure 12.
Organisational Structure,
Glyndebourne Festival Opera



During the 1998 festival, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera had¹ three directors, General Director Anthony Whitworth-Jones (background in arts administration), Music Director Andrew Davis (conductor) and Director of Productions Graham Wick (stage director). Under the three top directors there are three other directors in the organisation: Director of Artistic Administration, Director of Finance and Resources, and Technical Director. In addition to these directors there are several managers, some (based on the listing) responsible for small 'departments'. (For example, the House Manager is the highest title in the department responsible for security, maintenance and cleaning.) However, as the organisation is fairly small and operates partly on a part-time basis, the manager level is not described in the organisational chart above.

¹ The description of the organisational structure is based on information about the 1998 Festival period, as spelled out in the 1998 programme book, in order to keep the case-study description consistent. After the festival the structure changed as General Director Anthony Whitworth-Jones retired from his post and Nicholas Snowman took over. This development is commented on in the section on the artistic decision-making structure.

In the listing of staff, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera spells out the artistic staff¹ (excluding the singers, however) in addition to the other staff employed. The artistic staff has been divided² in the listing into subgroups, e.g. conductors, music staff (working under the Head of Music Staff), directors and designers etc. It seems reasonable to assume that the two first categories operate under the artistic authority of the Music Director and the two latter under the artistic authority of the Director of Productions, even though this is not directly indicated in the listings. All other departments operate under the authority of the General Director. This will be the case with the artistic staff as well in the future, when Nicholas Snowman will be the sole top-level director in the organisation. The division of responsibilities between the departments is described in the chart in a way that is deemed self-explanatory, and will therefore not be commented on here. However, as the Glyndebourne Festival Opera operates on a seasonal basis, it needs to be borne in mind that some of the employees are not full-time staff but employed only on a seasonal basis.

9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure

During the first years of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera's existence, a top organisational structure was created, where John Christie was the Chairman of the organisation and the executives included the General Manager Rudolf Bing and the artistic directors Fritz Busch and Carl Ebert, a conductor and a stage director, respectively. This structure has prevailed, according to the information given in the description of Glyndebourne seasons between 1934-1980 by Hughes (1981), with some slight changes and nuances according to the personalities involved over the sixty years of Glyndebourne Festival Opera. The three executive

¹ The division and inclusion of the artistic staff into the organisational structure differs somewhat from the way in which the other case-study organisations define their organisational structures. This, however, is probably due to the festival nature of Glyndebourne operations.

² The chorus and the two orchestras are listed elsewhere in the Glyndebourne programme book and have thus been included in the chart. The singers are listed in the credits of each production, and have thus not been included in the chart (based on the listings of the staff).

posts were held during the 1998 festival by Anthony Whitworth-Jones (General Director), Andrew Davis (Music Director) and Graham Vick (Director of Productions).

In late 1998, however, when Nicholas Snowman took over the position of General Manager, the situation started to change from the customary three Directors model. This description is based on an interview with Nicholas Snowman on 31st March 1999 and an article published in *Opera* magazine, dealing with the artistic and financial planning and decision-making structures that he is implementing. Over the period between autumn 1998 and autumn 2000, the whole Glyndebourne top management, including the Chairman, will have changed. The current Music Director and Director of Productions are to retire after the festival of summer 2000. The change of General Director took place in autumn 1998 and the change of Chairman took place in the end of the year 1999, when Sir George Christie handed over the chairmanship to his son Augustus Christie. In many opera organisations this pace of change would not be considered fast. However, in the case of Glyndebourne, where the directors and chairmen have generally worked for decades, this provides a chance for changes. Especially so, when the organisation has only recently been established in the New Opera House.

The new system will emphasise the executive power of the General Manager. The post of Director of Productions will cease to exist after Graham Wick has departed. According to Snowman this will streamline operations and avoid possible conflicts of authority. In his view, the General Director is in any case responsible for the quality of the productions. Similarly, even though the post of Music Director is to be maintained, the role will be directed more towards exchange of ideas and advice to the General Manager. However, the post has not yet been filled even though the vacancy will occur shortly. The reason for this is the search for new top-rank conductors to appear at Glyndebourne in the future, and a strong Music Director might be perceived as a hindrance in this situation. It seems, that the General Director, Snowman, is looking to the future, possibly hoping to attract one of the future top-rank conductors to act as Music Director and is thus not willing to commit the organisation at this point. (Clark 1999, 14.)

This development is well in rapport with his view of the role of the General Director at the Glyndebourne Festival Opera. The General Director is in charge of the organisation under the supervision of the Board, especially the Chairman Sir George Christie. Plans for the future are conceived in the General Director's office

and then presented to the Board for approval. The strong imprint of Nicholas Snowman's vision can already be seen in the long-term plan devised for future Glyndebourne Festivals. The approved plans are then budgeted in more detail, and if necessary over time, modified to fit the financial constraints etc. Snowman sees the responsibility of the artistic success and financial stability of the plans to be his responsibility. This will be ever more so now that the long-time Chairman has stepped down. Should artistic or financial plans fail, Snowman sees this to be a reason for the termination of his contract. Thus, Glyndebourne will in future be very much centred around the General Manager, Snowman, whose responsibility it is to maintain the trust of the board by succeeding in executing the plans and by keeping the organisation under control, both artistically and financially. In this he finds constant communication and personal presence essential, thus making it possible for him to deal with any problematic issues - especially in the artistic realm - before they become obstacles to the functioning of the organisation.

10. Summary

In this section the main points of the information presented above are collected into table form. The information is based – where applicable – on annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the next part of the thesis.

Organisational history and legal status	The festival grew from the domestic cultural activities of an aristocratic family. The first festival took place in 1934, in the purpose-built opera house adjacent to the manor house. The legal organisational structure was created in 1939 as a charitable company – Glyndebourne Production Limited. When activities resumed after the Second World War a supporting Trust was also established, in practice in 1954. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera currently operates through the two charitable companies, Glyndebourne Production Limited being responsible for the day-to-day activities of the organisation and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust concentrating on fund-raising.
Governing bodies	Official governing bodies: Board of Directors (Trustees) of Glyndebourne Production Limited and the Board of Directors (Trustees) of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. Members of the board appointed from the members of the company in both cases, these two being in practice the same. Thus, the boards are in reality self-appointing bodies. Both boards have close ties with the Christie family. There is also a Glyndebourne Council, which consists of eminent supporters of the Festival. Initially the Council has been a working-committee, but has later become more of an honorary committee.
Management structure	In 1998: the General Director responsible for the organisation. Two co-directors: Music Director and Director of Productions. New General Director is changing the structure concentrating both artistic and economic decision-making in himself. (Director of Productions to retire, no Music Director at the present time.)
Organisational structure	Departments directly under the General Director. Exceptionally (partly due to the festival nature of the organisation) the artists are included in the description of the organisation (i.e. listing of personnel by department). Fairly flat and streamlined structure, partly due to the seasonal nature of the company's operations.
Income structure	Total income £10 476 646: Box Office 70%,

	Glyndebourne Festival Society donations (through the Glyndebourne Arts Trust) 15%, programmes, catering and merchandising 9%, sponsorship and donations 6%.
Expenditure structure	The personnel costs are not separated in the accounts. All costs stated here include personnel. Artistic costs 32%, technical and production costs 23%, overhead costs 27%, administration and pensions 18%.
Number of employees	603 including part time personnel and visiting artists.
Personnel structure	Artistic personnel 369 (principal singers 53, dancers 4, chorus 66, orchestras 118 + 36 – total 154, music staff 25, extras 25, other artistic personnel 42), administration (incl. maintenance) 118, technical and production personnel 116.
Opera House	The new opera house was inaugurated in 1994 and has auditorium capacity of 1200. The stage is 16 m x 16 m in size and has some wing and rear stage areas being not, however, completely cruciform-shaped. The technical facilities are state-of-the-art.
Programming and number of performances in the main auditorium	Total number of performances 76, all opera. Six different productions three of which are new. Programming principle – semi-stagione. Programming relatively conservative, some less well known work included.
Ticket prices and sold capacities	Ticket prices £10 - £118. Sold capacities not publicly available, amounting , however, to over 90%.

9. THE OPERA NATIONAL DE PARIS

1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation

During the 17th century a distinctly French lyric art-form (as opposed to Italian Opera) had started to develop, especially in the '*Pastorale*' of Pierre '*Abbé*' Perrin and Robert Cambert. (Demuth 1963, 97-100.) This became very popular among the aristocracy and the court. Thus, in 1669 Louis XIV granted Perrin a royal patent to form '*Académie d'Opera*', giving him a monopoly on lyric performances. The *Académie d'Opera*, founded in 1669 is seen as the organisational creation of the *Opéra national de Paris*. (Demuth 1963, 105.)

From 1669 onwards, therefore, anyone wishing to perform opera needed Perrin's permission and had to pay a heavy fee to obtain it. Furthermore, all spectators attending the performances were ordered in the patent to pay fees, making no exceptions even for the members of the court - a fact which was to cause a considerable measure of unrest and unruly behaviour at the first performances. The first performance given by the *Académie d'Opera* took place in 1671, the intervening years having been spent on gathering an ensemble, creating a theatre and organising the finances needed. (Demuth 1963, 106 - 109.) The organisational beginning of the *Académie d'Opera* did not seem to promise centuries of existence. In order to finance his enterprise, Perrin had sold shares in his monopoly and formed a syndicate. The new enterprise was not altogether successful and Perrin soon found himself incarcerated for debts to the landlord of the theatre. However, as his signature was needed for any transactions, he continued his business from his debtor's cell. However, the situation did not improve and the syndicate was divided into two parts, both convinced of their right to continue the *Académie d'Opera*. (Demuth 1963, 113.)

Louis XIV's superintendent of music, Jean-Baptiste Lully, an opera composer of growing influence and with great ambitions at court, however, saw his moment in this quibble. He purchased the royal patent from Perrin in prison, who had kept the original letters patent even though selling shares of it to his syndicate members. The King subsequently annulled the initial letters patent and issued a new one to Lully in order to avoid any dispute over the ownership of the monopoly. He also changed the name of the enterprise to '*Académie royale de Musique*' to distinguish it from the first *Académie d'Opera*. (Demuth 1963, 116-

117.) Lully was able to run the *Académie royale de Musique* successfully and even gained financially from his monopoly. (Crosten 1948, 32.)

After Lully's death in 1687, his successors were not as fortunate in running the *Académie*. It soon acquired the habit of accumulating deficits and thus in January 1713, Louis XIV issued a Royal Ordinance (supplemented in November 1714) which placed the director of the *Académie royale de Musique* under the supervision of an inspector general, thus taking the organisation under direct control of the monarch. The Royal Ordinances defined the numbers of artists engaged and their fees, among other administrative matters. This added supervision was not, however, enough to ensure the financial stability of the organisation. Thus, new sources of income were granted by the King in the form of new patents between 1716 and 1769 providing the *Académie royale de Musique* a near complete control of music production in Paris. (Crosten 1948, 12.)

With the 1789 revolution, the monopoly of the *Académie royale de Musique* was broken when a law giving any citizen the right to establish a theatre was introduced in 1791. As a result, in 1793 a total of eighteen theatres presenting lyric drama were in operation in Paris. The Commune, however, retained the right to close any theatre that presented a programme not deemed suitable. (Crosten 1948, 12.) Even this relative freedom, however, was not to last. The administration of the *Opéra* (as it was now called¹) was placed under the strict control of the government in 1794. With the rise of Napoleon the situation gradually started to resemble the time before the revolution. The changes took place between 1806-1811. First, the Minister of the Interior was to determine the productions of the *Opéra* and any other theatre producing the same programme was to pay a fee to the *Opéra*. Then, Napoleon further reduced the number of theatres to eight (thus ending the freedom to establish a theatre) and subsequently ordered the theatres of 'second rank' to pay a fee to the *Opéra* for the use of music. The circle was thus completed. Even the pre-revolution format of a director of the *Opéra* under the Superintendent of Theatres was re-established and the habit of accumulating deficit and relying on State subsidies was resumed. (Crosten 1948, 13-16.)

¹ The name of organisation changed frequently during the revolution and the following years. The changes have been documented, e.g. in Bereson 1998, 89, and will thus not all be included here. The term *Opéra* will be used as a general name for the organisation.

The next change in the administration of the *Opéra* took place after the 1830 revolution. The new 'bourgeois-king' Louis-Philippe organised the administration on a basis similar to that in Lully's time, bringing together official and commercial aspects. (Fulcher 1987, 54.) The *Opéra* was to operate as a private business and the director's personal finances were to be at risk if the organisation made a loss. However, the *Opéra* did not become the property of its director, Louis Véron, but he was to run it at his own risk. Additionally, State subsidies were to be continued for a period of a few years, but were then to diminish gradually. Véron's artistic collaborations resulted in the successful period of French Grand Opera, a tradition that carried the *Opéra* on for half a decade. (Crosten 1948, 17-18.) However, Véron's successors were not to be as successful financially, resulting in the need for State funds for the *Opéra*. The third and final exception - after Lully and Véron - to the rule of *Opéra* directors losing rather than making money was Hyacinthe Halanzier (also known as Halanzier-Dufresnoy), who benefited from the new *Palais Garnier* and the 1878 Paris Exposition during his tenure between 1875-79 and created a fortune for himself. (Gourret 1977, 63 & 71-76.)

After the fall of Napoleon III, the French State took over the responsibility of the *Opéra* in 1871 - now called *Théâtre National de l'Opéra* - an arrangement that has continued ever since. The *Opéra* functioned in the new *Palais Garnier* with advancing levels of stagnation. In 1939 the *Opéra* and the *Opéra-Comique* were merged as *Réunion des Théâtres Lyriques Nationaux*, and later that year taken under the control of the Vichy government. (Gourret 1977, 86.) After the Second World War the organisation became less and less adventurous in its programming and artistic standards started to fall. The appointment of Rolf Liebermann in 1973 marked a turn for the better. The ensemble system was abolished and the stagione principle replaced the repertory system. (Gourret 1977, 86-101.) These principles are still in use at the *Opéra national de Paris*. With the inauguration of the new *Opéra Bastille*, the three centuries old company has been re-vitalised, and its artistic and working practices brought up to modern standards.

The current legal status of *Opéra national de Paris* is defined in Statute no. 94-111 of 5th February 1994, '*Statut de l'Opéra national de Paris*'¹. The *Opéra* is a public institution operating by commercial and industrial principles under the control of the Ministry of Culture ('*un établissement public à caractère industriel et*

¹ In a manner and detail resembling the Royal Ordinances of Louis XIV

commercial placé sous la tutelle du ministre chargé de la culture). The French State controls and monitors the organisation - as its main source of income - very closely, even though the *Opéra* is not directly part of the State administration. This is an understandable continuation of the close relationship of the *Opéra* and the State - whether a monarchy or a republic - and well in line with the historical development described above.

2. The income and expenditure structure of the Opéra national de Paris

The total income of the *Opéra national de Paris* in 1998, according to the 1998 budget¹, was FF 874 900 000. This is divided in the budget into three categories: subsidies FF 571 300 000 (65% of the total income), box-office income FF 219 500 000 (25% of the total income) and other self-generated income FF 84 100 000 (10% of the total income). The way in which these are broken down in the budget (in French Francs) is as follows:

<i>Total income in 1998 Budget:</i>	<i>Subdivided</i>	<i>Total</i>
Subsidies		571 300 000
State subsidy	571 300 000	
Box office income		219 500 000
Box office for performances	213 000 000	
Touring income	6 500 000	
Other self-generated income		84 100 000
Sponsorship	12 700 000	
Tours of the buildings	11 400 000	
Income from audio-visual recordings	10 500 000	
Commercial activities (shops etc.)	28 900 000	
Sundry income	20 700 000	
Total income FF		874 900 000

The total anticipated expenditure of the *Opéra national de Paris* according to the 1998 Budget is FF 866 100 000. It is broken down into four categories; the *Opéra* is not willing to give out any more detailed information of its expenditure structure. The information available is presented below (in French Francs):

<i>Total expenditure in 1998 Budget:</i>		
Personnel expenditure	497 200 000	(57%)
Artistic production expenditure	198 900 000	(23%)
General operational expenses	138 600 000	(16%)
Expenses for sundry cultural activities	31 300 000	(4%)
Total expenses	866 100 000	(100%)

The budget of 1998 thus shows a profit of FF 8 800 000 (income FF 874 900 000 - expenditure FF 866 100 000) before depreciation of equipment etc. The budget also contains a separate section for investments, the amount invested in equipment etc. being FF 33 100 000 and the State subsidy for such investments being FF 29 400 000.

¹ The budget in question is the 'skeleton' version made available to the press and the public. The actual operational budget is considered confidential and was not available for analysis in this study.

3. The Board of Directors

The role of the Board of Directors of *Opéra national de Paris* and its functioning is defined in the Statute no. 94-111 of 5th February 1994, '*Statut de l'Opéra national de Paris*'. The Board consists of five representatives of the State, four representatives of the employees of the *Opéra*, and two 'experts in the field'¹ who are appointed on the recommendation of the Ministry of Culture. The five representatives of the State include three members from the Ministry of Culture (Director of Music, Director of Dance and Director of General Administration) and one member from the Exchequer (the Director of Budget). The Chair of the Board of Directors is the fifth representative of the State, though his/her background is not defined in the Statute. The members of the Board receive a remuneration for their services equivalent to sixteen hours of work per month. Additionally, at meetings of the Board of Directors, the General Director is present with the State financial controller, who is a full-time employee of the State monitoring the financial state of the *Opéra national de Paris*. A representative of the accountants - appointed by the Exchequer - is also present at the meetings. These three, however, have only an advisory role.

The Board meets at least twice a year or whenever the Chair or the Minister of Culture deems necessary. The role of the Board of Directors is to monitor the organisation, to ensure that it fulfils the objectives set by the State in the Statute 94-111, to approve the financial plans and budget, to ensure that the financial status of the *Opéra* remains sound and is based on the budget approved by the Board etc. On top of its controlling role in organisational issues, the Board of Directors approves the programming plans prepared for it by the General Director one year in advance of the season in question, and sets the admission prices.

The Board of Directors has a subcommittee - the Financial Committee - which is in charge of the day-to-day financial monitoring of the administration of *Opéra national de Paris*. It consists of the Chair of the Board of Directors, three representatives of the Ministry of Culture (the Director of Music, the Director of Dance and the Director of General Administration) or their representatives, the

¹ '*Personnalités qualifiées*'.

Director of Budget (Exchequer) or his/her representative, the General Director, the State financial controller, and the State appointed accountant. Also, the Directors of the departments of the *Opéra* are present whenever requested by the Chair or the General Director. In effect the financial committee consists of the State representatives of the Board of Directors. The representatives of the personnel and the expert members of the Board of Directors are not included in the Financial Committee, thus giving the State an even tighter grip on the financial management of the *Opéra national de Paris*. The Financial Committee has a meeting every two months. It monitors the financial status of the *Opéra* on the basis of reports prepared by the General Director. It also monitors the current activities of the *Opéra*, especially in relation to expenses and income. If necessary, it informs the Board of Directors about developments, in order for it to react accordingly. (French Statute 94-111, 5th February 1994.)

4. The personnel structure

The personnel structure of the *Opéra national de Paris* is divided into three different groups, based on the nature of their employment contracts. The permanent employees are divided into 'cadres' and 'non cadres', i.e. higher rank employees (directors, heads of workshops etc.) with a status similar to civil servant status, and other permanent employees at the non-managerial level. The employment contracts are made between the *Opéra* and the employee, thus not giving the employees a state employee status. However, this is not always recognised by the employees and the labour unions, which often try to negotiate with the *Opéra* as they were direct state employees. The third employment status at the *Opéra* are the temporary contracts, which cover most of the artistic personnel, since the organisation has not had a permanent ensemble since 1971. There is a further division within the employment structure of the *Opéra national de Paris* between the personnel working solely in the *Palais Garnier* or in the *Opéra Bastille*. This is especially the case with the technical staff, who often work in only one of the houses. The total number of employees at the *Opéra national de Paris* is 1388, of which 537 are artistic personnel, 195 are administrative personnel, and 656 are technical personnel. Additionally the *Opéra national de Paris* has approximately 300 visiting artists contracted per annum. The employment structure will be presented below based on the way in which the

company it divides¹ internally, avoiding unnecessarily detailed divisions. (The presentation will follow the format: *cadre/non cadre* - total, e.g. 4/5 9.)

¹ In 1996 figures as produced and made available for this study by the *Opéra*.

<i>Personnel structure</i>	<i>Sub- divided, cadre/ non cadre</i>	<i>Sub- divided, total</i>	<i>Total, cadre/ non- cadre</i>	<i>Grand total</i>
<i>Technical Department, Bastille</i>			<i>82/265</i>	<i>347</i>
Technical direction	10/4	14		
Technical laboratory ¹	3/6	9		
Costume workshop	9/26	35		
Stage technicians, stage hands	10/71	81		
Audio-visual technicians	9/13	22		
Props department	7/17	24		
Lighting technicians	7/40	47		
Sets workshop	13/31	44		
Make-up department	4/7	11		
Music staff, pit managers	1/9	10		
Wardrobe staff	7/18	25		
Storage	1/6	7		
Transportation and maintenance	2/14	16		
'Génie scénique ² ' department	10/6	16		
<i>Technical Department, Garnier</i>			<i>48/142</i>	<i>190</i>
Technical direction	4/4	8		
Costume workshop	9/23	32		
Stage technicians, stage-hands	5/39	44		
Audio-visual department	3/9	12		
Props department	3/8	11		
Lighting technicians	7/29	36		
Technical archives	2/4	6		
Costume workshop	6/12	18		
Transportation	3/6	9		
Storage	1/3	4		
Music staff, pit managers	1/3	4		
Decorations office	1/1	2		
Make-up department	3/1	4		
<i>Buildings and maintenance department</i>			<i>20/99</i>	<i>119</i>
Buildings, <i>Bastille</i>	12/4	16		
Buildings, <i>Garnier</i>	2/1	3		
Interiors maintenance	4/43	47		
Security, <i>Bastille</i>	1/26	27		
Security, <i>Garnier</i>	1/25	26		
<i>Artistic personnel</i>			<i>55/482</i>	<i>537</i>
Programming and planning	7/2	9		
Audio-visual planning	1/1	2		
Stage planning	19/7	26		
Musical direction	10/8	18		
Chorus	0/93	93		
Orchestra	0/150	150		
Chorus principals	0/2	2		

¹ Due to the exceptional nature of the technical equipment at the *Bastille* and the potential it offers, the *Opéra national de Paris* has a technical laboratory in which designers are introduced to the stage technology and offered the opportunity to experiment. See also the section on the Opera Houses below.

² Génie scénique, i.e. the automated stage mechanism of *Opéra Bastille*.

Orchestra music staff	2/3	5		
Dance direction	9/24	33		
Ballet dancers	0/152	152		
Opera studio	2/3	5		
Ballet school	5/37	42		
<i>Administrative personnel</i>			92/103	195
Directors	4/0	4		
Assistant directors	4/0	4		
Department of human resources	17/16	33		
Committee of employees	1/2	3		
Dept. of administration and finance	6/5	11		
Computer department	10/2	12		
Accounts department	8/11	19		
Heads of general administration	9/1	10		
Budget administration	6/4	10		
Press office	7/1	8		
Audience development	8/37	45		
Book-keeping	2/21	23		
Print office	1/1	2		
Education department	9/2	11		
Total of all personnel			297/10	1388
			91	

5. The Opera Houses

The *Opéra national de Paris* operates in two venues, the *Palais Garnier* (inaugurated in 1875) and *Opéra Bastille* (inaugurated in 1990). The two venues will be described below one at the time.

The Paris *Opéra* has occupied several venues during its existence. Most have been destroyed by fire, as was Salle Lepelletier – the *Opéra*'s permanent venue for 52 years before *Palais Garnier* - only two seasons before the new venue was completed. Thus, *Théâtre de l'Opéra* (as the *Paris Opéra* was called at that time) performed in Salle Ventadour for two years before moving into *Palais Garnier*. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 67.) The new opera house was a lavish project by Napoleon III, who announced an architectural competition for it in 1860. It was won by an unknown young architect Charles Garnier in 1861. (Mead 1991, 45-50.) This started a long and costly project before the *Palais Garnier* was finally inaugurated in 1875. There were several reasons for the delay. Garnier, as a state architect, had to submit reports and apply for funding from the French State annually. This all was very bureaucratic and the budgetary issues remained a constant battle, especially when the revolution made the Third Republic paymaster for the project in 1871. (Mead 1991, 135.) Further, the Franco-Prussian war and the revolution itself considerably delayed the project. (Cowden,

ed. 1992, 67-68.) The *Palais Garnier*, a grand personal project of Napoleon III, was finally inaugurated by the newly elected President on the 5th January, 1875. The total cost of the new opera house had risen from the original estimates by the *Conseil des Bâtiments Civils* of 15 million Francs to the huge total of 36 million Francs, closer to Garnier's original unofficial estimate of 29 million Francs. (Mead 1991, 140 & 197.)

The current seating capacity of the *Palais Garnier's* horse-shoe shaped auditorium is 1990, in surroundings of exceptional splendour and luxury. It is therefore no wonder that, for a century, the *Paris Opéra* (as organisation) and the *Opéra* (as building) became synonymous and embodied all bourgeois values. Technically, however, the theatre suffers from the problems of all older opera houses that date from the time before modern stage layout and machinery. The stage complies with the conventions of its period of origin, having no real side or back stages (as they are now understood). The stage is 53 metres wide overall, out of which 28 metres is freely in use, leaving in effect 11 metre wide side stages to each wing. The total stage depth is 27.25 metres, of which 24.5 metres is behind the fire curtain. This leaves in effect a stage size of 28 m x 24,5 m. The maximum (recommendation by the technical department of the ONP) proscenium arch opening is 15.25 metres wide and 9 metres high and it is adjustable with black velvet curtains. The fly-tower height is 34 metres. The orchestra pit size is 16,6 m x 5,2 m and it can accommodate only 90 musicians. The *Palais Garnier* has recently undergone a process of modernising the stage machinery and lighting technology in order to avoid unnecessarily high technical staffing levels to compensate for its lack of adequate technology. However, due to the historical importance of the theatre, there are still limitations, e.g. to the size of scenery blocks etc. Further, storage space - both around the stage and in-house - is a problem resulting in frequent dismantling of sets. Therefore, it has to be possible to build and dismantle all sets in one four-hour shift of the technical staff. (ONP 1998.)


“Opera is by nature a costly art form and the *Palais Garnier* unites all the conditions for least democracy and greatest expense, the smallest number of spectators and the most splendid productions, with running costs well out of proportion to its own takings, despite the very high cost of seats...” (François Bloch-Lainé in 1976, as translated in Charlet 1989, 3.) This notion was the starting point for the process that resulted in the opening of the new *Opéra Bastille* in 1990. The *Palais Garnier* was perceived as a stronghold of the Paris bourgeoisie with high admission prices and over-demand for tickets. Also, the technical

problems of the old theatre made opera production very uneconomical and labour-intensive (problems that were partly solved in the 1990s refurbishment). Therefore, the French Government set out a project for a new 'more democratic' opera house in 1981. The house was to be larger, more accessible and to provide an increased number of performances per year than had been the case in the *Palais Garnier*. The aim was to "present top quality performances 250-300 times a year to a total audience of 7-800 000." (Charlet 1989, 25.) The Government set up a commission '*Mission Opéra Bastille*' to define the characteristics of the new opera house, the result being an extensive dossier sent out to all participants of the architectural competition that was announced in 1983. The competition was won by a Canadian, Carlos Ott. The ultimate winner of the competition was selected by President François Mitterrand from among the finalists, whose plans the jury of architects deemed suitable for the new opera house. (Charlet 1989, 78-83.) The implementation process of the new opera house, however, proved to be difficult. The first phase was the redesign of Carlos Ott's proposal, since some alterations were necessary due to the historically important location of the new house in the *Place de la Bastille*, as well as for practical and acoustic reasons. After the plans had been finalised, the project met several political problems even during the process of construction. A good indication of the seriousness of the political arm-wrestling surrounding the project is the fact that in July 1986, Finance Minister Edouard Balladur halted the building process temporarily - at a cost of 750 000 francs a day. The building process was definitely not made any easier by the simultaneous squabble over the future programming and artistic policy of the new house, manifested in the problems between Daniel Barenboim (appointed as the artistic and musical director of the new opera house in 1987) and Pierre Bérge (appointed as chairman of the *Association des Théâtres de l'Opéra de Paris* in 1988). (Charlet 1989, 167-168.) However, on 13th July 1990 the new house was inaugurated and has proven - since its initial technical problems have been solved - to be a well-functioning modern opera theatre.

The *Opéra Bastille* has three stages; the main auditorium with a capacity of 2700, the 'Greek-style' amphitheatre below the main auditorium with a capacity of 650, and a studio theatre with a capacity of 237. (ONP 1998.) The main stage fulfils the 'democratic' objectives set for the new opera house by having no boxes, all seats having a direct view of the stage, and the black and white colour scheme with wood being perceived as relatively neutral without any bourgeois connotations.

The main stage of the new *Opéra Bastille* is the most striking technical feature of the theatre. It represents the most modern step in the evolution from the traditional stage through the cruciform stage to 'the *Bastille* plan'. This development is demonstrated in figure 13. The illustrations describe a traditional stage (1), the cross plan stage (2), the Munich solution (3) and the Bastille plan (4). (Charlet 1989, 22.)

Figure 13.



The *Opéra Bastille* main stage area consists of six 19,5 m x 19,5 m stage sized 'modules'; all automatically interchangeable. The rear stage consists of a revolving stage 27.6 metres in diameter. Thus the set changes can be conducted very effectively as a total of four different sets can be prepared before the performance and wheeled onto the stage with 'a press of a button'. Additionally there are three stage-sized areas behind the actual stage. One of these is a rehearsal stage, and one connected to the studio theatre stage making the

interchange of sets between rehearsal room and stages efficient. Also, there is storage space on a level below the stage, into which whole stage-size sets can be lowered for storage. Normally the sets for all performances in the repertory at the same time can be stored in-house, without any major striking. (Naturally, the performances in the repertory but not currently running are stored elsewhere.) The proscenium arch opening is variable, its width varying from 12 metres to 19.7 metres and its height varying from 8 metres to 12 metres. Additionally, the location of the proscenium arch can be adjusted in depth. The orchestra pit size is 18.5 m x 18.5 m and consists of four elements, all individually variable vertically. The lighting and technical aspects of the stage are 'state-of-the-art', all computerised and individually programmable¹. (ONP 1998 & Charlet 1989, 162 - 166.)

6. Programming, pricing and audience figures

In the calendar year 1998², the *Opéra national de Paris* had seven opera premieres, four at the *Opéra Bastille* and three (two of which as a double bill) at the *Palais Garnier*. The premieres at the *Opéra Bastille* were Wagner: *Tristan und Isolde*, Berg: *Lulu*, Fénelon: *Salammbô* (World Premiere), and Verdi: *Don Carlos*. The premieres at the *Palais Garnier* were Rossini: *L'Italiana in Algeri*, von Zemlinsky: *Der Zwerg*, and Ravel: *L'Enfant et les sortilèges* (von Zemlinsky and Ravel as a double bill). There were additionally fourteen operas in the repertory of the *Opéra* in 1998, twelve at the *Opéra Bastille* and two at the *Palais Garnier*. The operas performed at the *Bastille* were: *La Traviata*, *Tosca*, *Carmen*, *Billy Budd*, *Eugene Onegin*, *Norma*, *Manon*, *Madame Butterfly*, *Der Rosenkavalier*, *Rigoletto*, *I Capuleti e i Montecchi*, and *Die lustige Witwe*. The operas performed at the *Palais Garnier* were: *Cosí fan tutte* and *La Cenerentola*.

The Ballet de *Opéra national de Paris* had three premieres in 1998, all at the *Palais Garnier*. The premieres were: Bart and Polyakov after Corrali and Perrot:

¹ The technical features of the *Opéra Bastille* are so advanced that the *Opéra national de Paris* runs a 'workshop' for instructing future designers in the potential and operation of the '*Génie scénique*', as it is called.

² The programming is presented for the calendar year to keep the analysis consistent with the financial data, which is based on the calendar year. The actual 1998-99 season ran from 12th September 1998 to 15th July 1999.

Giselle, Angelin Preljocaj: *Untitled*, and *Soirée de ballets 'Jeunes Danseurs'* by several choreographers. Additionally the *Ecole de danse* had two premieres: *Spectacle de l'Ecole de danse*, and *Démonstrations de l'Ecole de danse*. There were also two gala performances: *Hommage à Yvette Chauvire*, and a New Year's Gala at the *Palais Garnier*. The programme of the Ballet de *Opéra* also included three programmes¹ by visiting companies: Merce Cunningham Dance Company (two triple bills by Merce Cunningham) and Nederlands Dans Theater (Création by Jirí Kylián).

There were ten other ballet performances in the programme of the Ballet de *Opéra national de Paris* in 1998, six at the *Palais Garnier* and four at the *Opéra Bastille*. The ballets performed at the *Palais Garnier* were: *Double Bill* (Neumeier: Vaslaw and Bagouet: *So schnell*), Nuryev after Petipa: *Don Quixote*, Macmillan: *L'Histoire de Manon*, Bart: *Coppélia*, Mats Ek: *Giselle*, and *Quadruple Bill* by Duboc, Graham and Bausch. The ballets performed at the *Opéra Bastille* were: Nuryev after Petipa: *Raymonda*, Gallotta: *Les Variations d'Ulysse*, Nuryev: *Roméo et Juliette*, and Nuryev after Petipa: *La Bayadère*.

The total number of performances in 1998 of the *Opéra national de Paris* was 366²; 195 performances at the *Opéra Bastille* and 171 performances at the *Palais Garnier*. The total number of opera performances was 182 and the total number of ballet performances 184. The *Opéra national de Paris* also organised 13 concerts in 1998, 5 symphony concerts, 6 chamber music concerts and 2 recitals.

The pricing structure of the *Opéra national de Paris* is divided in three ways: by venue (*Opéra Bastille / Palais Garnier*), by performance and by seat location.

There are seven³ price categories used in both *Opéra Bastille* and *Palais Garnier*¹ based on the performance: Opera A and B², Ballet A, B & C,

¹ Here considered as premieres as they were performed for the first time at the *Opéra national de Paris*.

² Excluding concerts.

³ The categories and prices given here are based on the 1998/99 season. There has been a slight increase in prices from 1997/98 to 1998/99. However, the changes have been relatively straightforward increases, e.g. the top price increased from FF 635 to 650, thus making the presentation of both prices unnecessary.

Concerts/Recitals, and Chamber Music. The price ranges of these, the top and bottom being the same³ in both houses, are: Opera A FF 650 - 60, Opera B FF 555 - 60, Ballet A FF 405 - 30 (FF 50 in *Bastille*), Ballet B (used in 1998 season only for *Palais Garnier*) FF 340 - 30, Ballet C FF 250 - 30 (FF 45 in *Bastille*), Concerts FF 245 - 45, and Chamber Music (in *Palais Garnier* only) FF 90 - 45. The division (apart from the obvious opera/ballet/concerts) of performances between the price groups is relatively straightforward, e.g. all the operas belong to the A category, apart from *Billy Budd*, *Eugene Onegin*, *Lulu*, *Salammbô*, *I Capuleti e i Montecchi* and the von Zemlinsky-Ravel *Double Bill*, i.e. the slightly less well known operas. A similar, only three-tier structure applies to ballets, e.g. *Don Quixote* in category A and '*Spectacle de l'Ecole de danse*' in category C.

The price categories based on the programme are divided into subcategories according to the location of the seat. There are six (e.g. Opera A: FF 650, 495, 340, 220, 135, 60) seating categories in *Palais Garnier* and seven (e.g. Opera A: FF 650, 530, 450, 340, 220, 150, 60) in *Opéra Bastille*. The division of the auditorium in the *Palais Garnier* is very detailed and complex⁴, the stalls belonging to price group one (highest) and the amphitheatre to price group four. The rest of the auditorium is divided on the principle that the higher and the more towards the side the seat is, the cheaper it is. This is done in a very detailed manner indeed. The dress circle boxes are a good example of this detailed division since all the price categories - apart from category four - are present in them. The division at the *Opéra Bastille* is simpler, but still more detailed than in many opera houses. The stalls are mainly price category one, but the sides and the rear contain all the other categories apart from category seven. The dress circle front belongs to category one, the rest being divided between categories

¹ This is obviously a 'political' statement since the demand for opera seats, especially at the *Palais Garnier* is greater. See below the section on sold capacities.

² In previous seasons there have been different price categories for both Opera and Ballet from A to D. However, the tendency seems to have been to use only the top end of the scale, thus making category D and Opera C obsolete.

³ There are some exceptions to this general rule. In Ballet price categories some lower end prices are lower at the *Palais Garnier* than at the *Bastille*. This is due to the more limited visibility of the stage from certain less expensive seats at the *Palais Garnier* than at the *Opéra Bastille*.

⁴ The system has recently been made even more complicated. The 'Saison 1997/1998' booklet contains a 'corrections sheet' presenting the new *Palais Garnier* seating category structure. This is considerably more complicated than in the original picture contained in the booklet, e.g. the boxes are divided in a more detailed way in the corrections sheet.

two, three, five and six. The upper circle front belongs to category four, the rest being divided between categories five, six and seven. The side galleries all belong to price category seven.

Apart from the individual fully-priced tickets there are 'advance' concessions for persons under 25 years of age in specified performances. Furthermore, young persons, students, the retired and the unemployed can obtain discounted tickets four hours before the performance if there is sufficient number empty seats. This concession is available at the discretion of the management.

There are several subscription schemes in operation at the *Opéra national de Paris*, altogether ten different arrangements all with several choices for the performances included, totalling 31 different subscription choices. The range is from 'à la carte' to 'young persons' subscription scheme. The subscription selection reflects the same complicated pricing policy as the individual ticket prices - obviously intended to cater for a wide range of patrons.


The *Opéra national de Paris* conducted audience research in September-October 1997. Based on that survey, the audience structure divided by profession was as follows: professionals in managerial positions 40%, intermediate professionals 43%, manual labourers 9%, self employed 3% and others 5%. Geographic division of the audience was Paris 46%, Paris Region 38%, France outside the Paris Region 14% and foreigners 2%. (ONP 1998.) The information available about total sold capacities is divided up by the venue and the performance. The attendance figures have been constantly high, the total being 94% in the main auditoriums both in the 1996-97 and the 1997-98 season. In the 1997-98 season the total for operas at the *Bastille* was 96%, and for ballets 82%¹. The figures for Garnier were 99% and 97%, respectively. The attendance figures for each performance varied from 72% (Mahagonny) to 100% (e.g. La Traviata, Swan Lake), most performances, however, reaching attendance figures of over 90%. (ONP 1998.)

7. The organisational structure of the Opéra national de Paris

¹ Due to relatively low attendance for *Raymonda*.

The *Opéra national de Paris* defines its organisational structure by an 'organigramme' - a listing of the departments and the personnel - included in the 1998-99 'Saison' booklet. According to the Administrative and Financial Director, Benoit Paumier, the organisation avoids defining the relationships of the employees by a traditional organisational chart. This is partly due to the problems this sort of definition of authority would create in the relationship of higher level employees and partly due to the problems involved in the process of creating this sort of complicated chart for an arts organisation¹. (Paumier 1998.) However, this sort of hierarchical definition of the organisation (of its higher levels) had been done under the direction of the former General Director, Jean-Paul Cluzel. As the departments of the current organisation mainly correspond with the structure of the organisation under Cluzel, this organisational chart will be presented below in figure 14.

Figure 14.




¹ The *Theatro alla Scala*, Milano similarly restrains itself from this sort of hierarchical definitions of authority. This was revealed in the initial discussions with the representatives of the organisation when it was approached and asked to participate in the research project. Unfortunately, La Scala decided not to take part in the research.

Based on the former hierarchical organisational structure and the current '*organigramme*' the organisational structure of *Opéra national de Paris* is described in chart from in figure 15, as interpreted by the author.

Figure 15.

Organisational Structure,
Opéra national de Paris



The *Opéra national de Paris* is run by General Director Hugues Gall, who has a background in opera administration. He has sole overall responsibility for the organisation and is responsible to the Board of Directors (i.e. the State through the Ministry of Culture). He has two co-directors, Artistic co-director Bruno Schuster¹ and Managing co-director Philippe Agid. The former has a background in arts administration (through the civil service) and the latter has a general managerial and civil service background. Thus the three top directors do not include artists. The second level of the organisation contains the top artistic personnel, e.g. Music Director James Conlon and Chorus Master David Levi. It also contains the directors of the Ballet (Birgitte Lefèvre), the Ballet School (Claude Bessy) and the Opera Studio (Christine Bullin). Below these five 'artistic' directors there are ten departments and their directors, all responsible directly to the General Director (through the co-directors, where appropriate). The structure seems relatively bureaucratic with a large number of independent departments, all with a specified director. However, as the organisation is rather big, with the total of 1388 employees, this seems understandable. In reality, according to the Administrative and Finance Director, Benoit Paumier, all the departmental directors report directly to the General Director, who thus keeps the organisation under his control and coordinates the functioning of the organisation with the assistance of his co-directors. (Paumier 1998.)

8. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure of Opéra national de Paris

This section is based on three interviews, two of which were conducted at the *Opéra national de Paris* with co-directors, Philippe Agid and Bruno Schuster, and one at the Ministry of Culture with Senior Music Advisor Alain Surrans. Some information based on a short discussion with the Programming Director, Christoph Seuferle, and a telephone interview with the Director of Administration and Finance, Benoit Paumier, is also included. The importance of the General Director, Hugues Gall, in relation to artistic and financial planning was emphasised in all the interviews.

¹ Artistic co-director Bruno Schuster left the organisation unexpectedly in 1999. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the reasons of his departure.

The General Director has overall responsibility for the artistic planning and financial stability of the organisation. In effect there is a 'moral contract' between the General Director and the State (Ministry of Culture and the Treasury) based on the plans and projections about the development of the organisations. (Schuster 1998.) Before taking on the responsibility of the *Opéra national de Paris* in 1993, Hugues Gall was contracted to conduct an extensive survey of the state of the organisation and to propose plans and a financial framework for the organisation up to the year 2000 (roughly for the duration of his six years in office). (Gall 1993.) In 1997, General Director Gall produced a follow-up to the initial report, in which the years 1998-2000 receive more detailed attention. (Gall 1997.) In these reports the issues of, for example, artistic programming principles, utilisation of the two venues, the financial framework of the organisation, employment and personnel structures and the relationship between the state and the *Opéra* are explored in detail. It seems that these reports and the plans and forecasts they contain form the basis for the 'moral contract' and 'project of Hugues Gall' that define the relationship between the General Director and the Board of Directors, i.e. the Ministry of Culture and the Exchequer. (Schuster 1998 & Surrans 1998.)

The artistic policy defined in the Gall reports is to achieve a total number of 365 performances annually, approximately 200 opera performances and 165 ballet performances. The division of the two venues utilised by the organisation is defined by the type of performance, *Opéra Bastille* used mainly for opera and *Palais Garnier* for ballet performances. When programmes artistically allow, interchange between the venues and opera and ballet will take place, providing a few productions of opera at *Palais Garnier* per season. The 'project' at the *Opéra Bastille* is to produce relatively popular opera (due to the size of the auditorium) at the artistically highest level, and to gradually build up a repertory that would allow a high number of different productions per season. The actual artistic plan is then derived from this initial artistic policy. As a rough rule to the (opera) planning principle, the Managing co-director, Philippe Agid, suggested a division where the repertory consists 1/3 each of French, German and Italian works. The other principle used is based on the era of the opera, 3/5 being 19th century repertory and 1/5 each 18th and 20th century works.

The budget and financial framework projections of the organisation have been defined in the Gall reports, and the organisation has been successful in keeping to those forecasts and has even managed to undercut them. For example the forecast for the total expenditure of the organisation for 1998 was FF 917 000 000, while the actual budgeted expenditure remained at FF 866 100 000. From

the Board of Directors' point of view, the General Director is free to fulfil his artistic plan for the organisation as long as the financial framework is adhered to. The role of the Board of Directors is to monitor this development and control the artistic and financial success of *Opéra national de Paris*. As the organisation has performed well both artistically - based on its artistic policy of popular opera - and financially, the relationship between General Director Gall and the representatives of the State is a good one.

Internally the artistic planning process precedes the budgeting process. When the programme has been selected and finalised the actual production and performance plans are put together in the Planning and Programming Department. Only when the dates have been fixed and the artistic personnel contracted is the detailed budgeting of individual productions done. (Seuferle 1998.) According to the Managing co-director, Philippe Agid, the contracts with the artists seldom provide problems, with the exception of the designers and occasionally the directors. (Agid 1998.) However, the production control is relatively tight - the status of *Opéra national de Paris* among the leading opera houses providing the organisation with a good bargaining position. According to Artistic co-director Schuster, the management is not 'afraid of the artists' and allows the budget to be exceeded only if it seems artistically important. (Schuster 1998.) Thus the management executes its own artistic judgement on artistic issues if the result is important to the budget of the organisation. However, as the *Opéra national de Paris* has been successful at the box office as well as fulfilling the artistic 'project' of General Director Gall, the artistic planning and budgeting mechanism is not currently deemed overtly problematic. Its importance to the organisation is, however, widely acknowledged.

9. Summary

In this section, the main points of the information presented above are collected into table form. The information is based – where applicable – on annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the next part of the thesis.

Organisational history and legal status	Founded in 1669 by the royal patent granted to Pierre Perrin. The organisational history is best described as close connection and relationship with the State. Despite the mode of government, the French monarchs and the State have had a close interest in the functioning of the <i>Opéra</i> . The current
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legal status is a public institution under the control of the Ministry of Culture.

Governing bodies

Board of Governors, the role of which is defined in French legislation. Comprises five members appointed by the Ministry of Culture, four representatives of the employees and two 'experts in the field' appointed on the recommendation of the Ministry of the Culture.

Management structure

General Director, assisted by administrative and artistic co-directors.

Organisational structure	There are ten departments operating under the direct authority of the General Director leading to a flat organisational structure. Additionally, the Ballet, Ballet School and the Opera Studio operate as separate entities under the authority of the General Director.
Income structure	Total FF 874 900 000. State subsidy 65%, Box Office 25%, Other self-generated income 10%.
Expenditure structure	Personnel 57%, artistic production 23%, general operational expenditure 16%, other 4%.
Number of employees	1388 + app. 300 visiting artists
Personnel structure	Artistic personnel 537 (ballet 152, chorus 95, orchestra 150, other artistic staff 88, ballet school 42), technical staff 537, administration 195, maintenance 119.
Opera House	Two main venues: <i>Palais Garnier</i> and <i>Opéra Bastille</i> . <i>Garnier</i> : Inaugurated in 1875. Auditorium capacity 1990. Stage size 28 x 24.5 m with some wing space, but no real rear stage. Technology recently renovated, however, the historical importance of the building results in some difficulties in working practices. <i>Bastille</i> : Inaugurated in 1990. Main auditorium capacity 2700. Stage highly automated consisting of six interchangeable modules of 19.5 x 19.5 m. Additionally lots of storage space behind and underneath the stage. Technically state-of-the-art, now that initial problems have been solved.
Programming and number of performances in the main auditorium	Total number of performances 366; 182 opera and 184 ballet. 195 performances in <i>Bastille</i> and 171 in <i>Garnier</i> . 34 different productions, out of which 10 new (7 operas, 3 ballets).
Ticket prices and sold capacities	Ticket prices FF 30 – 650. Sold capacities <i>Bastille</i> : Opera 96%, ballet 82%; <i>Garnier</i> : Opera 99%, ballet 97%.

PART III – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

10. DISCUSSION

1. Introduction

In this part of the thesis, the five case-studies on the organisational structures of opera companies are discussed and some conclusions are drawn. The main conclusions of the research project are presented in the next chapter. The discussion will take the form of presenting the core information about the case-study organisations, one aspect at a time, bringing the information together from all the organisations analysed. This information is also discussed, where applicable (i.e. where the artistic or socio-economic issues influencing the organisational structures are discussed), in conjunction with the analytical model created in the theoretical part of the thesis. The core information about the case-study organisations is repeated here in order to avoid the necessity to constantly refer back to the case-study descriptions.

2. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisations

The organisational history and the legal status of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

DOB Established as a bourgeois opera theatre in 1911 by civil society initiative. The City of Berlin assumed responsibility for the organisation in 1925 changing it into a public institution under the authority of the cultural administration. The authority over the organisation has changed several times from City of Berlin to German Reich to Allied Forces in 1945. Currently the organisation operates under the authority of the Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur as a non-independent public organisation.

ENO Founded in 1925 (opened in 1931 at Sadler's Wells Theatre) on the initiative of Lillian Baylis to offer opera and drama at popular prices. Legal status: Charitable Company limited by guarantee – Sadler's Wells Trust Limited (non-profit-making organisation) established in 1946. Company changed its name to the English National Opera in 1974 after moving to the London Coliseum.

- FNO Founded in 1911 as an artists' co-operative. Formed into a foundation in 1956 in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. Current legal status: a private foundation (non-profit-making organisation) with close links to the Ministry of Education.
- GFO The festival grew from domestic cultural activities of an aristocratic family. The first festival took place in 1934 in the purpose built opera house adjacent to the manor house. The legal organisational structure was created in 1939 as a charitable company – Glyndebourne Production Limited. When the activities resumed after the Second World War a supporting Trust was also established, in practice in 1954. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera currently operates through the two charitable companies, Glyndebourne Production Limited being responsible for the day-to-day activities of the organisation and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust concentrating on fund raising.
- ONP Founded in 1669 by royal patent granted to Pierre Perrin. The organisational history is best described as close connection and relationship with the State. Despite the mode of government the French monarchs and the State have had a close interest in the functioning of the Opéra. The current legal status is a public institution under the control of the Ministry of Culture.

It is notable that the organisational history of all the case-study organisations (apart from the Paris *Opéra*) has started from a civil society initiative. Even in the case of the Paris *Opéra*, Louis XIV took a keen interest in the development of the new art-form that had gained ground at court and among the aristocracy when establishing the *Académie d'Opera*, thus not merely establishing an organisation according to his own will 'as the State'. All the organisations operate currently as non-profit-making organisations – a fact that can be seen as a continuation of the original civil society values in the organisations' functions. It is also worth noting that the legal status of all the organisations has changed between 1925 and 1946. The change brought stronger involvement of the State authorities in most cases. In the case of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera – not directly funded by the state – the company nevertheless needed to conform to the requirements of the State and the market in its mode of operations. Thus, it was established as a charitable company in 1939, bringing it more towards the systems level from the lifeworld (civil society) level where it had operated before that. The current trend, however, seems to be towards a lessening in the involvement of the State authorities (not least due to reduced or frozen funding levels). This is evident, for example, in the case of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* which the *Senatsverwaltung* would like to see as an independent body, apart from the State administration. Similar development is taking place in Italy, where the *Enti Autonomi* are to be established as private foundations. In the UK there has been discussion about

the possibility to 'privatising'¹ the Royal Opera House. Thus, the development from civil-society-based opera organisations towards state-run opera organisations seems to have ended in many parts of Europe. The possible ways for the organisations to proceed if they need to distance themselves from the state authorities, are either towards the market or the civil society. At the moment, however, there is no clear evidence of the direction that will prevail, even though there seems to be more emphasis on the market in the current discussion as the possible new source of income.

3. Governing bodies

Information on the governing bodies of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

- DOB No board of directors structure. Organisation governed through the Berlin Senate Administration.
- ENO Board of Directors elected by the general meeting from the Members of the Company. In practice the Members of the Company and the Board of Directors are the same, making the Board a self-nominating body.
- FNO Board of Governors (20 members, 15 nominated by the funding bodies) and Board of Directors (12 members, 7 nominated by the funding bodies).
- GFO Official governing bodies: Board of Directors (Trustees) of the Glyndebourne Production Limited and the Board of Directors (Trustees) of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. Members of the board appointed from the members of the company in both cases, these two being in practice the same. Thus, the boards are in reality self-appointing bodies. Both boards have close connections with the Christie family. Additionally, there is a Glyndebourne Council, which consists of eminent supporters of the Festival. Initially the Council was a working committee, but has later become more of an honorary committee.
- ONP Board of Governors, the role of which is defined in French legislation. Comprises five members appointed by the Ministry of Culture, four representatives of the employees and two 'experts in the field' appointed on the recommendation of the Ministry of Culture.

¹ The ROH organisation is a charitable company, so that privatisation would mean discontinuing State subsidies not a change in the legal organisational status.

The board of directors level structures of the case-study organisations well reflect the socio-economic framework in which the organisations operate. In the cases of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, the Finnish National Opera and the *Opéra national de Paris* the close links of the organisations to the State authorities is evident in the governing structure. The *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is currently governed directly by the authorities. Should it become organisationally more independent (GmbH - i.e. Plc.) in the future, the governing structure would doubtless resemble the Finnish and the French structure. In these cases the organisation is 'semi-independent', however, the majority of the members of the governing body are determined by the Ministry of Culture. Thus, the cultural authorities have relatively strong control over the organisations. The control is tighter in the French case where the *Opéra* is a public body and the governing structure is defined in the legislation.

In the cases of the English National Opera and the Glyndebourne Festival Opera the British 'arm's length' principle operates in the governing structures. The authorities do not have direct control over cultural organisations that operate in society in a way that combines civil society aspects and market aspects. The governing structure of the organisations resemble the structure used in the profit-making organisations. As the organisations are non-profit-making, however, the directors do not have similar financial liabilities and responsibilities to the shareholders as in the case of the profit-making companies. 'The shareholders' in essence is that section of civil society which the organisation caters for. This section also has an impact on the selection of the board of directors, as can be seen clearly for instance in the case of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera. In the case of the English National Opera, the board of directors appointments made by the board are tacitly to be approved by the Arts Council. Thus, it executes its power as the main source of funding for the organisation through unofficial chains rather than official, as is the case with the Paris *Opéra*, for example.

4. Management structures of the case-study organisations

Information on the management structures of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

- DOB The organisation is directed by the General Director. The management team also includes the Administrative Director, the Music Director and the ballet Director. (Schmitz 1998.)
- ENO Three top managers: General Director, Executive Director and Music Director. General Director ultimately responsible.
- FNO Two top managers: General Director and Administrative Director. Management team includes: Music Director, Ballet Director and Technical Director.
- GFO In 1998: the General Director responsible for the organisation. Two co-directors: Music Director and the Director of Productions. New General Director is changing the structure concentrating both artistic and economic decision-making to himself. (Director of Productions to retire, no Music Director at the present time.)
- ONP General Director, assisted by administrative and artistic co-directors.

The case-study organisations are all run by a General Director (or equivalent) who has a very strong position in the organisation. The backgrounds of the general directors are artistic in the case of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the Finnish National Opera, and arts administrative in the cases of the English National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the *Opéra national de Paris*. The dual function of opera organisations is manifested in the position of the general director. Their task is on one hand to ensure the artistic quality of the organisation's productions and on the other to ensure the financial viability of the organisation. This is reflected in the discussion about the preferred background of the general director – i.e. artistic versus managerial – which is taking place around several of the organisations concerned. Where the general director is artistic, the role of the administrative director or managing director becomes important. However, the trend seems to be towards general directors with backgrounds in arts administration, which in effect combines the two functions and two areas of expertise. In Finland there has even been discussion about whether the next general director of the Finnish National Opera should have a general administrative or business background; naturally combined with some understanding of the art form. In this case, the role of a separate strong artistic director would have been created. However, this solution (which was not in the end adopted by the FNO) might not provide the answer to the artistic-economic dichotomy the general director is forced to work with. It would only change the situation from one extreme to the other; from the dominance of the artistic issues to the dominance of the economic viability of the organisation.

The structure of the management team seems to be strongly influenced in the case-study organisations by the background of the general director and the general expectations of the socio-economic framework. In the case of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, for example, society has (until recently) placed the emphasis on the artistic viability of the organisation. Thus, the management team includes three artistic persons. The Administrative Director is a lawyer, which is again well in line with the bureaucratic way in which the organisation is governed. In the case of the Finnish National Opera the Administrative Director, who has a business background, currently provides the necessary 'counter force' to the artistic General Director, ensuring the financial viability of the organisation.

In the cases of the other three case-study organisations where the general directors all have a background in arts administration, the management team comprises both artistic and administrative managers or directors. This solution obviously gives the general directors assistance in both fields of expertise and emphasises the task of the general director as the combining and balancing force between the artistic and financial aims of the organisation.

5. Organisational structures of the case-study organisations

Information about the organisational structures of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below. Additionally, the organisational charts of the organisations are repeated below the table in figures 16 – 20 to enable easier comparison.

- DOB The organisational structure is relatively flat and the role of the General Director is strong. The second managerial layer of the organisation consists of the Music Director, the Opera Director, the Principal Stage Director and the Managing Director. Additionally there are seven other Directors under the General Manager on a level below the second managerial level.
- ENO Seven departmental directors (senior management team) under the General Director leading to a fairly flat organisational structure. The structure is defined hierarchically right down to the level of individual workers.
- FNO Flat organisational structure. Departments directly under the General Director.
- GFO Departments directly under the General Director. Exceptionally (partly due to the festival nature) the artists are included in the description of the organisation (i.e. listing of personnel by department). Fairly flat and streamlined structure, partly due to the seasonal nature of the company's operations.
- ONP There are ten departments operating under the direct authority of the General Director leading to a flat organisational structure. Additionally, the Ballet, Ballet School and the Opera Studio operate as individual units under the authority of the General Director.

Figure 16.

Organisational Structure,
Deutsche Oper Berlin




Figure 17.

Organisational Structure,
the English National Opera




Figure 18.

Organisational Structure,
the Finnish National Opera




Figure 19.

Organisational Structure,
Glyndebourne Festival Opera





Figure 20.



The organisational structures of the case-study organisations are surprisingly similar. All of the organisations - and organisational charts - analysed have a relatively flat organisational structure consisting of the General Manager and a set of Directors, each in charge of a department of the organisation. The organisations analysed vary considerably in size, from the 570 employees of the ENO to the 1388 employees of the ONP, which naturally influences the complexity of the organisational structures of the organisations. However, there seems to be a common basis for the division of all the organisations. Under the General Director there seem to exist five basic functions (sometimes divided between several Directors): the Managing Director in charge of the financial and organisational issues, the Planning and Production Department (in some cases called Artistic Administration) in charge of programming and production planning etc., the Music Department in charge of the orchestra, chorus etc., the Ballet in charge of ballet related matters, and the Technical Department in charge of the stages, workshops etc. In the case of the Opéra national de Paris, there are altogether seventeen different Directors immediately under the General Director. However, as the ONP organisation is considerably bigger than the others analysed, this is explained by division of the basic roles into smaller departments. For example, financial and organisational issues have been divided into six different areas including human resources, public relations, broadcasting and recording etc. None of the organisational structures analysed acknowledge any 'vertical' interaction between these five 'Departments' which must inevitably for the organisations to function properly without referring all decisions to the General Director and communicating through him. Additionally, apart from the description of the organisational structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, there are very few of the top artists – e.g. singers, conductors, designers – included in the structure charts of the case-study organisations. This seems surprising, as in the analytical model the top artistic figures seem to play an important part in the artistic-economic equation influencing the organisational structures. This phenomenon – deemed to be among the key findings of this research project – will be further discussed and commented on in the conclusion.

6. Income structures of the case-study organisations

The information about the income structures of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

DOB Total income in 1998 budget 51 142 000: *Land* subsidy 80%, Box Office 9.5%, Other self-generated income (mainly touring) 10.5%

Office 9,5%, Other self-generated income (mainly touring) 10.5%.

- ENO Total income 38 530 000¹: Arts Council subsidy 46%, Box Office 26%, subsidy from National Lottery funds 14%, sponsorship and donations 5%, other income (sales etc.) 9%.
- FNO Total income 34 365 000: State subsidy (National Lottery Funds) 67%, Box Office 20%, subsidies from local authorities 10%, other income 3%.
- GFO Total income 15 130 000: Box Office 70%, Glyndebourne Festival Society donations (through the Glyndebourne Arts Trust) 15%, programmes, catering and merchandising 9%, sponsorship and donations 6%.
- ONP Total 133 378 000: State subsidy 65%, Box Office 25%, Other self-generated income 10%.

The sources of income were divided in the analytical model between private sources and institutional sources and subsequently into single and multiple sources. Additionally, the value systems and the quality assumptions of state, market and civil society were linked to these income categories. The income of all the case-study organisations is divided into three main categories: subsidies (or major donations), box-office income and other self-generated income. The analysis of these categories is presented below one at the time, starting from the lower end of percentages of total income.

The category of 'other self-generated income' (including sales, merchandising and sponsorship² etc.) belongs clearly to the category of multiple-source income. It consists mostly of income from private sources (apart from sponsorship). Clearly the common factor in this category is 'the market' as the value system, as all the income is derived from market-based activities. The amounts (in percentages of total income) are fairly similar in all the organisations, the figures being: *Deutsche Oper Berlin* 10.5%³, the English National Opera 14%, the Finnish National Opera 3%, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera 15% and *Opéra national de Paris* 10%.

¹ All the GBP amounts have been converted to Euros using the exchange rate on 1st February 1999.

² Sponsorship and donations are not separated in the figures of all the case-study organisations. Therefore, for the sake of comparability they have been included in the figures of 'other self-generated income' also in the organisations which do give the information separately.

³ The DOB figure is inflated by exceptionally high touring income. The average figure for self generated income at the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is considerably lower.

Based on the case studies it seems reasonable to claim that the figure of 10 – 15% of self-generated income from market-based activities seems to be achievable for a European opera house in the current economic climate. Naturally, there are different factors influencing this figure in individual cases so that no conclusive claim can be made on the basis of the limited set of case studies analysed.

Box-office income forms the second income source category for all the case-study organisations apart from the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, for which it is the main source of income. The figures (in percentages of the total income) for the case-study organisations are: *Deutsche Oper Berlin* 9.5%, the English National Opera 26%, the Finnish National Opera 20%, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera 70% and *Opéra national de Paris* 25%. The box office income mostly comes into the category of multiple private sources. There is inevitably a segment of this income that comes from multiple institutional sources, consisting of tickets purchased by corporations for entertaining clients, rewarding employees etc. However, as no figures dividing the sales in this way are available, it is assumed that as individuals attend the performances the source of income can be classified as private even though the ticket is occasionally paid for by a corporation. The value system attached to the box office income can be analysed in two ways. On one hand the process of selling the tickets is clearly a market-based activity; on the other the reason for an individual to attend opera is clearly based on the civil-society value system and the meaning the performance has on his/her lifeworld level. Thus, it is argued here that the civil-society value system is the basis for the box office income, which in turn can be influenced by market-related processes of pricing and marketing. This interpretation makes sense, when considering the high box office figure for the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, for example. If the value source of the box-office income would be market-related, the GFO would inevitably be classified as a market-oriented organisation. However, it is obvious from the whole atmosphere and the list of benefactors of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera that this is not the case. Rather, the festival is a social occasion in which the civil-society values of a certain segment of British society are strongly manifested.

The biggest source of income for all the case-study organisations – apart from the Glyndebourne Festival Opera – are the subsidies. The figures (in percentages of the total income) for the case-study organisations are: *Deutsche Oper Berlin* 80%, the English National Opera 60%, the Finnish National Opera 77%, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera 15% and *Opéra national de Paris* 65%. The

categorisation of the subsidies is mainly single institutional source. However, in the case of the English National Opera and the Finnish National Opera there are also subsidies from local authorities and, in the case of the ENO also from National Lottery Funds. However, these form only a minor part of the subsidies and, in the case of the ENO and the National Lottery, the funds are channelled through the state authorities as well. The value system connected with the subsidies – apart from the case of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera – is naturally state-based. As was pointed out earlier, most of the organisations have moved closer to the state from the civil-society framework (in which they were established) during or after the Second World War. Thus, the states have accepted responsibility for maintaining organisations that were deemed valuable by the civil-society. However, this acceptance of responsibility seems to be increasingly questioned by the authorities, leading to diminishing or frozen subsidy levels. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera 'subsidy' – i.e. major donations – come from the Glyndebourne Arts Trust, which operates as a fund-raising body for the Festival. The value system attached to this support is naturally civil-society, as the individuals and members of the Glyndebourne Festival Society donating to the Arts Trust want to support the Festival from their personal funds.

Based on the above analysis – and generalising from it – it can be claimed that the main source of income for the case-study organisations (apart from the Glyndebourne Festival Opera) is a single institutional source (i.e. state subsidies), that operates on the state-based value system. The second largest income category is income from multiple private sources (i.e. the box office), its values being mainly civil-society based with, however, links to the market-based value system. The third category of income is that of multiple sources, both private and institutional, with a clearly market-related value system (i.e. sales, merchandising and sponsorship). The implications of this divisions on the organisational structures of the case studies analysed is discussed in the conclusions section. However, it needs to be noted here that the Glyndebourne Festival Opera differs from this in having a very strong civil-society value system behind 85% of its income (box office and Festival Society donations), which is clearly manifested in the operations and the structures of the organisation.

7. Expenditure structures of the case-study organisations

Information on the expenditure structures of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

- DOB Personnel 84.5%, operational 12.5%, materials 3%.
- ENO Personnel 59%, other operational costs 38%, depreciation 3%. Divided by activity (including staff costs): production and performance 55%, technical and transport 18%, support costs 13%, fund-raising and marketing 8%, other 6%.
- FNO Personnel 80%, operational 18.6%, rents 1.4%.
- GFO The personnel costs are not separated in the accounts. All costs stated here include personnel. Artistic costs 32%, technical and production costs 23%, overhead costs 27%, administration and pensions 18%.
- ONP Personnel 57%, artistic production 23%, general operational expenditure 16%, other 4%.

The division of the expenditure information varies greatly between the organisations. Thus, the information is not in a form that would allow comparative study in the strict sense. Even basic comparisons of this division cannot reliably be made here, apart from noting that the personnel costs form a high percentage in all the organisations. However, some indication of the operations of the case-study organisations can be found when comparing the total expenditure with numbers of performances and employees. These comparisons are only indicative as the corpus of case-studies is too small for any conclusive remarks. However, the aim of the research was not to provide comparative information on the case studies but to perceive possible patterns and similarities emerging from the information. The comparisons below seem to suggest that there is a strong link between the art form and the resources needed for its production. This pattern is manifested in both of these comparisons.

The total expenditure of the case-study organisations per performance is calculated below. The similarity of this figure in the English National Opera, the Finnish National Opera and the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is striking. As the artistic output of the organisations is relatively comparable e.g. in terms of artistic quality and number of different productions, it seems reasonable to assume that the art form fairly strongly influences the economic input needed for a similar output. Naturally, the number of case studies is not high enough for any far-

reaching conclusions. However, the difference in the figure in the cases of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* and the *Opéra national de Paris* are likely to be caused by the higher number of different productions in the repertory of these two organisations (i.e. 38 and 34 respectively) compared with the other three (i.e. 22, 20 and 6¹). Additionally, the *Opéra national de Paris* operates in two different venues which probably influences the cost per performance.

DOB	Total expenditure 205 performances	51 142 000 /	249 000 / performance
ENO	Total expenditure 193 performances	38 530 000 /	199 000 / performance
FNO	Total expenditure 199 performances	34 365 000 /	172 000 / performance
GFO	Total expenditure 76 performances	15 130 000 /	199 000 / performance
ONP	Total expenditure 366 performances	133 378 000 /	364 000 / performance

Below the total expenditure of the case-study organisations is divided by number of employees, including the visiting artists. Again, the similarity in the numbers is fairly clear. The organisations differing most in this calculation are the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the *Opéra national de Paris*. Glyndebourne has many part-time staff members, this difference explaining the figure. In the case of the *Opéra national de Paris* the difference is more difficult to explain, since the staffing level of the organisation is the highest among the case-study organisations. Thus, it seems that either the organisation is not operated on as economical a basis as some of the other case-study organisations or the artistically more 'international' standard influences the expenditure structure of the organisation quite strongly.

DOB	Total expenditure 975 employees	51 142 000 /	52 000 / employee
ENO	Total expenditure 662 employees	38 530 000 /	58 000 / employee
FNO	Total expenditure	34 365 000 /	46 000 / employee

¹ The difference in the number of productions is accounted for the festival nature of the operations of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera.

755 employees

GFO	Total expenditure	15 130 000 /	25 000 / employee
	603 employees (many part-time)		
ONP	Total expenditure	133 378 000 /	79 000 / employee
	1688 employees		

8. Number of employees and the personnel structures of the case-study organisations

Information on the total numbers of employees and the personnel structures of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below. The first table contains the total number of employees and the second the personnel structures.

Total numbers of personnel of the case-study organisations:

- DOB 867 employees + 108 visiting artists = total 975
- ENO 570 + 92 visiting artists = total 662
- FNO 583 + 172 visiting artists = total 755
- GFO 603 including part-time personnel and visiting artists = total 603
- ONP 1388 + app. 300 visiting artists = total app. 1688

Division of the employed personnel of the case-study organisations:

- DOB Artistic personnel 417 (ensemble 45, ballet 53, chorus 100, orchestra 141, other artistic personnel 55), technical staff 332, administration 52, maintenance 66.
- ENO Artistic personnel 238 (ensemble 20, chorus 68, orchestra 79, other artistic personnel 71), technical staff 191, administration 57, front-of-house and maintenance staff 84.
- FNO Artistic personnel 355 (ensemble 29, ballet 80, chorus 60, orchestra 115, other artistic personnel 53, ballet school 18), technical staff 184, administration 44.
- GFO Artistic personnel 369 (principal singers 53, dancers 4, chorus 66, orchestras 118 + 36 – total 154, music staff 25, extras 25, other artistic personnel 42), administration (incl. maintenance) 118, technical and production personnel 116.
- ONP Artistic personnel 537 (ballet 152, chorus 95, orchestra 150, other artistic staff 88, ballet school 42), technical staff 537, administration 195, maintenance 119.

The information about the personnel structures is in a form which does not allow conclusive comparisons to be made. This is due to different categorisations of personnel structures etc. However, it is deemed useful that the information is available for informal comparisons even though any firm conclusions cannot be reliably made here. Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that the organisations that have in earlier comparisons displayed great similarity, i.e. the English National Opera and the Finnish National Opera, seem also to have fairly similar personnel structures when the effect of the ballet company is removed from the FNO figures. This might suggest that the artistic policy, the number of performances and the number of productions (all relatively similar between the ENO and the FNO) define the functions of the organisation to a great extent. However, the

corpus of the case studies is too small and does not fulfil the criteria for comparative analysis for this to be conclusively claimed here.

The aspect most worth noting in the personnel structure figures of the case-study organisations is that the artistic personnel is the biggest personnel category in all the case-study organisations. This, in itself, is not surprising. It was rather to be expected, as the artistic side of the analytical model of variables influencing the structures of opera organisations displayed a great number of different artistic roles. However, this fact makes even more surprising the finding presented earlier, that the artists – apart from the chorus and the orchestra – often seem to be missing from the organisational charts describing the case-study organisations. This phenomenon will be further commented on in the conclusion.

9. Opera Houses of the case-study organisations

Information on the opera houses used by the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

- DOB The New Charlottenburg Opera House was inaugurated in 1961. Capacity of 1900 seats, all facing the stage (i.e. democratic layout). The cross-shaped main stage is 18 x 18 m, with similar size wing (right wing stage slightly narrower) and rear stages. The lighting and sound technology were refitted in 1989, thus being state-of-the-art.
- ENO London Coliseum, built in 1904 as a variety hall. Auditorium capacity 2350. Stage 16 x 16 m, with very limited wing and rear-stage spaces. Technically fairly outdated, the limitations in space and stage-technology hinder effective working. Some of the workshops and majority of storage space located outside the theatre.
- FNO New Opera House, inaugurated in 1993. Main auditorium capacity 1365. Stage cross-shaped, size 16 x 16 metres with good wing and rear stage spaces. State-of-the-art equipment.
- GFO The new opera house was inaugurated in 1994 and has an auditorium capacity of 1200. The stage is 16 m x 16 m in size and has some wing and rear stage areas, though not completely cruciform-shaped. The technical facilities are state-of-the-art.
- ONP Two main venues: *Palais Garnier* and *Opéra Bastille*.
Garnier: Inaugurated in 1875. Auditorium capacity 1990. Stage size 28 x 24.5 m with wing space, but no real rear stage. Technology recently renovated, however, the historical importance of the building results in some difficulties in working practices.
Bastille: Inaugurated in 1990. Main auditorium capacity 2700. Stage highly automated, consisting of six interchangeable modules of 19.5 x 19.5 m. Additionally lots of storage space behind and underneath the stage. Technically state-of-the-art, now that initial problems have been solved.

Two of the opera houses used by the case-study organisations date from the 19th century (Palais Garnier 1875) or the early 20th century (London Coliseum 1904). The other four houses are relatively new, being built well after the Second World War. The older opera houses are both designed to conform to the more 'aristocratic' theatre tradition (tiered horse-shoe shape with gilded decorations and velvet materials) than the new ones. Descriptions of the new opera houses by the case-study organisations often emphasise the fact that the layout is 'democratic', providing good visibility from all the seats etc. This does not, however, prevent the theatres from having a tiered structure, which conforms to the older tradition and offers a good solution to the need to accommodate large

audiences in a limited amount of space¹. Often, the most notable visual difference in the new opera houses compared with the older ones are the colours and the materials. All the new houses use wood and light colours in the finishes of the auditorium and often dark material in the seats. The obvious aim has been to avoid gold and red, due to their 'aristocratic' connotations that would not suit the new 'democratic' opera houses. Thus the process of democratisation of the art-form of the bourgeois public sphere – pointed out earlier – has implications on the design of the new theatres as well. The auditorium capacities of the case-study organisations vary from 1200 to 2700 which reflects fairly well the limits of the general variation of opera auditoria in Europe. It seems that presenting large-scale opera for less than a thousand spectators would not make sense (especially economically) and audiences of well over 2500 would be difficult to accommodate in a way that would ensure visibility of the stage and acoustically ensure that the performance is adequately heard in the auditorium.

The stages of the case-study organisations seem to reflect great similarity, both in size and layout. The most notable exception is the *Palais Garnier* which differs both in size and layout due to the fact that it dates from an earlier historical period. Similar 'individuality' can also be seen in the London Coliseum, which – as should be born in mind – was not originally designed as an opera house. The other opera houses conform to the trend of uniformity of opera houses all having a cruciform stage, the size of the main stage being between 16 x 16 m and 19.5 x 19.5 m. The size of the stage, understandably, reflects the general size of the auditorium. Thus, the biggest stage is in *Opéra Bastille* which also has by far the biggest auditorium capacity. Also, the *Bastille* stage layout is 'the next step' from the cruciform stage, providing more space around the main stage for preparing and storing scenery etc.

Technically, the new opera houses seem to conform to a similar standard, the technical limitations of the older ones being referred to as problematic. This is inevitably a reflection of the fact that the main designers and directors move around internationally and expect to find similar facilities in all the opera houses. Thus, the opera houses need to conform to these expectations to be able to attract the most wanted artists. The technical improvements are also argued to have had an impact on the needed technical staffing levels required, reducing them due to improved working practices. Naturally, the need to conform to current

¹ This phenomenon was commented on earlier when discussing the physical limitations influencing the operations of an opera organisation.

technical expectations poses a problem to those older opera houses with limited space. It is often deemed difficult or impossible to expand or renovate the older theatres because of their cultural value or limitations in building space around them, as is the case with the London Coliseum. In contrast, the Royal Opera House has just gone through an extensive building project to ensure that its technical resources will be adequate in the future. This has been done, however, by respecting the old auditorium to protect the cultural historical value of the opera house, and has been made possible by the fact that there was space available around the original site.

10. Programming and performance numbers of the case-study organisations

The information on programming and performance numbers at the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

- DOB Total number of performances 195; 145 opera performances and 50 ballet performances. Additionally 10 opera performances on tour. Number of different productions 36, of which six new (four operas, two ballets). Programming principle – semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory fairly traditional, Wagner emphasised.
- ENO Total number of performances 193. 22 different productions, of which 9 new productions. The English National Ballet visited the theatre with 78 ballet performances. Programming principle – semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory relatively traditional, Händel and new English works included.
- FNO Total number of performances 199; 125 opera performances, 74 ballet performances. 20 different productions, of which 7 new productions (4 operas, 3 ballets). Programming principle – semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory fairly traditional apart from new Finnish works.
- GFO Total number of performances 76, all opera. Six different productions of which three new. Programming principle – semi-stagione. Programming relatively conservative, some less well known works included.
- ONP Total number of performances 366; 182 opera and 184 ballet. 195 performances in *Bastille* and 171 in *Garnier*. 34 different productions, of which 10 new (7 operas, 3 ballets). Programming principle – semi-stagione – repertory. Repertory conservative.

The total numbers of performances per annum are relatively similar in all the opera houses operating on a full-time basis¹, the total number of performances being just under 200 per annum. It seems reasonable to assume that this figure represents fairly well the highest possible number that can be achieved in one auditorium in reality, taking into account changing productions and staff vacations. The number of new productions per annum varies from Glyndebourne's three to the *Opéra National de Paris's* ten. The average for the full-time companies is eight new productions a year. Again, as the figures suggest a high degree of similarity, it seems reasonable to assume that this rate of renewal is deemed optimal in the framework of financial and practical constraints of a full-time opera company. The number of different productions in the programme of the case-study organisations per annum varies from Glyndebourne's six to *Deutsche*

¹ In this, *Opéra Bastille* and *Palais Garnier* are regarded as separate entities.

Oper Berlin's 38. The figure is higher for the 'bigger' companies, i.e. *Opéra national de Paris* and *Deutsche Oper Berlin* (34 and 38, respectively), compared with the 'smaller' full-time companies English and Finnish National Operas (22 and 20, respectively). The number of different performances in the repertory of the company might thus be one explanatory factor in the differences in the resources needed for a similar output in performance numbers.

The programming principle of all the case-study organisations is semi-stagione / repertory, i.e. combining aspects of both systems. Most case-study organisations have a core repertory upon which they can draw. The performances are then organised in semi-stagione manner, alternating a few productions during a short period of time. This is presumably the most effective way of making use of the international visiting artists, but on the other hand maintaining the economies of a core repertory. There are slight variations in the way in which the case-study organisations conduct their programming, some leaning more towards the repertory principle, e.g. *Deutsche Oper Berlin*, some more towards the semi-stagione principle.

The programming of all the case-study organisations is fairly conservative, concentrating mostly on the 19th century repertory. This, naturally, is the current (20th century) trend throughout the operatic world. The difference in the repertory is mainly reflected in national characteristics – e.g. *Deutsche Oper Berlin* presenting more Wagner than the other case-study organisations, or contemporary national composers gaining world-premieres in their national opera houses. Thus, it seems quite possible to claim that the quality context in which the case-study organisations operate is political-economic based on the categorisation of Nielsen. (Nielsen 1999.) The organisations need to choose the programme so that the auditorium is kept constantly full and the political authorities thus satisfied. Naturally, the effect of the director and the designers in the artistic quality of the repertory has not been taken into account in this consideration, it being within the sphere of the quality in art institution context. This can have quite an effect on the functioning of the organisation, as can be seen in the case of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin*. This is further commented on in the context of the sold capacities of the case-study organisations.

11. Ticket prices and the sold capacities of the case-study organisations

Information on the ticket prices and the sold capacities of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below.

DOB	Ticket prices	9 – 72 . Sold capacities 70% for opera, 41% for ballet.
ENO	Ticket prices	7 – 79. Sold capacities 75% (for the opera performances by the company).
FNO	Ticket prices	8 – 67. Sold capacities 91% for opera, 86% for ballet.
GFO	Ticket prices	14 – 170. Sold capacities not publicly available, amounting to, however, over 90%.
ONP	Ticket prices	5 – 99. Sold capacities: <i>Bastille</i> : 96% for opera, 82% for ballet. <i>Garnier</i> : 99% for opera, 97% for ballet.

The range of ticket prices of the case-study organisations is surprisingly similar in Euros. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera differs greatly due to its festival type of operations and due to the fact that it does not receive any public subsidies. The other organisation differing from an otherwise uniform pricing structure is the *Opéra national de Paris* which has both the lowest low end and the highest high end of the prices. This is partly explained by the more detailed pricing categorisation used in Paris, which allows both the low and the high end of the pricing structure to be extended to their limits.

The sold capacities of all the case-study organisations are high – around or above 90% – apart from the English National Opera and the Deutsche Oper Berlin. In the case of the ENO this is probably explained more by the characteristics of the London Coliseum than by not paying attention to the box-office figures. The London Coliseum auditorium has a relatively high number of seats that do not provide ideal conditions for opera spectators. Also, the auditorium size is quite large, possibly slightly too large for the scale of operations of the English National Opera. Thus, even 75 of the total auditorium capacity is equivalent to 1762 tickets being sold on average per performance. The case of the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* is slightly different. The sold capacities for opera and ballet are 70% and 41%, respectively. This seems to be more a policy decision by the *Generalintendant* Götz Friedrich than an inability to attract spectators if desired. Friedrich has obviously emphasised the art institution as the organisation's quality context rather than the political and economic quality context. Thus, he has aimed to provide interesting productions that have high artistic quality rather than making decisions on programming decisions and selection of the key artists on the basis of audience figures. This assumption was confirmed by both the

Senatsverwaltung für Kultur Senior Advisor, Guido Herrmann, and Financial Manager, Heinz-Dieter Sense, in the interviews. However, based on the fact that *Generalintendant* Friedrich is to resign in the near future, the political and economic quality context is likely to gain more ground in the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* in the future.

12. The artistic-financial decision-making structures of the case-study organisations

The analytical framework with which the variables influencing the opera organisation structures were analysed included a great number of artists involved in the artistic process. The initial overly ambitious aim of the research project was to analyse and map the forces inherent in the process of transforming the artistic vision into reality in the organisational framework of an opera organisation. This, however, proved to be impossible within the time-scale and resources available for the project. Nevertheless, some insight into the structures perceived through the analysis of the material about the case-study organisations was gained through interviews with the top management of the case-study organisations. The persons interviewed were, however, mainly directors and board members of the organisations and, apart from the artistic general directors, were not artists. Thus the information gathered mostly covers the area of the relationship of the 'official' organisational framework to the artistic production process, and not so much the actual artistic process. This would be a field for another research project to explore in the future.

The organisational approach of the case-study organisations to the artistic-financial dichotomy is defined by reference to the systemic tools in these relationships in the first place. The starting point for the artistic-financial planning process seems in most cases to be an artistic one; a vision of the artistic future of the organisation is created. Subsequently, this vision is gradually worked towards an executable plan that takes into account the financial and organisational limitations of the organisation concerned – i.e. brings the artistic vision to the systemic level. Thus, a detailed plan stating the programming, the key artistic personnel and the resources available is drawn up. Control of this plan – often incorporated in the funding agreements of the organisation and in the contracts of the artistic personnel – takes place on two levels in most of the case-study organisations. The first and most obvious one is the systemic level; i.e. enforceability of the contracts and agreements. However, most of the general directors interviewed emphasised that this is not always effective in relation to the artistic realm the organisation needs to deal with. Thus, the personal negotiation skills of the general director and his/her ability to balance the artistic and the organisational goals of the organisation become the most important tools in balancing artistic-economic decision-making. Thus, the success of an opera organisation seems to be connected to the general director's ability to engage in a process of

communicative interaction with the artistic side (the artists involved) of opera production. This issue is further commented on in the next chapter presenting the conclusions of the research project.

11. CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

Based on the organisational information and the organisational charts for the case study organisations presented above, several observations and conclusions can be made. These are mainly divided into two different areas: the artistic-economic dichotomy in the organisational structures of opera organisations at the organisational level, and the general framework of opera organisations incorporating the value systems and the quality assumptions defined above. The dual organisational structure is first discussed in this chapter and then a holistic model describing the organisational framework of opera organisations proposed. This analytical model brings together the model created for the analysis of the case-study organisations and the case-study findings. Additionally, some practical implications of this model and the forces included in it will be pointed out. Also, some issues linked to the research project will be commented on. These include certain limitations in the approach used and some new research questions arising from the material of the research.

2. The dual organisational structure; artistic and organisational

One of the main findings of the research project is that there is a dual organisational structure in many opera companies: artistic and organisational. This finding is validated by extensive analyses of five major European opera houses and interviews with key persons involved in their management. This finding is discussed and argued for below. It presents the main manifestation of the artistic-economic dichotomy in the organisational structures of the opera companies analysed.

In the structures of the organisations analysed, the first thing that seems surprising is the absence, or relative unimportance, of the key artistic players in the artistic process¹ and the small role of the numerically largest personnel group, the artists. It seems unreasonable to assume that the star conductors, stage directors and

¹ These were highlighted in the artistic side of the analytical model.

singers are happy to accept the place they have been allocated at the lowest level of the organisation charts - needing in effect to go through the whole 'chain of command' before reaching the general director. Rather, they should be included in the top layers of the organisations. Based on this observation – and the undeniable power and influence these key players have on the functioning of opera organisations (demonstrated for example by the fees the organisations are willing to pay for their services) – it seems more likely that a dual organisational structure exists in the organisations concerned. In the organisations analysed there is an official organisational structure – dealing with the organisational and socio-economic side of the organisation – and an unofficial artistic one – dealing with the artistic side of the opera production process. This is well in line with the argument made earlier that opera as an art-form is a civil society / lifeworld phenomenon and thus operates in the realm of communicative interaction. Thus, the official organisational structure – operating on the system level – is ultimately incapable of dealing with the art form and thus needs to rely on the person of the general director in doing this.

Based on the above it seems reasonable to claim that the role of the organisation with its official organisational structure is to cater for the artistic production process managed more or less directly by the general director (as the artistic director of the organisation) through communicative interaction somewhat 'outside' the organisational domain. The organisation serves this process – under the temporary artistic authority granted by the General Director to the key artists in the production team – with its planning and production department, music department, ballet, technical department and administrative department.¹ The role of the Managing Director is then to ensure that the organisation complies with the financial and organisational expectations of surrounding society – i.e. the system level. This is reflected in the organisational structures which outline the resources needed for opera production (in the division of the above mentioned departments), but do not acknowledge the organisational powers of the key artistic personnel in the artistic production process. This leads inevitably to conflicts and confusions of authority (organisational versus artistic) in the organisations, as anyone familiar with the everyday work of an opera organisations knows well.

¹ This is the basic organisational division detected in all the case-study organisations. Naturally, in bigger organisations these functions may have been divided between several departments, as is the case in the *Opéra national de Paris*, for example.

This dual organisational structure, and the friction it often causes, is the key manifestation of the artistic-economic dichotomy in opera organisations. It represents the solution to the need to combine the artistic success criteria and the organisational-economic success criteria in producing opera. In effect, thus, both sides of the artistic-economic dichotomy are managed as individual co-existing entities. This is done, and the relationship is balanced mainly by the general director, as will be described in the model presented below in section 4 of this chapter.

3. *The socio-economic framework*


One of the preliminary assumptions of the research project was that the socio-economic framework in which a specific opera organisation exists influences its organisational structure considerably. As can be seen from the organisational charts, this is the case at the 'Board of Directors' level of the organisations, but does not seem to filter any deeper into the actual organisational structures - apart from the value and quality assumptions discussed separately below. This places the general director of an opera organisation in a difficult balancing act between three types of forces: the artistic forces not directly dealt with by his organisation, the socio-economic forces influencing his organisation in the form of the Board of Directors (or equivalent) and the audience (Box Office), and the organisational forces (as the manager of an organisation - even though in this the managing director can provide support).

This claim can be supported by brief examples. In the interviews included in the case-study analyses, the directors were asked about the systems by which the artistic production process can be, and is, controlled. In the answers the importance of contracts was stressed, acknowledging that the bargaining power of the key artists extended beyond the legal organisational realm and that in the event of a dispute (artistic or artistic-financial) the general director plays a key role in solving the tensions and negotiating a solution to the problematic situation. Similarly, in the interviews the representatives of the boards and the funding bodies stressed the (relative) artistic autonomy of the general directors admitting, however, that the choice of the director is a key policy decision in the artistic sense. This provides the Board with an opportunity to influence the organisation and its future policy by this selection.

4. The model combining the analytical model and the case-study findings

Based on the argumentation above the organisational forces involved in managing an opera organisation can be described as a tripartite model, the central role being taken by the general director. The creation of this model is among the key results of the research project. The model includes the artistic process taking place somewhat outside the organisational domain, the official organisational structure serving the artistic process and dealing with the systemic expectations of society, and the socio-economic framework in which the organisation needs to operate including the different value and quality assumptions. This model is presented below in figure 21. It is argued here that the forces – often contradictory – surrounding an opera organisation can be mapped and analysed with its help.

Figure 21.



5. Practical applications of the model created

As a demonstration of the practical usefulness of the model, let us consider some examples of the most frequently occurring problems and arguments concerning

opera organisations (e.g. financial carelessness and mismanagement) and the problems in the relationship between the general director and the managing director (and the whole discussion on whether the organisations should be managed by an artist or by a professional manager). The key to understanding these problems seems to be the value assumptions attached to the resources allocated to the organisation, and the different contexts of quality discussion in which the different instances operate. The general director is in the position where s/he needs to evaluate the importance of these value sets and contexts of quality discussion to his/her organisation. His/her success in this balancing act – determining the organisation's artistic policy and managerial practices – determines the success of the whole organisation.

The relationship between the organisation and the artistic production team (assumed to be aiming for artistically high quality production – arts institution as quality context) has earlier been shown to be mediated by the general director - apart from the direct influence and authority given to the artistic team over the organisation in order to realise the production. Should the general director choose to accept the 'arts institution' as the organisation's sole context of quality discourse, the organisation would completely facilitate the artists in their quest. However, as the organisation experiences influences from the economic side of the equation as well - state and market oriented expectations of accountability and efficiency (with quality discussed in the political and economic context), and civil society oriented expectations by the society (with lifeworld as quality context) a balance needs to be found. Accusations of financial carelessness and mismanagement intrude when the general director has balanced the equation in favour of the artistic production team, causing the issues of accountability and efficiency to be placed in a secondary position. In effect, the question is about prioritising the artistic output of the organisation rather than the market oriented expectations of financial accountability.

Naturally, the inability of the general director to successfully balance the expectations of the 'arts institution' and the society providing the resources for his organisation can also be manifested as problems between the general director and the managing director, whose primary function is to assure the efficacy of the organisation in organisational and financial terms. These problems, occurring frequently, have led to different solutions in different value frameworks. For example, in the *Deutsche Oper Berlin* there seems to be a trend to move from the situation of one 'Generalintendant' towards two equal Directors (Artistic Director - Managing Director) structure (Herrmann 1998.) in the future. On the

other hand, Richard Eyre recommends an arrangement at the Royal Opera House with a single Artistic Director (Intendant) at the top of the organisation assisted by general manager rather than the general director having a managerial background, as has been the case recently. (Eyre 1998, 106.) However, it seems that both systems can produce good as well as catastrophic results. The answer to this dilemma is the top management's ability to correctly read the value and quality expectations of the forces influencing their organisations and balance them successfully, not the number, job definitions or backgrounds of the top directors. Naturally, a change in the managerial structure of an opera organisation in difficulties can provide a scapegoat for the parties responsible. However, without proper consideration of the value and quality issues in the future management of the organisation, this hardly provides a lasting solution.

6. Wider implications of the findings of the research project

Apart from its usefulness in the analysis of the framework in which opera organisations operate, the model created here has some wider implications as well. These fall mainly into two categories: the potential for generalising the findings outside the realm of opera organisations and the implications for arts management education.

The model was based on the analysis of opera organisations and their socio-economic framework. However, it may be possible to generalise the findings beyond the art form of opera as there are only limited references to opera-specific issues in the model. Naturally, there is no firm basis for this, as the research project concentrated on opera organisations. However, looking at the issue from the other direction, one could ask why opera should differ from other art-forms in the way it is organised and managed in its socio-economic framework. The artistic-economic dichotomy (defined as the tension between the artistic and the economic-organisational goals of the arts organisation) is common to all art forms. Thus, why would the forces influencing art organisations in general be any different from the forces influencing opera organisations. Therefore, analysis of the framework of all arts organisations based on the values and quality contexts is essential to the functioning of these organisations in the future.

Furthermore, as the issues of the value assumptions of the society in question and the issues concerning different quality contexts seem – based on the model

created here – to form the core forces influencing the functioning of an opera organisation, these issues should, accordingly, form the core of education for potential opera directors. Should it be possible to generalise the findings to other art-forms as well, this would be applicable to all arts management education. Thus, the education of future arts managers should include the value and quality concepts for the students to be able to deal with them successfully in their future careers. Naturally, an arts manager will need the practical tools required to manage the official organisational structure of his/her organisation in the future, too. However, as the artistic and socio-economic frameworks are currently going through a process of change, the ability to analyse and conceptualise the value and quality issues will be of increasing importance, especially to the top-level managers of arts organisations. The importance of the value and quality issues is also relevant to the people operating at lower organisational levels in arts organisations. As was pointed out earlier, there are numerous conflicts and confusions of authority resulting from the fact that a dual organisational structure exists in opera organisations. If arts management education is able to conceptualise and model this phenomenon to the people working on the administrative-organisational side of arts organisations it would inevitably be easier to deal with this tension. Naturally, the higher position the person has in the organisation, the more useful – if not essential – these considerations will be.

7. Limitations of the research and possible new research questions

The initial aim of the research project was to map the forces influencing the organisational structures of opera companies and also the decision-making processes, especially in conjunction with the artistic-economic dichotomy. This was to be done by analysing several case-study organisations. This approach, however, soon proved that it was impossible to include the artistic decision-making processes in the research project in a conclusive way. It could be argued that analysing and mapping these forces could be done successfully in only one organisation at a time with extensive participative observation. The omission of artistic decision-making from the research project has naturally biased the approach more to the organisational side. However, it is argued that with the initial analysis of the structures of opera organisations made in this research project, it will be easier to tackle the subtle issues of artistic decision-making in future research. This research project has thus provided a useful starting point and defined an interesting new topic for a possible future research project.

The analysis of the case-study organisations seemed to suggest that there is a strong correlation between the artistic policy of the organisation and the resources needed for the realisation of its artistic aims. This was most evident when comparing the English National Opera and the Finnish National Opera, with regard to both their artistic policies and their numerical and structural information. However, as the case-study material was not collected in a way that would enable comparative study in a strict sense, this correlation can only be suggested. It would be interesting to conduct a similar research project with a set of case-studies that would from the outset be selected on the basis of similar artistic policy and numbers of performances and new productions annually. Based on the analysis of data selected in this way, i.e. according to stricter principles of comparative study, the findings suggested here could be confirmed. Another potential research topic thus arises from the findings of and limitations contained in this research project.

The limitation of the case-study organisations to the framework of Western Europe – due to the withdrawal of the Metropolitan Opera Association – has provided data that may not represent the global picture of the issues dealt with. The North American situation especially would provide an interesting comparison to the data presented here. Also, the former Eastern European countries might provide a different perspective to the artistic-economic dichotomy in opera

organisations. Thus, similar research with a wider geographical spread of the case-study organisations would be worthwhile conducting in the future in order to provide further validation for the findings presented here.

What is most important, however, is that research into the issues of quality and values included in the management of arts organisations should receive attention. Most often arts management research deals with issues on the economic side of the artistic-economic dichotomy. However, the questions of quality of the artistic output of the organisations and the values on which the management of arts organisations is based are crucial ones that must be contemplated and analysed. The model created in the course of this research project is an attempt to approach these issues within the discipline of arts management with tools created elsewhere in academic discussion. However, further investigations of these matters and of the applicability of the model created here still need be carried out.

8. Conclusion

In this thesis a research project into opera organisational structures has been described and the findings and conclusions presented. It has been shown that a dual organisational structure exists in the opera organisations analysed: artistic and official organisational structures. This division is further explained and analysed considering opera as a civil society phenomenon, especially in the bourgeois public sphere. The value systems and quality expectations of state, market and civil society are also considered within this framework. The main result and culmination of the research project is the model created for describing and analysing these forces – including the organisational aspects – that influence opera organisations both from the artistic and the socio-economic sides. With the help of this model the often contradictory forces and expectations that make opera management difficult can be considered and analysed, academically as well as practically. This, it is hoped, will provide assistance in the actual process of managing an opera organisation in a successful manner. This seems to be increasingly necessary if the art-form – greatly loved by the author – is to survive in the future.

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APPENDIX I

INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM THE CASE-STUDY ORGANISATIONS

1) Legal status

Information about the legal status of the organisation, i.e. state legislation where organisation's status is defined, association's articles, regulations and legal mission statement etc., whichever are applicable to the organisation concerned and which define its legal framework.

2) Composition of Board of Directors

List of the members of the Board of Directors and their background (state representative, politician, benefactor, employees' representative etc.) and the criteria of appointments (statutory, election, nomination etc.).

3) Organisational structure / chart

Organisational chart describing the top layers of the organisation, especially the relationship between board of directors, general management and artistic management. Information about the background of the persons in the top management included in the chart (artistic background, managerial background, political background etc.).

4) Income/expenditure information

Information about the income/expenditure structure of the organisation. Especially information about revenues is essential, i.e. box office (subscriptions and other), contributions (sponsorship and private), subsidies (state and municipal) in as detailed form as possible. This information can be provided in the form of annual report, accounts etc.

5) Basic employee information

Numerical information about the personnel employed, i.e. size of permanent ensemble, chorus, orchestra, technical staff, workshop staff, administrative staff etc.

including the total number of employees. Numbers of in-house artistic staff (soloists, conductors, directors, designers) versus 'per production' contracted artistic staff, if applicable.

6) Basic venue details

Basic information about the venue(s) used; seating capacities, size(s) of stage(s) and general technical information.

7) Programming and pricing information

Information about current programming and pricing. If information about audiences and capacities sold is available, this is most welcome.